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  This thesis offers a comprehensive account of Ralf Dahrendorf’s liberal 
political thought between the early 1950s and the late 1980s, with particular 
emphasis on the role that his methodological ideas played in his conception of 
politics. It argues that materialist conceptions, borrowed from Karl Marx and other 
materialist theorists, informed his liberal outlook throughout his career, 
transcending his early abandonment of political socialism. Situating Dahrendorf 
within a tradition of debate about necessity and contingency in German social 
thought from the end of the First World War to the Positivism Dispute of the late 
1950s and early 1960s and the cultural turn of the 1970s and the 1980s, the work 
studies his attempt to overcome the social-scientific ideas of Talcott Parsons and 
other structural-functionalists and to recast sociology as a causality-oriented 
discipline that takes interests and social structure rather than ideas and values as its 
subject. This also affected Dahrendorf’s academic politics. Examining his role in 
the foundation of the University of Constance between 1964 and 1966, it shows 
how an anti-idealist critique of German higher education and political culture 
informed his attempt to create an institution for the social sciences that could break 
the perceived dominance of the humanities and overcome the central role of Law 
departments in the formation of the Federal Republic’s elite. 
  The final two chapters discuss Dahrendorf’s engagement with 
neoconservatism and neoliberalism. Covering his interaction with scholars such as 
Daniel Bell and Samuel Huntington at settings including the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and the Trilateral Commission in the wake of the 
student movement, it discusses the development of his ideas vis-à-vis an emerging 
consensus that politics had turned into a cultural – rather than socio-economic – 
conflict. Finally, the thesis discusses Dahrendorf’s critique of Friedrich Hayek, 
Thatcherism, and constitutional economics during the 1980s. Here, it highlights a 
divergence between Dahrendorf’s agonistic liberalism and a new liberalism built 
on the assumption that the vast influence of ideas meant that politics was highly 
contingent and unpredictable. Combining the history of political thought and the 
history of the social sciences, this thesis revises established readings of Dahrendorf 
as a straightforward ‘Cold War liberal’. By doing so, it provides a new perspective 
on the history of liberalism and political thought more broadly before and after the 
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Introduction: Ralf Dahrendorf’s Question 
 
‘I have sometimes dreamt of the weatherman after the television news being followed by 
a “social processes man” who points at various parts of the globe and describes the 
unstable and thunderous condition in the Middle East, the stable high-pressure area over 
the Soviet Union, and the disturbing influence of Atlantic depressions on Europe.’ (Ralf 
Dahrendorf, ‘Disjunction and Analysis’, London Review of Books 3, 19 February 1981.) 
 
  In November 1997, writing for the left-liberal German weekly DIE ZEIT, 
Ralf Dahrendorf cautioned his contemporaries about the advent of an authoritarian 
century that he saw arising from the social, economic, and political consequences of 
an ever more globalizing and interconnected world.2 As a political liberal, he 
welcomed a more open and dynamic world that had introduced values such as ‘self-
reliance and individual initiative’ that, he argued, had been discounted for too long.3 
Yet as a methodological materialist, Dahrendorf also worried about the rise of a new 
social conflict as a consequence of the latest instance of the ‘revolutions of the 
productive forces’.4 A new divide had materialized between members of the ‘global 
class’, who were able to take advantage of new international opportunities, and those 
parts of the world population who either did not wish to or could not do so.5 Dahrendorf 
                                                      
2 Earlier versions of some passages of this introduction have been published as part of Marius 
Strubenhoff, ‘Materialist Method, Agonistic Liberalism: Revisiting Ralf Dahrendorf’s Political 
Thought’, History of Political Thought 39 (2018). Chapter II draws on revised material from the same 
publication. Chapter I draws on Marius Strubenhoff, ‘The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology, 
1954-1970’, History of European Ideas 44 (2018). The title of this introduction takes inspiration from 
Wilhelm Hennis, Max Webers Fragestellung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987). 
3 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Die Globalisierung und ihre sozialen Folgen werden zur nächsten 
Herausforderung einer Politik der Freiheit’, DIE ZEIT, 14 November 1997: ‘Selbständigkeit und 
Eigentätigkeit’. 
4 ibid: ‘Revolutionen der Produktivkräfte’. 




detected symptoms of this new conflict in the rise of regional separatism in places like 
Quebec, Scotland, and Northern Italy, and in the rise of political and religious 
fundamentalism across the globe. What made the new conflict problematic, he argued, 
was that the negative side effects of globalization were transnational and thus 
impossible to be controlled by democratic nation-states. With democracy’s 
ineffectiveness in the face of larger social forces becoming clearer, a new basis of 
support for authoritarian political solutions was growing that would have dramatic 
consequences in the next century.6  
  In his warning about the coming authoritarianism of the twenty-first century, 
Dahrendorf was concerned with the future. He directed his attention to new social 
structures and realities that, though already under way, would only reveal their full 
political implications in later years. Dahrendorf had been working on such questions 
for decades. As he told a correspondent in November 1977, ‘the intention of class 
theory both in Marx and in my own approach is to predict events rather than 
attitudes...’.7 Dahrendorf’s objective was what Reinhart Koselleck has described as the 
distinct concern of modern political theorists since the French Revolution: the attempt 
to gauge the future consequences of socio-economic processes and historical changes.8 
Prior to the later eighteenth century, Koselleck argued, political ideas had been 
informed by cyclical philosophies of history that ruled out that anything 
                                                      
6 ibid. 
7 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/78, Ralf Dahrendorf to Robert Robinson, 21 November 
1977. 
8 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Geschichliche Prognose in Lorenz v. Steins Schrift zur preußischen 
Verfassung’, in Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt: 




‘fundamentally new’ could happen.9 For Koselleck, the move away from these notions 
of recurring history profoundly influenced modern political thought. Indeed, from 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx in the nineteenth century to Max Weber and 
Joseph Schumpeter at the beginning of the century to the modernization theorists and 
futurologists of the post-war period, many political theorists were concerned with 
present and future implications of socio-economic change.10 Philosophers, too, became 
more interested in making sense of historical change after the turn that Koselleck 
identified: the questions that G.F.W. Hegel was asking in this respect were not those 
of, say, René Descartes or Thomas Hobbes. In The Will to Power, Friedrich Nietzsche 
for his part wrote that ‘[w]hat I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe 
what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This 
history can be related even now; for necessity itself is at work here’.11 
  And yet, what for Koselleck was characteristic of the modern outlook was 
never an uncontested consensus. In a review of Dahrendorf’s Lifechances published in 
the London Review of Books in 1980, the Oxford philosopher Stuart Hampshire 
vehemently criticized the book for its ‘desultory and unfocused argument’ and its 
                                                      
9 ibid., 88: ‘prinzipiell Neues’. 
10 For the post-war social sciences, cf. Jenny Andersson, The Future of the World: Futurology, 
Futurists, and the Struggle for the Post Cold War Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018); Elke Seefried, Zukünfte: Aufstieg und Krise der Zukunftsforschung 1945-1980 (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2015); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Kaya Tolon, ‘Futures Studies: A New Social 
Science Rooted in Cold War Strategic Thinking’, in Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens (eds.), Cold 
War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  





‘generalised lucubrations and mild meanderings’.12 More worryingly, Hampshire 
found, the publication was  
 
also the symptom of a well-established academic disease, which spreads into journalism 
and corrupts political argument. Consider the two questions put on page 40: ‘What is the 
direction of the processes which move human societies?’ and ‘Where is the driving force 
of history?’ It is a very large assumption that there actually exists such a direction, or that 
there exists ‘a driving force of history’.13 
 
Further, Hampshire faulted Dahrendorf for assuming that ‘there is such a thing as the 
development of humanity as a whole, as opposed to the several and divergent 
developments of different empires and different populations’.14 For Hampshire, 
Dahrendorf’s book was just another example of the misguided search for meaning in 
history, of which Hegelianism, Marxism, and positivism were major examples.15 
Instead, Hampshire advocated going back to the philosophies of history of Machiavelli 
and Vico. With his emphasis on ‘Fortune’, Machiavelli was allegedly much better 
equipped to account for individuality and contingency in history. Vico’s cyclical 
philosophy of history, in turn, was a useful antidote against Dahrendorf's assumption 
of driving forces and directions.16  
  Hampshire’s review of Life Chances was not the first time Dahrendorf was 
confronted with this reproach. Twelve years earlier, in the discussion of his paper on 
                                                      








‘Domination, Class Relations, and Stratification’ at the German Sociological 
Association’s (GSA) Sixteenth Conference in April 1968, Theodor Adorno framed one 
of his objections to Dahrendorf’s work as follows:  
 
Now, as far as modesty towards the future is concerned I can only repeat 
what I said yesterday; that prognosis is not the purpose of emphatic theory. 
This would actually be relevant to a debate on positivism, as for positivism 
all categories of verification [Bewährungskategorien] are of the prognostic 
kind.17 
  
Neither was Hampshire an isolated figure on the question of the ‘meaning’ and 
direction of history, particularly within the tradition of twentieth-century liberalism 
that Dahrendorf is commonly associated with.18 Thus, Karl Popper’s The Poverty of 
Historicism and the postscript to his The Logic of Scientific Discovery pressed the case 
of the ‘indeterminacy of history’ against Marxist historical materialism on the logical 
ground that since history was so profoundly influenced by the ‘growth of human 
knowledge’, a fact that even ‘those who see in our ideas, including our scientific ideas, 
merely the by-products of material developments’ needed to admit, the future could 
not be predicted by scientific means, as nobody could predict the future growth of 
                                                      
17 Quoted in Heinrich Popitz, ‘Herrschaft, Klassenverhältnis und Schichtung: Protokoll der Diskussion 
(Diskussionsleiter Heinrich Popitz)’, in Theodor Adorno (ed.), Spätkapitalismus oder 
Industriegesellschaft? Verhandlungen des Sechzehnten Deutschen Soziologentages (Stuttgart: 
Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1969), 103: ‘Nun, was die Zurückhaltung in bezug auf die Zukunft anlangt, so 
kann ich dazu nur wiederholen, was ich gestern sagte; daß der Sinn emphatischer Theorie nicht die 
Prognose ist. Das gehörte eigentlich in den Zusammenhang einer Positivismus-Debatte, denn im 
Positivismus sind die Bewährungskategorien für die Wahrheit allesamt prognostischer Art.’ 




knowledge.19 Popper’s critique of historicism entailed opposition to the notion that 
certain ideas were inherently linked to specific historical periods, as he made clear in 
a review of Friedrich Engel-Janosi’s The Growth of German Historicism:  
 
He seems to believe that historicism is ‘dated’, i.e., that it was a nineteenth century 
phenomenon whose ‘very basis ... came to an end’ (p.17) with Nietzsche’s Vom Nutzen 
und Nachteil der Historie fuer das Leben. (I do not agree, by the way, with the author’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche who, I believe, never ceased to be a historicist: ‘futurism’ is 
always a version of historicism.) But the very idea that doctrines are in this sense ‘dated’ 
is a historicist doctrine – indeed a nineteenth century doctrine which, however, is 
unfortunately still very much alive. Other historicist doctrines which the author seems to 
adopt are: the unanalysed, naive acceptance of the existence of historical collectives (the 
author speaks of ‘individuals’, using a Germanism analysed by Professor Hayek in this 
Journal, Vol. X, p.57) such as nations, and especially periods; the doctrine that history 
has to grasp the unique character (‘individuality’) of ‘a person, a nation or a period’ 
(p.67)...20 
 
Consequently, students of Popper who attempted to analyze social change using 
collective nouns for discrete periods in history had to be prepared to be criticized by 
their teacher, as Ernest Gellner was for the use of ‘historicism’ in Thought and 
Change.21 Dahrendorf’s sociology invoked similar suspicions on the part of Popper’s 
student Hans Albert. In a letter to Popper, Albert outlined the current state of sociology 
                                                      
19 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), v-vi. 
20 Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Sir Karl R. Popper Papers, [accessed at Popper Library, 
University of Klagenfurt], 35/19, Karl Popper, ‘Review of F. Engel-Janosi, The Growth of German 
Historicism’, in Economica 12/48 (1945). 
21 Gellner argued that he was merely using historicist language for lack of alternatives: cf. Hoover 





in Germany for the purpose of briefing him for the GSA’s meeting in October 1961 in 
Tübingen, where Popper was to speak alongside Adorno. Even though Dahrendorf’s 
work displayed awareness of Logik der Forschung, Albert noted that he lately seemed 
to have developed an ‘inclination to resume the older, more historically oriented 
German sociology’.22  
  In his famous Auguste Comte Lecture on ‘Historical Inevitability’, delivered 
on 12 May 1953 at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Isaiah 
Berlin took the issue even further than Popper, who to his mind was not stringent 
enough in differentiating the social from the natural sciences.23 An Oxonian friend of 
Hampshire, Berlin dismissed the notion that history was governed by ‘inexorable’ 
forces in which human agency did not feature, and that prediction should be part of the 
work of historians and social scientists.24 Similarly, in The Counter-Revolution of 
Science, Friedrich Hayek attacked sociology and the philosophy of history that he 
thought it was based on. According to Hayek, the attempt to discover causal laws of 
historical progress and change was the ‘darling vice’ of the nineteenth century, 
informing the work of Hegel, Comte, Marx, and other social theorists. Hayek thought 
that there was no reason to believe that ‘one kind of “system” must as a matter of 
historical necessity be superseded by a new and different “system”’.25 Hayek cautioned 
against the use of methods copied from the natural sciences that were inapplicable to 
                                                      
22 Hoover Institution Archives, Sir Karl R. Popper Papers, 267/13, Hans Albert to Karl Popper, 6 May 
1961: ‘Neigung … die Tradition der älteren, mehr historisch ausgerichteten deutschen Soziologie 
wieder aufzunehmen’. 
23 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Historical Inevitability’, in Isaiah Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on 
Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 101. 
24 ibid., 96. 
25 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason (London: 




the different nature of social research. Criticizing ‘positivist’ sociology, Hayek insisted 
that there were no ‘objective facts’ in society: ‘So far as human actions are concerned 
the things are what the acting think they are’.26 If it made sense at all to speak of social 
structure, it consisted of ideas and concepts men held in their minds.27  
  For Popper, Berlin, and Hayek, the assumption that history was a contingent 
process was inextricably linked to the conviction that ideas were predominant factors 
in history. In his ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin argued: 
 
when ideas are neglected by those who ought to attend to them – that is to say, those who 
have been trained to think critically about ideas – they sometimes acquire an unchecked 
momentum and an irresistible power over multitudes of men that may grow too violent to 
be affected by rational criticism. Over a hundred years ago, the German poet Heine 
warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas: philosophical concepts 
nurtured in the stillness of a professor’s study could destroy a civilization.28 
 
Five years earlier, Berlin had already criticized the notion that history is determined by 
material forces in his Comte Memorial Lecture at the LSE.29 While working on the 
lecture manuscript, Berlin wrote to Popper that he would have Morris Ginsberg, head 
of the LSE Department of Sociology, proofread the manuscript ‘so that I say nothing 
too grossly unfair about sociology, much as I dislike it’.30 Popper’s The Open Society 
and its Enemies attached a similar degree of importance to ideas, depicting Plato, 
                                                      
26 ibid., 26-7. 
27 ibid., 34. 
28 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Berlin, Liberty, 167. 
29 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Historical Inevitability’, passim. 





Hegel, and Marx’s ideas as the main sources of totalitarianism. Hayek agreed with 
Popper that the ideas of great minds were dominant in history, adding Descartes, Saint-
Simon, and Comte to the list of negative influences.31 The conviction that ideas 
mattered led him to non-determinist conclusions: 
 
If the politician has no choice but to adopt a certain course of action (or if his action is 
regarded as inevitable by the historian), this is because his or other people’s opinion, not 
objective facts, allow him no alternative. It is only to people who are influenced by certain 
beliefs that anyone’s response to given events may appear to be uniquely determined by 
circumstances.32 
 
Hayek also distrusted ‘that peculiarly unhistorical approach to history which 
paradoxically is called historicism, much of what has been known as sociology during 
the last hundred years, and especially its most fashionable and most ambitious branch, 
the sociology of knowledge’.33  
  In contrast to Berlin, Popper, and Hayek, Raymond Aron’s work paid more 
attention to sociological aspects. Reviewing Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty for the 
European Journal of Sociology, which he had set up with Dahrendorf and the British 
Marxist sociologist Thomas Bottomore in 1960, Aron argued in 1961 that the rule of 
men over men could never be completely eliminated from human societies. Thus, he 
rejected Hayek’s absolute insistence on the importance of the rule of law as a tool to 
                                                      
31 For Descartes, cf. Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge, 2013 [1973-
1979]), 17-9. For Saint-Simon and Comte, cf. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science. 
32 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 2009 [1960]), 97. 




circumscribe the arbitrary rule of men.34 In a follow-up article, Aron emphasized that 
for Tocqueville, the political consequences of ‘democracy’ mainly arose from 
democracy as a new form of society more than democracy as a new constitutional 
type.35 Aron’s intellectual pursuits were preoccupied with the analysis of the 
implications of different forms of societies for politics. And yet, he thought that there 
was a considerable element of freedom and choice open to humans. Thirty years 
earlier, in a review of the work of Henri de Man, he had maintained that ‘the margin 
of indeterminacy contained within a given situation corresponds precisely with the 
power of our will. It is the belief in determinism which is the cause of our servitude. 
Faith in our will can be the basis of our autonomy.’36 Influenced by the contemporary 
publication of Marx’s earlier writings, he argued that materialist interpretations of 
Marx did not capture the theorist.37 Aron’s Introduction to the Philosophy of History 
(1938), in his own words, sought to demonstrate ‘the impossibility of a purely causal 
historical or social science’.38  
  By the early 1960s, Aron had moved away from this radical position. In 
Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society, he remarked: ‘Twenty years ago, in my 
Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire, I entirely accepted this relativistic 
epistemology ... Today, I am not so sure, and having indicated ... how dangerous it is 
to give universal validity to one view of social phenomena, I should like to suggest that 
                                                      
34 Raymond Aron, ‘La définition libérale de la liberté: I: A propros du livre de F.A. Hayek “The 
Constitution of Liberty”’, European Journal of Sociology 2 (1961), 210. 
35 Raymond Aron, ‘La définition libérale de la liberté: II: Alexis de Tocqueville et Karl Marx’, 
European Journal of Sociology 5 (1964), 159. 
36 Cited in Robert Colquhoun, Raymond Aron Vol. I (London: Sage, 1986), 162. 
37 ibid., 162-5. 
38 Raymond Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of Historical 




it is hardly less dangerous to regard all interpretations as relative’.39 Aron also 
abandoned his earlier insistence on the importance of Marx’s early writings. Now, he 
offered a Capital-centric reading that downplayed the ‘youthful or marginal writings’ 
that hailed from a period in which Marx ‘certainly knew Hegel better than he knew 
capitalism’.40 
  Aron’s engagement with the student movement effected a second 
discontinuity. In his early years, like Dahrendorf, he was fascinated by the works of 
Karl Mannheim. Aron, however, turned against Mannheim in the late 1960s, having 
come to associate Mannheim’s thought with Claude Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, 
Louis Althusser, and Jacques Lacan.41 While having moved away from the radical 
position of Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Aron continued to emphasize 
historical contingency. When commenting on determinism and causality, Aron 
frequently took recourse to Weber’s probabilistic understanding of causation.42 Aron 
was convinced that ideas were influential in public life, and opposed the idea that 
socio-economic factors would automatically give rise to certain ideas and 
institutions.43 Attributing importance to ideas in a way that many other post-war social 
scientists did not, Aron disagreed with convergence theories (which argued that the 
economic-political models of East and West would converge due to developmental 
                                                      
39 Raymond Aron, Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1961), 
27. 
40 Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976 [1965]), 
112-4. 
41 Max Likin, ‘“Nothing fails like Success”: The Marxism of Raymond Aron’, French Politics, 
Culture & Society 26 (2008), 45-6. 
42 Daniel Mahoney, ‘The Politic Liberal Rationalism of Raymond Aron’, Polity 24 (1992), 697.  
43 Tony Judt, ‘Introduction’, in Raymond Aron, The Dawn of Universal History (New York: Basic 
Books, 2003), xiii-xiv; Daniel Mahoney, ‘Aron, Marx, and Marxism: An Interpretation’, European 




factors inherent in modernization) that were prevalent among social scientists in the 
1950s and 1960s.44 In his book on Carl von Clausewitz, Aron returned to the subject 
of causality, which indicates that he still considered the topic very important to political 
reflection in 1976. In the section ‘Necessary Laws and Laws of Probability’, Aron 
lauded Clausewitz for paying attention to the role of contingency in warfare.45 As 
Matthias Oppermann puts it, for Aron, history was ‘never exclusively fateful nor 
exclusively contingent’.46 
  Dahrendorf has been depicted as a follower of these liberals in both political 
thought and philosophy of science. Giovanna Galione claims that Popper’s The Open 
Society and its Enemies exerted tremendous influence on Dahrendorf.47 Jürgen Kocka 
emphasizes Popper’s tremendous influence on Dahrendorf during his time at the LSE 
and Dahrendorf’s general fascination with ‘Western’ rather than German political 
ideas.48 Jens Hacke makes the same argument, maintaining that Dahrendorf’s 
conversion to liberalism was due to two factors – meeting Popper at the LSE and 
general exposure to the Western political tradition.49 Hacke portrays Dahrendorf as a 
‘Cold War liberal’, deeply indebted to Popper as well as Hayek, Aron, and Berlin.50 
                                                      
44 ibid., xvi. 
45 Raymond Aron, Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz I: L’age Européen (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 298. I 
am indebted to Arthur Kuhle for alerting me to this element in Aron’s reception of Clausewitz. Further 
on Aron and Clausewitz, cf. his Arthur Kuhle, Die preußische Kriegstheorie um 1800 und ihre Suche 
nach dynamischen Gleichgewichten (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2018). 
46 Matthias Oppermann, Raymond Aron und Deutschland: Die Verteidigung der Freiheit und das 
Problem des Totalitarismus (Paris: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2008), 75: ‘niemals ausschließlich 
schicksalhaft oder ausschließlich kontingent’. 
47 Giovanna Galione, Ralf Dahrendorf: Una Biografia Intelletuale (Rome: Albatros, 2012), 12.  
48 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Ralf Dahrendorf in historischer Perspektive: Aus Anlass seines Todes am 17. Juni 
2009’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 35 (2009), 350-1. 
49 Jens Hacke, ‘Das politische Scheitern eines liberalen Hoffnungsträgers: Ralf Dahrendorf und die 
FDP’, in Thomas Kroll et al. (eds.), Intellektuelle in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Verschiebungen 
im politischen Feld der 1960er und 1970er Jahre, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 126. 




Hübinger also argues that Popper fascinated Dahrendorf most during his PhD at the 
LSE.51 Hübinger also emphasizes Aron’s influence on Dahrendorf.52 Thomas Hauser’s 
recent work on Dahrendorf also locates him in this intellectual tradition. According to 
Hauser, in contrast to Marx, Dahrendorf viewed history as ‘open and uncertain’.53 He 
claims that Dahrendorf’s continued relevance is above all connected to his ‘insistence 
that history is that which we ourselves create, rather than something that follows some 
kind of necessity’.54 
  Franziska Meifort’s biography of Dahrendorf makes a similar argument. 
Quoting autobiographical sources that Dahrendorf produced late in his life, Meifort 
emphasizes Popper’s influence, quoting Dahrendorf’s self-description of having been 
a “Popperian before reading Popper”.55 More generally, Meifort emphasizes Popper, 
Milton Friedman, Immanuel Kant, and Weber as intellectual influences on 
Dahrendorf.56 However, no analysis of what these influences entailed and what 
consequences they may have had for Dahrendorf’s political theory is offered. Based 
on the fact that titles of two of Dahrendorf’s books took inspiration from Democracy 
in America and Reflections on the Revolution in France respectively, Meifort also 
attributes important influences to Tocqueville and Edmund Burke.57 Meifort also 
argues that Dahrendorf turned into a liberal at a very early stage, prompted by a double 
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experience of ‘totalitarianism’ in the form of German Nazism as well as the Soviet 
Communism that he experienced in Berlin after the end of the Second World War. 
Based on Dahrendorf’s published autobiography, two unpublished autobiographic 
manuscripts, and other later documents, Meifort largely follows Dahrendorf’s own 
account of his early years.58 Correspondingly, Meifort heavily discounts Dahrendorf’s 
indebtedness to Marx.59 In her interpretation, his experience of ‘totalitarianism’ led 
Dahrendorf to reject the ideas of the nineteenth-century economist at a very early point 
in his life.60 Accordingly, Meifort reads Dahrendorf’s Ph.D. thesis on Marx’s concept 
of justice and Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (1959) as critiques of 
Marx.61 In line with this interpretation, Meifort expresses surprise at the fact that in 
1976, Dahrendorf mentioned critical engagement with Marx as the linchpin of his 
work, ‘even though’, she argues, ‘he did not publish on Marx anymore at this time’.62 
  Dahrendorf himself also frequently emphasized his intellectual debt to 
Popper, as well as to Berlin and Aron in later years. In his BBC Reith Lectures in 1974, 
Dahrendorf argued that attending Popper’s lectures while studying at the LSE between 
1952 and 1954 had been an important factor in his conversion to liberalism.63 In his 
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last book, published in 2006, Dahrendorf described Berlin and Popper as father 
figures.64  
  The first concern of this thesis is to show that closely associating Dahrendorf 
with Popper, Hayek, Berlin, and Aron is to seriously misunderstand his intellectual 
project. Placing emphasis on socio-economic matters and on the role of interests rather 
than ideas in politics, his political thought was rooted in assumptions that were 
anathema to them. His interest in social laws and prognosis was fundamentally at odds 
with their conceptions of science. Throughout his entire career, Dahrendorf assumed 
that politics was governed by inexorable socio-economic processes and, following 
Marx as well as other materialist theorists such as Mannheim, Theodor Geiger, and 
Karl Renner, tended to regard ideas as socio-economically determined ideologies. 
Assuming that interests were the central determining factor in politics, Dahrendorf 
insisted that the attempt to stamp out interest politics must never be attempted. In order 
to do allow liberal democracy to flourish, interest politics had to be accepted as a 
necessary and irremediable aspect of public life. For Dahrendorf, this acceptance was 
inextricably linked to a pessimistic conception of agency. Political theories that 
included assumptions of wide-ranging potential for action or attempts to change the 
political behaviour of certain groups on ethical or political grounds struck him as 
utopian. Following Marx, he rejected attempts to define the concept of ‘justice’ on the 
ground that such a step implied the demand that political actors should alter their 
behaviour in order to conform with a stipulated ideal.65 Political demands made by 
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interest groups should be acted upon not if they conformed to a defensible concept of 
justice or fairness. Instead, the demands of interest groups should be answered 
precisely because and when they were made. For him, evaluating political demands on 
the basis of some conception of justice equaled ideological attempts to suppress or 
change historical processes. Attempts to do so and to suppress the manifestation of 
interests within the political sphere would only exacerbate social conflict, and in 
extreme cases would lead to political violence and revolutionary situations. Indeed, the 
question of revolution and how to avoid revolutionary situations was at the forefront 
of Dahrendorf’s mind throughout his life. This particular character of Dahrendorf’s 
liberalism only becomes intelligible once the influence of materialist thinkers and the 
significant methodological differences between Popper and Dahrendorf are 
recognized.  
  Acquired during his socialist youth but retained until the end of his career 
despite his political conversion to liberalism in the later 1950s, Dahrendorf’s 
materialist convictions meant that he took a close interest in the scientific study of 
social forces. The liberal reform programme that he developed and partly put into 
practice during the 1960s aimed to bring institutions into line with social structure, and 
to ensure that political systems remained adaptable to changing structures that would 
lead to altering political landscapes with redrawn battle lines between social interest 
groups. He was adamant that in terms of method, sociology had to be understood as a 
scientific discipline that did not differ from the natural sciences, and sought to 
contribute to sociology with the aim to create a new body of theory that could be 




and neoliberalism in the 1980s, materialist arguments still featured prominently in his 
critiques. The desire to gauge probable social developments that still lay in the future 
was still central to his intellectual concerns at this point.66 From the early 1950s until 
the late 1980s, his work revolved around the question of how liberty could be protected 
in modern societies in which both social structure and the constellation of social 
conflicts were in constant flux. The constitutional task of constructing viable 
democratic states was a constantly evolving question that depended on the nature of 
social conflict. Dahrendorf developed this social and political doctrine within a 
transatlantic intellectual network of American and German-American émigré scholars 
that included many theorists who were sympathetic to his emphasis on the centrality 
of the socio-economic realm of society. While he is often seen as a quintessentially 
British figure in intellectual terms, this thesis seeks to highlight the relevance of the 
United States to his world. In this way, the thesis should also be relevant to scholars 
of American social thought. 
  The importance of this first objective, to account for Dahrendorf’s 
idiosyncratic contribution to twentieth-century liberal thought vis-à-vis other liberals, 
is due to the particular route that the existing literature on Dahrendorf has taken. The 
second – ultimately more substantial and important – aim of the thesis relates much 
more straightforwardly to interests and concerns of Dahrendorf himself. To achieve 
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this goal, this thesis is written not only as a study of twentieth-century liberalism but 
also as a contribution to the history of the social sciences – sociology in particular –
during a period of profound methodological change in the second half of the century. 
Dahrendorf’s liberalism was the product of his sociological work, not vice versa. It is 
by studying his sociology that this thesis hopes to arrive at a more accurate depiction 
of his liberalism. This involves taking an approach that differs from numerous books 
written on the history of liberalism. Frequently, as in the cases of Edmund Fawcett or 
Alan Ryan, twentieth-century liberalism is written about as if it was a coherent and 
closed entity, based on the assumption that twentieth-century liberals had been in 
constant exchange with one another’s ideas.67 The existing historiography on 
Dahrendorf, described above, continues this tradition. This thesis shows instead that 
he spent remarkably little time engaging with the liberal theorists that he allegedly 
used as central reference points. Like (or unlike?) the French Revolution, liberalism 
was not a bloc.  
  As one of the Federal Republic’s most prominent sociologists, Dahrendorf 
constitutes an invaluable case-study that promises to shed light on the profound 
intellectual changes that took place in the social sciences between the mid-1960s and 
early 1980s, and to provide another perspective on the differences between the 
assumptions underpinning the works of prominent social scientists in the immediate 
post-war period and those of subsequent decades. Historians of the social sciences have 
already taken a close interest in the post-war period. Anglophone scholars have tended 
to depict the social sciences of the 1940s to mid-1960s as a value-free enterprise that 
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was insufficiently guided by morality and values. Proximity to government and 
dependence on funding by either the state or by organizations such as the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, or the Social 
Science Research Council has been seen as a source of scientific bias.68 More recently, 
these interpretations of social science-as-ideology have been called into question by 
scholars seeking to nuance our understanding of the politics, practices, and theories of 
social scientists working between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s.69 Historians of 
Germany who have devoted attention to the history of the social sciences have tended 
to approach the subject from a slightly different angle, concentrating instead on the 
question of whether the social sciences contributed to the political stability of the 
Federal Republic during its foundational years.70 
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  The case of Dahrendorf does not bear out the social science-as-ideology 
interpretation. While he was closely involved in both state policy-making and the 
decision-making of funding bodies for several decades (for instance by serving on the 
Ford Foundation’s Board of Trustees from 1974 and 1984) as well as participating in 
conferences and events funded by organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Dahrendorf at the same time held on to Marxian notions and methodological views 
that involved criticizing American sociology as a conservative ideology. Indeed, his 
own critique of American sociology and Parsonian structural functionalism, still made 
when he became involved in policy-making himself, prefigured the arguments of 
critical historians of later years. His paradoxical position as a Marxian liberal and 
vehement advocate of a sociology modelled on the natural sciences, caught between 
the Frankfurt School’s rejection of empirical sociology and the methodological-
political views of conservative sociologists in the post-war Federal Republic, suggests 
that in his case the connection between social research on the one hand and politics on 
the other was more complex. Despite his involvement in funding bodies and 
government agencies, his sociology did not amount to an affirmation of the status quo. 
On this point, the findings of this thesis buttress revisionist arguments. 
  However, on the methodological and theoretical substance of the social 
sciences before and after the methodological crisis of the social sciences around the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, this thesis seeks to nuance revisionist interpretations. 
Against social science-as-ideology interpretations, Howard Brick and Peter Mandler 




1970s, questioning the idea of a stark break.71 The German social sciences have 
received less attention in this respect. This case-study of Dahrendorf and his social-
scientific network highlights the profound changes in basic assumptions about the 
nature of politics and society that got underway in reaction to the shifting political 
conflicts of the student movement years, and the lasting impact this had on the thematic 
orientation of the social sciences. Examined from today’s viewpoint, the social 
sciences as practiced in West Germany before the late 1960s stem from another world 
operating on assumptions that most scholars today reject. 
  The existing literature on Dahrendorf has blurred this difference by 
assimilating him to assumptions that are much more current today. This is particularly 
pronounced in Hübinger’s recent work, which divides twentieth-century theorists into 
two groups (while strongly sympathizing with one side).72 Hübinger seeks to show that 
thinkers like Herbert Spencer, Marx, and post-war modernization theorists failed to 
recognize history’s profoundly contingent character. In his narrative, what others have 
called the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1970s and 1980s functions as the moment at which the 
social sciences and humanities finally shed their allegedly faulty methodological 
assumptions.73 Whatever one’s own methodological predilections, there is a strong 
element of Whig history in this account. Hübinger takes Dahrendorf to be a prime 
example of the category of intellectuals who ‘know ... that they cannot immediately 
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derive their political values and judgments from the progress of history’.74 While this 
is not wrong as such, Dahrendorf certainly does not fit in the category of intellectuals 
who, according to Hübinger, emphasized contingency to dispel the notion that history 
was a ‘homogenous continuum that can be analyzed objectively through causal-genetic 
reconstruction’.75 This thesis hopes to show that Dahrendorf’s methodological views 
were opposed to those Hübinger associates him with. 
  This blurring of distinctions characterizes the more general literature as well. 
As the author of this thesis has shown elsewhere, scholars commenting on the 
Positivism Dispute have not recognized that its origins lay in acrimonious debates 
about necessity and contingency among German sociologists from the mid-1950s 
onwards.76 Such interpretations chime with assessments of the reform-oriented 1960s 
as a period in which social scientists and policy-makers allegedly held optimistic 
beliefs about their ability to transform and change society. Several historians have 
argued that during these years, optimistic social scientists assumed that society was 
‘malleable’ and could be shaped and reformed at will.77 In this vein, Gabriele Metzler 
designates the 1960s the ‘decade of plannability and feasibility’.78 In particular, Jenny 
Andersson and Elke Seefried argue that futurology and futures studies, one of the 
social-scientific casualties of the cultural turn, were characterized by the widespread 
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assumption of a malleable future that could be shaped, and that futurologists conceived 
of their science as a contribution to the manipulation of the world.79 These readings 
are at odds with critical assessments of the post-war social sciences that gained 
increasing currency within the profession itself from the late 1960s onwards. By the 
early 1970s, modernization theorists were confronted with the charge of critics such 
as Dean Tipps, Ian Weinberg, Joseph LaPalombara, or Samuel Huntington that their 
social theories were determinist and assumed a unilinear development of 
modernization that applied to the whole world irrespective of cultural differences.80 
Futurologists were confronted with a similar critique of their alleged determinism 
during the same period.81 Dahrendorf also came under fire from this angle. Having had 
great influence on the Bielefeld School of History and social structure-oriented 
historians of modern German society more generally with works such as Society and 
Democracy in Germany (1965), exponents of the cultural turn criticized him for 
making determinist assumptions. In their influential revisionist study of modern 
German history, Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn attacked Dahrendorf for assuming 
that societies must necessarily move through a historical stage in which the 
‘bourgeoisie’ dominated politics.82 
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  A study that examines Dahrendorf’s work before, during, and after the 
methodological crises of the late 1960s to early 1980s can provide insights into the 
nature of this shift. The picture that emerges from this study differs from that provided 
by historians who see the post-war social sciences as governed by an optimistic ethos 
of ‘feasibility’. Dahrendorf, and most of the key members of his network, did not 
assume that their ability to reform society during the post-war decade was unbounded. 
The economic miracle of the post-war years did mean that the fiscal capabilities of the 
state allowed many reform projects to flourish that foundered as the economic crises 
of the 1970s unfolded. However, Dahrendorf and many of his associates insisted that 
certain reforms should be enacted not because they were possible, but rather because 
they were rendered necessary by certain socio-economic trends and developments. His 
intellectual circle during this period was not an esoteric one that ran against the current 
of its time. It included some of the most prominent scientists and politicians of its day, 
not least Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, West Germany’s Chancellor from 1966 until 1969. 
  In Howard Brick’s study of the post-war social sciences, Dahrendorf’s 
argument that the concept of ‘capitalism’ no longer adequately described the social 
reality of the post-war period, made in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, 
serves as the starting-off point for his argument that sociologists started to be less 
interested in economic matters during this period.83 Society, Brick argues, became 
increasingly seen as autonomous from the economic realm in the post-war decades.84 
This is said to have come to an end during the 1970s, a decade that witnessed the return 
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of economy-focused political views and solutions.85 This thesis suggests a different 
picture. Socio-economic aspects were central to the theoretical imaginations of 
Dahrendorf and the theorists he was surrounded by, whereas other factors such as 
culture or ideas were downplayed as factors determining politics and society. It was 
this downplaying of the autonomous role of culture and ideas that made it possible to 
regard social developments as predictable and to conceive of the future as a legitimate 
field of enquiry. 
  The rise of conceptions of society and politics as largely contingent during 
the cultural turn connects the first and second concern of this thesis. Studying 
Dahrendorf’s relationship with other liberal theorists of the twentieth century 
highlights his divergence on central questions of philosophy of history (Chs. I, II, VI). 
His role in the development of sociological theory during its post-war heyday (Chs. I, 
II, III, IV) and his critique of its neoconservative and neoliberal alternatives during the 
1970s and 1980s (Chs. V, VI) in turn suggest that the rise of new versions of liberalism 
from the 1970s onwards and the demise of the post-war social sciences were 
connected. Strongly committed to the notion that ideas rather than socio-economic 
factors were central in shaping society and heavily dismissive of determinism, liberal 
theorists like Hayek, Berlin, and Popper saw their fortunes rise during these years.86 
During the post-war years, Hayek’s critique of the conception of ‘objective facts’ was 
idiosyncratic – by the later 1970s, it had become a mainstream position. It was at this 
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point of crisis in the social sciences that new political options became conceivable. 
Rather than seeing the 1970s as a period in which reform-oriented optimism and belief 
in the ‘malleability’ of society were shattered, this thesis suggests that this period saw 
the rise of a new belief in feasibility that had been absent in the 1950s and 1960s.87  
  With the rise of anti-determinist and contingency-oriented versions of 
liberalism, politics from the mid-1970s onwards saw an opening up of new 
possibilities. In contrast to the subjects of Koselleck’s work, in the case of twentieth-
century liberal thought it was not the centrality of the future as a horizon of expectation 
that facilitated utopian ideas. Rather, it was the demise of a conception of the future as 
predictable and dependent on non-random, non-contingent social factors during the 
1970s and 1980s that functioned as a fertile ground for new utopian ideas.88 
Dahrendorf was unique in that the late 1960s and 1970s did not alter his political and 
scientific vision. When, in the early 1960s, he pressed for higher education reforms 
because changes in social structure had rendered the ‘idealist’ set-up of German 
universities anachronistic, this was not an uncommon position. When, in the early 
1980s, he argued that Margaret Thatcher would soon be out of office because her 
policies were utopian because they ignored social structure, it had become an 
idiosyncratic position. It is this that makes him an invaluable subject to study 
historically. 
  By drawing attention to Dahrendorf’s emphasis on the socio-economic realm 
and on causality, the characterization of his social and political thought made here 
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resembles the picture of the post-war social sciences drawn by its late 1960s and 1970s 
critics. However, while they had a clearer picture of the reality of the social sciences 
as practised after the war than later commentators, this is no reason to adopt their 
overall verdict. While its critics were fond of highlighting the political biases of post-
war social scientists, Chapter V of this thesis shows that political concerns and 
impressions gathered from contemporary political events and developments were as 
prominent during the cultural turn. While contemporary critics like Hampshire or Eley 
and Blackbourn were aware of some of the assumptions at play in Dahrendorf’s social 
thought that subsequent historians have not picked up on, they also succeeded in 
caricaturing the arguments of their predecessors. While Dahrendorf thought that given 
social forces constrained and dictated politics in considerable and often over-towering 
ways, his was not a teleological determinism. While certain aspects were given and 
inexorable, politicians and decision-makers still had a very important and creative role 
to play. On the basis of given social forces, different options were open. It was not for 
nothing that he decided to accept the Free Democratic Party’s offer to run for office 
on their ticket in a safe seat in October 1967. 
  To make this case, the chapters of the present thesis are organized along 
thematic lines, progressing broadly in chronological order. Given that his career 
encompassed several distinct phases characterized by slightly different intellectual 
concerns, a study of Dahrendorf is in the comfortable position of not having to choose 
too strictly between thematic and chronological organization.  
  Chapter One locates Dahrendorf within the intellectual context of a 




necessarily entailed certain inexorable processes, such as increasing prominence of 
bureaucratic decision-making in all spheres of society. It seeks to highlight the 
centrality of the question of the scope for individual and collective action to transform 
society to the concerns of intellectuals in Germany throughout the first seven decades 
of the twentieth century. The rise of large-scale organizations in both the public and 
the private sphere gave rise to a long-standing political debate on the role of 
bureaucratic entities in modern industrial society that interlinked to the question of the 
extent to which certain aspects of modernization were inescapable. The consequences 
of modernization were thought to immensely complicate the every-day tasks of 
politicians and administrators. These political analyses of modernization formed the 
backdrop of methodological disputes among German sociologists from the mid-1950s 
to the late 1960s about the degree of necessity and contingency of social and political 
developments. This debate formed the central backdrop of Dahrendorf’s intellectual 
development during the first two decades of his academic career. 
  Chapter Two charts Dahrendorf’s early politics, his reading of Marx, 
Mannheim, Renner, Geiger, and other materialist theorists during his student days and 
early academic career in the 1950s, as well as his continuous redeployment of 
materialist theories in later years. By doing so, it shows how materialist assumptions 
informed his agonistic liberalism throughout his entire life beyond his abandonment 
of political socialism in the late 1950s. The chapter also contrasts Dahrendorf’s reading 
of materialism with the perspectives of Popper, Hayek, Berlin, and other liberals he 




  Chapter Three focuses on Dahrendorf’s attempt to reform sociology from the 
beginning of his sociological career in the mid-1950s until 1967, when the beginning 
of his political career put an end to his close concern with rewriting sociological theory. 
The chapter covers his involvement in both German and transatlantic debates, focusing 
on the ‘Homo Sociologicus’ controversies in Germany, his critique of Talcott Parsons’ 
structural-functionalism as well as American sociology more generally, and his 
relationship with American sociologists such as C. Wright Mills who shared his 
materialist convictions. Centrally, the chapter studies how Dahrendorf resolved the 
apparent contradiction between his strong conviction in the importance of empirical 
and theoretical sociology, based on strict assumptions about necessity and causality, 
and his rejection of the stipulation of value freedom as a basis for social scientific 
research. 
  Chapter Four discusses Dahrendorf’s involvement in transatlantic intellectual 
networks of anti-idealist German-American scholars such as Hajo Holborn, Fritz 
Ringer, Leonard Krieger, and Fritz Stern, and the conclusions he drew from their ideas 
for education reform, particularly relating to the foundation of the University of 
Constance in 1966. For Dahrendorf, Constance was a conscious attempt to disrupt the 
German academic landscape in the social sciences, which to his mind was dominated 
by idealism to the detriment of both research and society. By founding a radically 
reformed university that broke with tradition, Dahrendorf sought to create a research 
centre which could inform politics and educate public opinion by highlighting the 
historical processes that society was undergoing and provide an institutional setting 




  The rise of anti-positivist thought in the 1960s and the 1970s constituted a 
challenge to Dahrendorf’s ideas. Chapter Five focuses on his engagement with the 
changing political landscape of the 1970s and contrasts his reaction to the student 
radicalism of the late 1960s with those of his intellectual associates. In particular, the 
chapter discusses his engagement with ‘neoconservatism’ during this period, an 
intellectual movement dominated by sociologists such as Daniel Bell who were 
intellectually closely affiliated with him. It draws attention to the way in which 
Dahrendorf sought to reconcile his agonistic liberalism with contemporary 
developments that pointed in the direction of a new social conflict that was defined by 
ideal rather than material interests. 
  Chapter Six analyses Dahrendorf’s critique of neoliberalism in the 1970s and 
1980s. It draws attention to the central role that materialist assumptions played in this 
critique, thus highlighting continuity in his political thought. In many ways, 
Dahrendorf’s critique of Hayek and other ‘constitutional economists’ who sought to 
constrain political processes by imposing constitutional limits on what political actions 
were permitted drew on his earlier materialist argument that parliaments had to act as 
arenas for the manifestation of sectional interests. It further argues that the 
disagreements between Dahrendorf and neoliberals were based on different 
assessments as to whether economic concentration and bureaucratization were 
inherent parts of modernization or contingent consequences of political decisions. 
Falling in the latter part of this division, neoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s gradually 
won the debate against those with the increasingly fragile conviction that modernity 




  A word about the intentions of this thesis is due. While we will deal with a 
wide range of political statements by Dahrendorf, it will not always be possible to 
discuss their validity in depth. While this thesis would not have been written if its 
author took Dahrendorf’s political thought to be entirely irrelevant to the present day, 
a good number of his assumptions remain open to question. In this respect, much 
depends on the question of whether material conflicts are in fact the main issues 
characterizing the politics of our day. Dahrendorf, as we shall see in Chapter V and 
VI, had his own views on this question but did not substantiate them empirically. 
Surely, the jury is still out on this question, which in turn deserves its own doctoral 
theses. This thesis therefore concentrates its energy on portraying Dahrendorf’s ideas 
as historically accurately as possible. What to make of them in the light of the present 
it leaves to the reader. This is important because in many instances, we will be 
concerned not just with his views but with the methodological assumptions that entered 
them. Taking this approach focuses our attention on two core questions: what happens 
to politics if its thematic focus shifts? What happens to politics when a paradigm shift 
alters how social scientists look at society? 
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Chapter I: Sociology and Modern Industrial Society 
‘In a modern state rule ... necessarily and inevitably lies in the hands of officialdom, both military and 
civilian.’ (Max Weber, ‘Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order’, in 
Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds.), Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 145.) 
‘The most significant function of sociological analysis for social action today is no longer pointing out 
what is to be done and what is to be decided, but rather to make visible that which is happening 
anyway and cannot be changed.’ (Helmut Schelsky, Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie 




For observers of social developments during the first years and decades of the twentieth 
century, it was clear that the character of modern societies was changing rapidly.2 One 
socio-economic trend that particularly captivated attention was the rise of large-scale 
organizations. In the economic sphere, large-scale conglomerates and trusts were 
becoming more prominent.3 In Imperial Germany, heavy industries such as iron, metal, 
mining, machinery, chemicals, electronics were on the rise: by 1907, Krupp employed 
64,300 workers, while Siemens had 42,900 employees. The mining company 
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks Aktien-Gesellschaft occupied third place with 31,250 
                                                           
1 ‘Die wichtigste Leistung der soziologischen Analyse für das soziale Handeln liegt heute gar nicht 
mehr in der Angabe dessen, was zu tun und wie zu entscheiden ist, sondern viel mehr darin, sichtbar 
zu machen, was sowieso geschieht und was gar nicht zu ändern ist’. 
2 Parts of this chapter draw on Strubenhoff, ‘Positivism Dispute’. 
3 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1849-1914 (Munich: Beck, 1995), 622-637; 
Erik Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany 1864-1894 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 237. The impression these economic developments made on 
liberals is noted by Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical Argument 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 3. 
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workers.4 In the political sphere, organized parties were becoming ever more 
dominant. At the same time, the introduction of welfare legislation meant that the 
number of experts and administrators employed by the state rose as well.5 The First 
World War only increased this impression of the growing importance of 
administration. In contrast to previous wars, the deployment of millions of soldiers in 
an age of mass warfare increased the prominence of bureaucracy in the deployment of 
modern armies. Max Weber – an observer particularly interested in the rise of 
bureaucracy and administration – argued at the end of the First World War that 
bureaucratization was taking place in every realm of society, including religious 
organizations such as the Catholic Church, military academies, and universities.6 
Bureaucracy, he wrote, ‘is ... distinguished from other historical bearers of the modern, 
rational way of ordering life by the fact of its far greater inescapability. History records 
no instance of it having disappeared again once it had achieved complete and sole 
dominance’.7 
  Weber’s was a radical version of an argument about the inescapable nature of 
modernity that held great sway in German-speaking political debates in the first seven 
decades of the twentieth century. During this period, many German theorists were 
closely concerned with the question of whether modernity was an inexorable process 
in which the ability of individuals and societies as a whole to act freely was 
                                                           
4 Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1849-1914, 624. 
5 On this historical trend more generally, cf. Lutz Raphael, ‘Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen 
als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts’, 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996). 
6 For the Catholic Church, cf. Weber, ‘Parliament and Government in Germany’, 146. For military 
academies, universities, and other examples cf. ibid., 155. 
7 Max Weber, ‘Parliament and Government in Germany’, 156. 
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increasingly constrained. This debate formed the central setting in which Dahrendorf’s 
political thought developed. 
  This chapter lays out the nature of this debate. In doing so it forms the natural 
counterpart of Chs. V and VI, which cover the demise of this paradigm, as well as the 
political consequences that this intellectual change entailed. After providing a brief 
genealogical overview of the debate since the beginning of the century, this chapter 
examines the debate during the foundational years of the post-war West German 
sociological discipline between the early 1950s and later 1960s in further detail. During 
this period, the discipline saw increasingly acrimonious disagreements about the 
degree to which social circumstances in modern industrial societies were necessary or 
contingent. Closely connected to this issue was the question of what role or ‘function’ 
the sociological discipline had to play in such modern societies. Fought between 
advocates of empirical and causality-oriented conceptions of sociology such as Helmut 
Schelsky, René König, Arnold Gehlen, and Dahrendorf on the one hand and the 
Frankfurt School on the other, this debate significantly influenced the intellectual 
trajectories of all theorists involved. By providing this overview, this chapter draws 
attention to a context without which the questions that Dahrendorf’s political ideas and 








2. Bureaucratization, Rationalization, and Modernity. 
 
  Weber’s concerns about bureaucracy were not limited to his famous 
exposition in ‘Parliament and Government’. In numerous works, Weber emphasized 
the increasing power held by bureaucratic office holders over individuals in modern 
societies.8 According to Reinhard Bendix and Wolfgang Mommsen – thinkers 
interested in bureaucracy and modernity in their own right – Weber envisaged that the 
future of politics would be characterized by political conflicts between charismatic 
leadership and bureaucratic power, and hoped that to some extent the former would 
counteract the latter.9 In his advocacy of a strong and directly elected President as part 
of the constitutional settlement of the Weimar Republic in February 1919, Weber 
sought to establish a figure strong enough to confront the bureaucratic hierarchies of 
the state governments, particularly those of Prussia.10 Only a directly elected leader, 
he argued, could disrupt Germany’s sclerotic party system dominated by notables and 
professional politicians.11  
  Although the theme of bureaucratic rule also featured prominently in his 
writings on Ancient civilizations, Weber made it clear that he thought that there was 
an inherent link between modernity and bureaucratization.12 In September 1909, at a 
                                                           
8 Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, 184-194; Stefan Breuer, Bürokratie und Charisma: Zur 
politischen Soziologie Max Webers (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994). 
9 Wolfgang Mommsen, ‘Universalgeschichtliches und politisches Denken bei Max Weber’, 
Historische Zeitschrift 201 (1965); Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (London: 
Methuen, 1966 [1959]), 388. 
10 Max Weber, ‘Der Reichspräsident’, in Max Weber, Gesammelte politische Schriften (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1980), 500-1. 
11 ibid., 499. 
12 Fritz Ringer, Max Weber: An Intellectual Biography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 
220. Note in particular Ringer’s observations on Weber’s fundamentally ambivalent attitude towards 
bureaucracy in ibid., 220-3. Further cf. Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, 191. 
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meeting of the Association for Social Policy, Weber suggested that while Ancient 
Egypt had been more bureaucratic than any other human society ever since, the spectre 
of bureaucracy in the present was even more threatening because today’s bureaucratic 
means were technologically superior and more rationalized.13 Over the next decade, 
Weber did not lose his anxiety about the rise of bureaucracy. In January 1919, Weber 
told students in Munich that the ‘bureaucratic constitution of the state’ was ‘also and 
in particular characteristic of the modern state’.14 Even in the United States, he pointed 
out, the Civil Service Reform had at last introduced a professional bureaucratic class 
– this was part of an inexorable trend caused by ‘[p]urely technical, irremediable 
[unabweisliche] administrative requirements’.15 In his posthumously published work 
on the pure types of legitimate domination, he observed that the ‘whole developmental 
history of the modern state in particular is identical with the history of modern 
bureaucratism [Beamtentum] and the bureaucratic organization ... to the same extent 
that the development of modern high capitalism is identical with the increasing 
bureaucratization of economic enterprises’.16 
  Weber’s interest in economic bureaucratization was shared by many of his 
contemporaries. Werner Sombart, Weber’s co-editor of the Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, devoted two chapters of Der Moderne 
                                                           
13 Max Weber, ‘Debattereden auf der Tagung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik in Wien 1909 zu den 
Verhandlungen über “Die wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der Gemeinden”, in Weber, Gesammelte 
Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), 414. 
14 Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’, in Weber, Gesammelte politische Schriften, 510: ‘bürokratische 
Staatsordnung’, ‘auch und gerade dem modernen Staat charakteristische’. 
15 ibid., 517: ‘Rein technische, unabweisliche Bedürfnisse der Verwaltung’. 
16 Max Weber, ‘Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’, in Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze 
zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), 477: ‘Die ganze Entwicklungsgeschichte des 
modernen Staates insbesondere ist identisch mit der Geschichte des modernen Beamtentums und 
bürokratischen Betriebes … ebenso wie die ganze Entwicklung des modernen Hochkapitalismus 
identisch ist mit zunehmender Bürokratisierung der Wirtschaftsbetriebe.’ 
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Kapitalismus to the rise of large-scale companies and the rise of science and expert 
administration in business.17 In both social science and politics, the political 
implications of this new group became hotly debated. Speaking at the Eighth 
Protestant-Social Congress in 1897, Gustav Schmoller introduced the concept of the 
‘newly-forming middle class’, a term that would be central to debates about social 
structure for decades to come.18 Schmoller held a broadly positive view of 
administration and bureaucracy. Disagreements about the role of value judgements in 
economics among members of the Association for Social Policy were intricately linked 
to debates about cartels and monopolies and the role of state bureaucracy. While older 
leading members of the Association, prominently Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, saw 
civil servants as the decision-makers that would be best-placed to administrate the 
social and economic problems associated with industrialization, Weber (joined by his 
younger brother Alfred) objected.19 According to Weber, it was misguided to believe 
that civil servants could be truly neutral administrators of public affairs who stood 
above sectional interests.20 Growing out of these debates, Weber and other sociologists 
founded the break-away German Sociological Association in January 1909. When the 
issue of objectivity and value freedom again led to passionate disagreements at the 
General Meeting of the Association for Social Policy in Vienna in September 1909, 
the growth of bureaucracy was central to the arguments of Weber and others. In his 
                                                           
17 On the rise of large-scale companies and the rise of science and expert administration in business, 
cf. Werner Sombart, Der Moderne Kapitalismus: Historisch-systematische Darstellung des 
gesamteuropäischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart Volume III: Das 
Wirtschaftsleben im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1955 [1902]). 
18 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Angestellter’, in Reinhart Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner Conze (eds.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 125: ‘neu sich bildenden Mittelstandes’. 
19 Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society, 187. 
20 ibid., 188. 
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contribution to a debate about municipal enterprises, Weber insisted on the 
‘irreversibility of the progress of bureaucratic mechanization’.21 The question was not 
how this trend could be reversed – as this was impossible – but rather what ‘we can 
furnish against this machinery’.22 Concerned about what a world filled by bureaucrats 
would look like, Weber cautioned his colleagues against their enthusiasm for 
bureaucratic administration.23 These sentiments were not shared by those members of 
the Association who thought that economics should be based on explicit value 
judgements, and that the state was often better placed to act in accordance with values 
than private enterprises. In the aftermath of the conference, the economist Georg 
Friedrich Knapp complained to Schmoller that newspapers had portrayed the event as 
if there had been no proceedings besides the pathos-laden preaching of the Weber 
brothers against bureaucracy.24 
  However, the economy and the state were not the only spheres that 
contemporaries thought to be subject to bureaucratization. In 1911, Weber’s associate 
Robert Michels published a treatise on bureaucracy and modern parties that argued that 
all political organizations were subject to an ‘iron law of oligarchy’.25 Frustrated by 
the politics of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which he thought had 
                                                           
21 Weber, ‘Debattereden auf der Tagung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik in Wien 1909’, 413: 
‘Unaufhaltsamkeit des Fortschritts der bureaukratischen Mechanisierung’. 
22 ibid., 414: ‘was wir dieser Maschinerie entgegenzusetzen haben’. 
23 ibid. 
24 Quoted in Johannes Glaeser, Der Werturteilsstreit in der deutschen Nationalökonomie: Max Weber, 
Werner Sombart und die Ideale der Sozialpolitik (Marburg: Metropolis, 2014), 241. Apart from this 
quotation, Glaeser does not discuss the role played by disagreements about bureaucratization in the 
origin of the disagreements about value judgements, instead placing emphasis on the concurrent 
debate about productivity. 
25 For the close relationship between Weber and Michels cf. Duncan Kelly, ‘From Moralism to 
Modernism: Robert Michels on the History, Theory and Sociology of Patriotism’, History of European 
Ideas 29 (2003), 347-8. 
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abandoned its true revolutionary fervour, Michels was initially attracted to 
syndicalism. After moving to Turin in 1907 because his social democratic politics 
made it impossible to find employment at German universities, Michels gravitated 
towards the elite theories of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, who both maintained 
that ruling classes necessarily dominated all societies. Michels adopted this 
perspective: his work on the sociology of oligarchy argued that political parties as well 
as trade unions of necessity required administrators and leaders. Increasingly, labour 
would be divided and become more complicated. The amount of technical knowledge 
required in modern politics rendered democratic control of leaders and administrators 
impossible.26 In his later life Michels joined the Italian Fascist movement, which he 
hoped could serve as a vehicle for improvements in a political sphere subject to the 
iron law of oligarchy.27 
  The later stages of the First World War and its immediate aftermath saw a 
surge in concerns about bureaucratization. Not only was this the period when Weber 
produced most of his works about this issue. Many liberals, in particular those affiliated 
with the German Democratic Party (DDP), argued that bureaucracy’s inevitability had 
to be accepted.28 This was the line taken by Walter Rathenau in an essay on ‘The New 
Economy’, published in January 1918. In contrast to his In Days to Come (1917), 
which he had published just a year prior but had started writing before the war, 
                                                           
26 Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen 
über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner, 1957 [1911]). 
27 David Beetham, ‘From Socialism to Fascism: The Relation Between Theory and Practice in the 
Work of Robert Michels’, Political Studies 25 (1977). 
28 Here this thesis takes issue with the wholesale indictment of the DDP in Wolf Lepenies, The 
Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 26. Lepenies 
seems to take the Sonderweg interpretation of German liberalism too far by presenting intellectuals 
close to the DDP as frustrated ‘metaphysicians’ obsessed with culture. 
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Rathenau advised his compatriots that the war had accelerated inevitable processes. 
The nineteenth-century ideal of the free market would not work anymore. What was 
instead needed in the new age were cartelized structures of economic governance. 
According to Rathenau, the bureaucracy that would emerge would not stand in the way 
of growth – instead, it would benefit economic development.29 Similarly, as a member 
of the Weimar Constituent Assembly, Friedrich Naumann implored his colleagues to 
recognize that the character of the new constitution had to reflect the changing social 
structure of German society. During the debate on the basic rights clauses on 1 April 
1919, Naumann stated that the entry of the Social Democrats into government and the 
‘phenomenon that the mass personality, the association personality [Verbandsmensch] 
rather than the individual’ now dominated society needed to be considered in the 
writing of the constitution. For this reason, he said, it was necessary not only to take 
older constitutions as blue-prints for the new one – it was also necessary to draw on 
the Bolshevist constitution of 15 July 1918.30 The liberal theologian Ernst Troeltsch, 
another DDP grandee who sat in the Prussian Constituent Assembly from 1919 until 
1921, used similar rhetoric about the alleged inevitability of certain political facts and 
developments. As far as political parties were concerned, he implored political 
commentators to recognize reality by ‘above all differentiating clearly between the 
irremediable and the remediable of our situation’.31 Political parties and their 
                                                           
29 Shulamit Volkov, Walther Rathenau: The Life of Weimar’s Fallen Statesman (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 159-161. 
30 Quoted in ‘Die Grundrechte des deutschen Volkes’, Vossische Zeitung, 01 April 1919: 
‘Erscheinung, daß nicht mehr der einzelne, sondern der Massenmensch, der Verbandsmensch’. 
31 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Kritik am System: Das Parteienwesen (Juni 1920)’, in Ernst Troeltsch, Spectator-
Briefe und Berliner Briefe, 1919-1922 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 287: ‘das Unwiderrufliche und 
Widerrufliche an unseren Verhältnissen vor allem klar zu scheiden’. 
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machineries were part of the irremediable.32 Trying to confront dissatisfaction with the 
existing party system of the Weimar Republic, he argued that it was important to 
recognize that ‘one cannot create parties as one wished, and that the existing parties 
essentially correspond to certain natural groups within society and therefore have a 
certain inner necessity’.33 A year later, in 1921, he called for ‘a politics based on 
assessments that are coldblooded and devoid of illusions’ and spoke of democracy as 
having become ‘fate’.34 Only in this way could democratic responsibility and the ‘will 
to select leaders’ be fostered.35 
  Joseph Schumpeter, a member of the Socialization Commission during the 
tumultuous first months of the Weimar Republic in early 1919, argued along similar 
lines.36 In an article published in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 
1920, he argued that due to increasing bureaucratization, the growth of large-scale 
industry, and the rise of managers and experts, socialism was inevitable.37 In this 
earlier setting, the famous argument of Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1943) – which portrayed bureaucracy as an inevitable aspect of modern 
societies – prefigured. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy expanded on this idea 
and disseminated it among a wider audience more than twenty years later. 
Bureaucratization, rationalization, and the shift of power from bourgeois entrepreneurs 
                                                           
32 ibid. 
33 ibid: ‘daß man Parteien nicht beliebig schaffen kann und daß die gegebenen Parteien im 
wesentlichen bestimmten natürlichen Gruppierungen der Gesellschaft entsprechen, also eine gewisse 
innere Notwendigkeit besitzen’. 
34 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Ideologien und reale Verhältnisse’, in Troeltsch, Spectator-Briefe und Berliner 
Briefe, 1919-1922, 433: ‘eine Politik der kaltblütigen und illusionslosen Bilanz’, ‘schicksalsmäßig’. 
35 ibid.: ‘Willigkeit zur Führerauslese’. 
36 For Schumpeter’s politics on the Socialization Commission, cf. Richard Swedberg, Joseph A. 
Schumpeter: His Life and Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 55-8. 
37 William Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 193. 
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to administrators were key factors in the historical process that Schumpeter here saw 
as inevitably leading from capitalism to socialism.38 In this book, he argued that value 
judgements were out of place in any rational evaluation of these issues, as ‘mankind is 
not free to choose ... Things economic and social move by their own momentum and 
the ensuing situations compel individuals and groups to behave in certain ways ... If 
this is the quintessence of Marxism then we all of us have got to be Marxists’.39 A few 
years after Schumpeter’s original article, these arguments still carried weight in liberal 
circles. In reaction to conservative pleas that the modern industrial state should be 
turned back into an agrarian state, the liberal historian and DDP member Friedrich 
Meinecke argued in The Idea of Reason of State (1924) that such plans were utopian. 
While agreeing that the former state of affairs was culturally preferable, Meinecke 
argued that the modern state would inevitably become a ‘rational giant organization 
[rationalen Großbetrieb]’.40 Even though some clamoured to go back to the agrarian 
past, the demographic growth of the recent past rendered this impossible.41 Modern 
rationalized statecraft and industry had become mankind’s fate.  
  For liberals, the rise of bureaucracy constituted a potential challenge, as it 
seemed to turn an emphasis on individual liberty into an anachronistic ideology of the 
previous century. However, Weimar political theorists of the Left were as preoccupied 
by the issue of bureaucracy and modernity, as the rise of administrative white collar 
                                                           
38 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 2010 [1943]), 118-
9. It should be noted that Schumpeter had a markedly positive view of bureaucracy, cf. Swedberg, 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, 161. 
39 ibid., 115. For Schumpeter’s conception of historical change, cf. Gerhard Winterberger, Über 
Schumpeters Geschichtsdeterminismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983). 
40 Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 
1963 [1924]), 483: ‘rationalen Großbetrieb’. 
41 ibid., 490-1. 
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workers complicated Karl Marx’s prediction of the disappearance of the middle class 
in capitalist economic systems. In 1926, Emil Lederer and his student Jacob Marschak 
published a widely noted essay on ‘The New Middle Class’ that discussed the political 
sociology of the holders of bureaucratic posts in business.42 In the early 1930s, this 
topic was taken up by Theodor Geiger and Hans Speier, two sociologists closely 
affiliated with the SPD. By then, analysing the new middle class had gained even 
further urgency, given that at the time it was seen as one of the electoral taproots of 
National Socialism.43 Marxist authors also took note of the changing nature of 
capitalism. For Rudolf Hilferding, Weimar Germany’s Finance Secretary during the 
onset of the Great Depression, observations about the rise of ‘organized capitalism’ 
played a key role in the development of his revisionist Marxism.44 Hilferding hoped 
that the trend towards large-scale bureaucratic enterprises and managerialism would 
make a non-violent transition to socialism possible in the future.45 In Austria, the 
prominent Austro-Marxist Karl Renner also sought to make sense of the rise of white 
collar workers for the politics of the present: Dahrendorf later adopted his concept of 
the white collar ‘service class’ in his theory of the politics of industrial society.46 
                                                           
42 Emil Lederer and Jacob Marschak, ‘Der neue Mittelstand’, Grundriß der Sozialökonomik 9 (1926). 
43 Theodor Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes: Soziographischer Versuch auf 
statistischer Grundlage (Stuttgart: Enke, 1932); Hans Speier, Die Angestellten vor dem 
Nationalsozialismus: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der deutschen Sozialstruktur, 1918-1933 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977). Speier’s book was only published in 1977 at the 
initiative of Jürgen Kocka, as publication of his work after 1933 proved impossible for Speier. 
44 Heinrich August Winkler, ‘Einleitende Bemerkungen zu Hilferdings Theorie des organisierten 
Kapitalismus’, in Winkler (ed.), Organisierter Kapitalismus: Voraussetzungen und Anfänge 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974). 
45 Harold James, ‘Rudolf Hilferding and the Application of the Political Economy of the Second 
International’, Historical Journal 24 (1981), 856. 
46 Cf. Chapter II. 
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  In spite of this strong current in German social thought, not everybody agreed 
that rationality and bureaucracy were inexorable aspects of modernity that simply had 
to be accepted. Frequently, the insistence that this trend was not irreversible was 
combined with emphases on the importance of ‘culture’.47 Alfred Weber – a prominent 
member of the German sociological profession in his own right and provisional chair 
of the DDP after its foundation – had views that differed significantly from his brother 
Max. While both agreed about the negative consequences of bureaucracy, Alfred had 
higher hopes in culture as an antidote against the loss of meaning and life that he saw 
modern societies to be undergoing as a consequence of the increasing rationalization 
of society. Influenced by the vitalism of Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, Alfred 
actively supported the youth movement, which he hoped could instil in students a 
broader sense of meaning than the increasingly narrow and specialized training at 
universities that he viewed as a consequence of the rise of bureaucracy and 
rationality.48 Like many others at the time, Alfred distinguished between civilizational 
(negatively connoted) and cultural (positively connoted) forces in society.49 In his 
memoirs, Max Weber’s assistant Hans Staudinger recalled Max’s annoyance at 
Alfred’s juxtaposition of culture and civilization.50 Even more so, critics of rationality 
                                                           
47 For a good introduction cf. Klaus Lichtblau, Kulturkrise und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: 
Zur Genealogie der Kultursoziologie in Deutschland (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996) as well as the 
earlier works Lepenies, Seduction of Culture; Rudolph Hermann, Kulturkritik und konservative 
Revolution: Zum kulturell-politischen Denken Hofmannsthals und seinem problemgeschichtlichen 
Kontext (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971); Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise 
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and bureaucracy could be found on the right of the Weimar Republic’s political 
spectrum.  
  One of them was Carl Schmitt, who was horrified by the alleged dominance 
of ‘economic-technical thinking’ and ‘instrumental rationality’ in the present.51 In 
1933, Schmitt celebrated the National Socialist Machtergreifung as the triumph of a 
new order over the bureaucracy.52 Schmitt differentiated between the liberal state of 
the nineteenth century, in which civil servants had held dominant positions, and the 
new political system introduced in Germany. The liberal state, Schmitt reasoned, was 
based on two separate spheres: the state on the one hand, and society made up 
individuals on the other. Basic rights enshrined in constitutions guaranteed the freedom 
and rights of individuals. However, the rise of ‘strong collective associations or 
organisations’ rendered this liberal model anachronistic.53 By taking advantage of 
rights designed to protect individuals, such overpowering associations dominated both 
the state and their individuals members.54 In such pluralist societies a strong total state 
was called for.55 In contradistinction to Weber, Schmitt thought that political life was 
not subject to a necessary course that could not be changed.56  
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  Sombart decried the predominance of the economic realm over culture and 
morality, which he attributed to the influence of ‘the Jewish spirit’.57 He hoped that the 
increasing rationalization of modern life, which he saw as a direct consequence of 
capitalism and Judaism, could be reversed.58 Speaking at the Association for Social 
Policy’s conference in Zurich in September 1928, he paraphrased Genesis 3:19 to say: 
‘In the sweat of thy face shalt thou work like Americans, rationalist, profitably, and 
turn into practice the economic principle that thus far could only be found in the 
textbooks of national economics.’59 Although he still paid lip service to the principle 
of value freedom, Sombart nevertheless told his colleagues how ‘humanity could be 
liberated from the curse of economic rationalism’.60 Convinced that capitalism was the 
outgrowth of a certain spirit, he argued that overcoming the ‘overvaluation of the 
material’ was crucial, combined with tackling the problem of overpopulation and 
Germany’s enslavement.61 By contrast, Alfred Weber’s anxiety about the cultural 
crisis of the present was markedly moderate. Like his brother, he saw bureaucracy and 
rationality as something that ultimately was crucial for modern existence and that could 
therefore not be removed.62 In his cultural sociology, he described social processes as 
‘inherent’, ‘predetermined’, and ‘necessary’.63 Unlike Sombart, he did not see National 
Socialism as a force that could overcome the bureaucratic predicament of modernity. 
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Nonetheless, Alfred Weber was fascinated by Benito Mussolini, whom he met in Rome 
in November 1932. During the same visit, Alfred claimed that liberalism was perishing 
in Europe.64 
  The sociologist Hans Freyer similarly decried the predominance of 
capitalism, technology, and science over culture. Modern societies, Freyer feared, 
faced the prospect of meaninglessness.65 However, Freyer did not share Weber’s 
resignation in the face of modernity. He argued that the ‘prospect of a dawning age 
devoid of meaning was not an inexorable consequence of the development of 
technology’.66 If capitalism was overcome, the predicament of modernity could be 
rectified.67 In Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft (1930), a general treatise on 
sociology, Freyer emphasized the possibility for change in the future. This earned him 
a laudable review by Herbert Marcuse, who praised Freyer for his orientation towards 
the future and towards what was possible.68 Thinking that rationalization was not an 
inescapable facet of modernization, Freyer supported National Socialism, which he 
hoped could open up an alternative path to modernity. In this he was not alone. Arnold 
Gehlen – like Freyer a member of the Leipzig School – made similar points in an essay 
on ‘Idealism and the Present’ published in 1935. Quoting Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf 
on idealism and perception, Gehlen argued: ‘it is precisely not the realistic way of 
perception [Erfahrungsrichtung] that remains attached to the given that leads to the 
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most profound perception’.69 Instead, science had to be based on an idealist conviction 
that sought to ‘change the “given”, namely to “merge” an idea ... with reality (as Fichte 
said)’.70 
 
3. Necessity and Contingency in Post-War German Social Thought. 
 
  West German theorists seeking to make sense of the nature of modern 
industrial society after the Second World War could thus draw on a long-standing 
intellectual tradition.71 During the war, James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution 
(1941) added another high-profile publication that spurred anglophone interest in the 
issue of bureaucratization.72 Burnham’s book was also closely studied by German 
theorists. The experience of the reality of National Socialism and war changed the 
terms of the debate as well. In the case of many scholars, it effected a change of heart 
and move away from advocating radical change on the basis of conceptions that saw 
society as contingent. Helmut Schelsky, one of the founding fathers of the sociological 
discipline after the Second World War and another member of the Leipzig School, 
recalled how the experiences of the war had cured him of his youthful interest in 
‘abstract philosophical, particularly idealist thought’, for instance that of Fichte and 
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Schelling.73 The same applied to Freyer, who changed his views on the philosophy of 
history radically after the war. As Jerry Muller shows, the experience of National 
Socialism effected a fundamental change of heart in Freyer. During the 1950s, Freyer 
adamantly insisted on the inevitability of ‘industrial society’, the source of alienation 
that he had sought to overcome during Weimar. Freyer now opposed any ‘chiliasm 
[that] served to delegitimize the present through its promise of salvation within 
history’.74  
  Consisting mostly of sociologists and historians, through the work of 
Schelsky and Gehlen the Leipzig School exercised great influence on the 
methodological outlook of the social sciences in West Germany in the immediate post-
war period. With Schelsky and Carl Jantke, two members of the Leipzig School 
worked at the Academy for Common Economics in Hamburg, where Dahrendorf took 
up his first professorial appointment on 1 May 1958. Schelsky developed his 
methodological ideas in dialogue with and opposition to the Frankfurt School. In his 
Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie, Schelsky discussed Theodor Adorno’s 
critique of empirical sociology at length.75 In this book, Schelsky recommended that 
sociology should be understood as a science of ‘reality control’ as it was practiced by 
Gehlen or König: 
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The most significant function of sociological analysis for social action 
today is no longer pointing out what is to be done and what is to be decided, 
but rather to make visible that which is happening anyway and cannot be 
changed. At this point, the most essential task of scientific examination of 
reality may well be a function against the planning and manipulation 
mandate for modern Man, against the philosophy of ‘feasibility’ of people 
and issues. This means that the limits rather than the goals of social action 
are the legitimate object of contemporary sociology.76  
 
  Gehlen was similarly opposed to political schemes that ignored reality. Like 
Freyer and Schelsky, Gehlen abandoned his earlier celebration of idealist fervour to 
overcome modern society for a conservative appraisal of the status quo. As Karl-
Siegbert Rehberg relates, the two scholars closely studied American pragmatism at the 
American Library in Karlsruhe in 1947. Indeed, Gehlen dismissed the anti-empirical 
tendencies of German philosophers by saying that ‘as far as German philosophy is 
concerned, Socrates was devoured by Plato, and Hobbes, Hume, W. James, and Dewey 
lived in vain’.77 Seeking to turn sociology into an ‘administrative auxiliary science’, 
Gehlen praised American sociology for its realistic outlook.78 Along the lines of his 
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teacher Gehlen, Schelsky interpreted Hobbes as a predecessor of pragmatism.79 
Gehlen’s call for reality culminated in Moral und Hypermoral, published in 1969 as a 
critique of alleged utopian humanitarian politics that were based on ethics of 
conviction. In this book, Gehlen warned against losing a sense of reality, stating that 
‘those who strive for the “realization” of an idea are likely to perceive real practical 
constraints as immoral, as an unevenness of reality that must be grinded off by the 
guillotine’.80   
  Anti-idealism was central to Schelsky’s political thought. For him, idealists 
were guilty of ignoring the ‘practical necessities’ that reality imposed on politics. 
Schelsky’s work was an attempt to highlight precisely which practical necessities 
existed so that public life could be administered on their basis. Specifically, Schelsky 
sought to break up the idealist monopoly at German universities. In 1963, in 
Einsamkeit und Freiheit, Schelsky suggested that the traditional Humboldtian 
university was at odds with the new social realities of post-war industrial society.81 
Schelsky’s book vigorously rejected idealism and the ideas of Humboldt, Fichte, 
Schelling, and Schleiermacher on university education. Schelsky noted that for 
idealists, universities functioned as institutions of withdrawal from society and were 
geared at the moral purification and self-realization of the individual.82 Schelling, 
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Fichte, and Humboldt assumed that this was the best way of creating servants of the 
state. Schelling wanted future statesmen to familiarize themselves with ideas since 
‘only ideas make action vigorous and provide it with moral significance’.83 In the 
works of Fichte, Hegel, Steffens, Schleiermacher, and Humboldt, Schelsky detected a 
conception of the state as a ‘cultural state’, realizing ‘ideas’ and ‘ideals’, removed and 
freed from the needs of and ‘particular interests’ present in society.84 Schelsky 
cautioned that this conception of the state could lead to utopian ideas on university 
reform.85 Most importantly, Schelsky argued that idealism was a spectrum of ideas 
closely connected to a particular context of a social upper class.86 Those who called 
for new universities to be founded according to the idealist ideals of the nineteenth 
century ignored the importance of this social context. Institutional foundations based 
on certain ideas only made sense if those ideas were aligned with the social reality of 
their present society.87 Ignoring such sociological elements, idealists were wrong to 
insist that their ideas were timeless rather than historical.88 As society had further 
evolved since the nineteenth century, universities also had to evolve. 
  This critique of idealism was underpinned by the assumption that expert-led 
administrative forms of politics were a given part of modernity that could not be 
ignored.89 According to Schelsky, industrial society depended on administrative 
experts who were conscious of the constraints imposed on politics by ‘reality’. For this 
reason, he envisioned sociology as a science that would instruct and supply 
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administrators for ‘social policy and social planning’.90 In an outline of his thoughts 
on the ‘new university’ dating from 17 August 1965, Schelsky maintained that the rise 
of bureaucracy and its dependence on scientific research for administrative purposes 
necessitated much closer collaboration between science and politics.91 In turn, 
Schelsky again criticized the ‘idealist’ defenders of Humboldt’s university for ignoring 
such practical necessities when they argued that universities should be constituted 
according to a timeless ‘idea’.92 Any institution needed to be founded upon an idea 
which was congruent with social reality. If this was no longer the case, institutions 
would wither away. Ideas that were unaligned with reality in turn led to utopianism 
and moralistic preaching.93  
  Schelsky attempted to put these ideas into practice as the principle figure in 
the foundation of the University of Bielefeld. In early 1965, the education secretary of 
North-Rhine Westphalia Paul Mikat (CDU) appointed Schelsky to conceptualize a new 
university for the North East of the federal state.94 Schelsky intended Bielefeld as a 
realist university which would function as an institution for academics who were intent 
on creating awareness of practical constraints on collective human agency.95 After the 
university started operating in 1969, Schelsky heavily invested in an intellectual 
engagement with Habermas’ writings. In January 1970, the new university’s Center 
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for Interdisciplinary Research hosted a seminar on Habermas.96 For Schelsky, one of 
the attendants of the seminar, intellectual engagement with Habermas culminated in a 
hundred-page long unpublished manuscript that, by quoting the Austrian writer 
Heimito von Doderer, portrayed Habermas’ social thought as the product of an 
intellectual living ‘in a “second reality” which is supposed to enable [Man] to live in 
the extension of that which he has made up’.97 According to Schelsky, Habermas 
epitomized the reluctance of intellectuals to recognize unchangeable practical 
necessities. At the University of Bielefeld, many scholars shared Schelsky’s outlook. 
Based at Bielefeld, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann continued a new thread of debate 
with Habermas, who criticized his systems theory as a ‘social technology’.98 Besides 
Luhmann, perhaps one of the most famous academics who Schelsky managed to attract 
to Bielefeld was the intellectual historian Reinhart Koselleck. As Willibald Steinmetz 
shows, Koselleck’s theoretical writings always emphasized the tremendous extent to 
which human action was constrained by external necessities.99 Koselleck’s first book 
Critique and Crisis focused on the rise of utopian philosophies of history during the 
Enlightenment, portraying it as the root of the crisis of a modernity characterized by 
misery and conflict. During the Enlightenment, Koselleck argued, mankind had started 
to dangerously overestimate the degree to which destiny could be controlled:  
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During the course of the unfolding of Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum as the 
personal guarantee of Man fallen from religious bonds, eschatology turns 
into utopia. Planning history becomes as important as gaining control over 
nature. The technologized state contributes to the misconception that 
history can be planned...100  
 
  In Koselleck’s analysis, this impulse was important to explain the rise of 
ethics of conviction in modern history. Finally, he stressed that utopian philosophies 
of history could only have developed within the safety that absolutism provided.101 
Consequently, Koselleck’s views on Hobbes were very similar to Schelsky, 
accordingly praising the prominent seventeenth-century theorist of absolutism for 
deriving ought from is.102 In contrast to Schelsky, however, Koselleck had a decidedly 
negative view of bureaucracy. In his Habilitation thesis on Prussia, written under the 
aegis of Werner Conze, Koselleck identified bureaucratic administrators like Karl 
August von Hardenberg as the social group who overestimated the degree to which 
social reality could be politically changed.103 Their optimistic view on what was 
politically feasible prompted a political approach to reform that generated a social 
movement that eventually grew out of control.104 
  With this methodological programme, Schelsky became a leading member of 
the field of sociology in post-war West Germany. It was at a meeting in Hamburg 
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which he organized in 1955 that Dahrendorf met many others of his generation of 
sociologists for the first time, most importantly Heinrich Popitz (who became a close 
ally, as well as godfather of his daughter Nicola nine years later) and Jürgen 
Habermas.105 Others in attendance were René König, Carl Jantke, Hellmuth Plessner, 
Karl Martin Bolte, Heinz Kluth, Dietrich Goldschmidt, Christian von Ferber, and Hans 
Paul Bahrdt, making the gathering an assembly of many prominent members of the 
discipline.106 In a journal review that did not attempt to conceal its methodological 
preferences, Dahrendorf contrasted the Twelfth German Sociological Conference in 
Heidelberg in 1954 with the Hamburg seminar of the following year.107 Dahrendorf 
pointed out that, whereas the Conference was dominated by sociologists inclined 
towards philosophical speculation and system-building, Schelsky’s seminar assembled 
sociologists with ‘a more modest orientation towards the empirically given’.108 
Discussing Gehlen and Schelsky’s new sociology textbook, Dahrendorf described the 
new approach to sociology as ‘perhaps less spectacular, but at the same time more 
useful’ than the work of their methodological adversaries.109 
  Industrial sociology was the topic that most attracted the attention of both 
Schelsky and the younger scholars assembled in Hamburg. For Schelsky, it was clear 
that ‘changes in the ways of production’ had been by far the most important driving 
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force in modern history.110 During the same year, a group of young researchers started 
to meet regularly at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. With Dahrendorf, 
Popitz, Bahrdt, Habermas, Ludwig von Friedeburg, Ernst August Jüres, and Hanno 
Kesting, the group formed a politically curious mix. Von Friedeburg was a junior 
researcher at the Institute in Frankfurt (where Habermas joined him a year later), while 
Popitz had written his doctorate on Marx’s early writings on alienation.111 Several of 
the most prominent members of this group worked at the Social Research Institute in 
Dortmund. It was here that Popitz, Bahrdt, Jüres, and Kesting published a path-
breaking study in industrial sociology on workers’ conceptions of society.112 With 
figures like Gunther Ipsen, a student of Freyer and a member of the Leipzig School, 
the Institute had a reputation as a conservative institution. Kesting in turn was a close 
friend of Koselleck, whom he had met at Alfred Weber’s seminar while studying in 
Heidelberg.113 Sharing Koselleck’s conservative instinct and intellectual affinity to 
Schmitt, Kesting’s doctorate on Utopia and Eschatology (1952) and his Philosophy of 
History and Global Civil War (1959) closely resembled the argument of Critique and 
Crisis. Indeed, by moving to the Institute in Dortmund, Kesting made a career move 
that Koselleck had also considered: In the summer of 1955, Koselleck was close to 
taking up an offer by Popitz to join him at the Institute.114 In December 1953, Popitz 
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had already approached him about the possibility of coming to Dortmund.115 Although 
he was very interested, Koselleck in the end opted for an assistant position in history 
at Johannes Kühn’s Chair at the University of Heidelberg.116 For intellectual historians 
of the Kesting and Koselleck type, Dortmund constituted an appealing opportunity to 
closely study the reality of industrial society, and thus to pursue science in a way that 
eschewed the political utopianism that they sought to contain. In 1962, Kesting moved 
to Aachen to become Gehlen’s assistant.117 
  In the publications of the industrial sociology working group, the issue of 
structures and contingency in modern industrial society featured prominently. This was 
even the case for someone like Bahrdt, who argued that bureaucratization was not 
inescapable. Speaking at the Fourteenth Sociological Conference in May 1959 on the 
Industrial Sociology Panel that Dahrendorf chaired, Bahrdt argued that industrial 
bureaucracy was in fact in decline. In industries where technical knowledge was 
crucial, hierarchies were becoming flatter and the degree to which administrators 
dominated lower tiers had diminished. For instance, the tendency of the atomic 
industry to introduce cooperative bodies in which experts shared responsibility for 
decision-making was not ‘the work of otherworldly utopians who seek to abolish the 
type of domination by bureaucratic hierarchies. The dissolution of this type of 
domination and its changing into a cooperative system of leadership of a new type is 
in fact a “technical necessity dictated by the nature of the form of labour”’.118  
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  Paralleling Schelsky’s ambitions, René König had an equally prominent 
position in the German sociological profession in the post-war period. While the two 
disagreed profoundly on political questions – most prominently on how to engage with 
Germany’s recent Nazi past – König shared his methodological orientation towards 
reality. For König, sociology’s relevance was rooted in its orientation towards social 
reality, while the quality of political measures depended on the recognition of the 
unchangeable character of certain social facts. As the successor of Leopold von Wiese 
at the University of Cologne, König edited the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, by far the most important sociological periodical at the time. 
Moreover, König emphasized his intellectual debt to French positivism and his 
distance from idealism.119 For König as for Schelsky, Gehlen, and Dahrendorf, 
idealists were guilty of categorically refusing to accept social reality, an attitude that 
led to utopianism. In exile in Zurich between 1937 and 1949, König elaborated on this 
point in a book on Machiavelli published in 1941, which described the Renaissance as 
a period of aesthetic utopianism that distracted men from reality by appealing to a 
mythologized classical world.120 In the context of a social crisis after the breakdown 
of the social order of the Middle Ages, Machiavelli had offered a new utopian political 
ideal, the state:  
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Machiavelli’s work was located within the tension of the disordered 
everyday world and the long-term goal of a new order. The scale of his 
thought therefore spanned from acknowledgment of the irredeemably 
disordered state of the historical-social world of the Renaissance to risking 
a new order of life in the form of the foundation of the state. Nonetheless 
he was bound to fail, since the crisis structure of his time did not allow him 
to realize that society cannot be ordered by utopian schemes, that it 
dismembers societies even further, and that the state can only be founded if 
new orders come to life from within real life.121 
 
  König thus disagreed with the picture of Machiavelli as a ‘reason of state 
realist’ drawn by commentators such as Fichte, Leopold von Ranke, Friedrich 
Meinecke, and Freyer.122 During the post-war decades, König continued his campaign 
against the influence of social utopias and social philosophy on sociological 
practice.123 König extended his critique of Machiavelli to the Frankfurt School and 
other intellectuals who refused to accept the changed social conditions of the twentieth 
century. After 1918, König argued, revolutionary Marxism had ‘become an inadequate 
ideology’ caught in a process of ‘aesthetic and philosophical dilution’.124 A new social 
                                                           
121 ibid., 16: ‘In der Spannung zwischen dem ordnungslosen Alltag und dem Fernziel neuer Ordnung … 
bewegt sich das Werk Machiavellis. Die Skala seines Denkens reicht dementsprechend von der 
Anerkenntnis des unüberholbar ordnungslosen Zustandes der geschichtlich-gesellschaftlichen Welt in 
der Renaissance bis zum Wagnis einer Neuordnung des Lebens, der Gründung des Staates. Da allerdings 
mit der Krisenstruktur seiner Gegenwart ihm die Möglichkeit verschlossen ist einzusehen, daß die 
Gesellschaft durch utopische Entwürfe nicht nur nicht geordnet, sondern nur noch mehr zerrissen wird, 
und daß nur dann der Staat gegründet warden kann, wenn innerhalb des faktischen Lebens neue 
Ordnungen lebendig warden, muß er ins Leere stoßen.’ 
122 ibid., 245. 
123 Günther Lüschen, ‘Einleitung’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie: Sonderheft 
21 (1979), 13. 
124 René König, ‘Zur Soziologie der zwanziger Jahre’, in Studien zur Soziologie (Frankfurt am Main: 




reality had turned it into an ideology of intellectuals who were unable to accept given 
facts and were engaged in intellectual projects which lacked any connection to reality. 
Drawing a contrast between himself and the Frankfurt School, König advocated a 
version of social science whose ‘increasing knowledge of social reality could “really” 
change society, and not just in “critical conscience”’.125 
 
4. Escalation of Disagreements during the Later 1950s: The Origins of the 
Positivism Dispute in the German Sociological Association. 
 
  Such arguments in favour of empirical sociology did not go unchallenged in 
post-war West Germany. Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas were to become their 
most prominent critics. In 1957, Adorno published a broadside against empirical 
sociology, arguing that it entailed an inherently conservative tendency to reproduce, 
and thus positively affirm, given states of society.126 With this tendency, he stated, 
empirical social research mirrored the reality of a society which was dominated by 
administration.127 For Habermas it was equally clear that modern societies were subject 
to bureaucratization. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), 
Habermas charted the effect that bureaucratization had on public discourse and 
democracy.128 In a contribution to the Festschrift for Wolfgang Abendroth, he 
observed in 1968:  
                                                           
125 René König, ‘Vorwort’, in Studien zur Soziologie, 8: ‘wachsenden Erkenntnis der gesellschaftlichen 
Wirklichkeit Gesellschaft auch “wirklich” verändert werde und nicht nur im “kritischen Bewußtsein”. 
126 Theodor Adorno, ‘Soziologie und empirische Forschung’, in Rolf Thiedemann (ed.), Theodor 
Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972 [1957]), 204-5. 
127 ibid., 199. 




The creation of technologically usable knowledge, the development of 
technology, the industrial and military use of technologies, and an 
encompassing administration of all aspects of society [my italics], private 
as well as public, seem to merge into a crisis-proof and sustained expansive 
system...129 
 
It was this process, he thought, that threatened human autonomy. Increasing the scope 
of free human agency within bureaucratic societies was central to Habermas’ 
intellectual project.130 
  Adorno’s critique of empirical sociology in turn sparked objections after its 
publication in 1957. Schelsky for his part took aim at it in the Ortsbestimmung volume, 
mentioned above. Over the next years, a fierce debate about the merits of empirical 
sociology ensued, which involved acrimonious disagreements about necessity and 
contingency in society. As the author of this thesis has shown elsewhere in further 
detail, it was this disagreement between the Frankfurt School and its allies on the one 
hand and advocates of empirical sociology on the other that evolved into the debate 
that subsequently acquired the name of the ‘Positivism Dispute’.131 Organized by 
Dahrendorf, who had received a Chair in Sociology at the University of Tübingen the 
previous year, the German Sociological Association assembled for a seminar at 
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Tübingen in October 1961. With Karl Popper and Adorno delivering papers on the 
‘logic of the social sciences’, this seminar has had a lasting impact on the 
historiography of the methodological and political debates surrounding the seminar, to 
the effect that Popper’s role is seen as central and that the reasons why the seminar was 
organized at all are not problematized.132  
  The seminar at Tübingen picked up where previous exchanges had ended. As 
Rainer Lepsius notes, this meeting was a follow-up of a seminar that had taken place 
on 28 and 29 October 1960 at Niederwald Castle.133 Attended by Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer, König, Gehlen, Schelsky, Arnold Bergstraesser, Wilhelm Emil 
Mühlmann, Hans Achinger, Bahrdt, Hellmut Becker, Dahrendorf, and Popitz, this 
seminar assembled most of West Germany’s leading sociologists of the early 1960s.134 
This meeting was an attempt to overcome, or at least better formulate, the 
methodological and political disagreements that had divided German sociologists for 
the larger part of the 1950s, when disagreements had often led to bitter fighting about 
the thematic focuses of the GSA’s official conferences.  
  The split between philosophically oriented sociologists and advocates of 
empirical research had emerged with full force at the Thirteenth German Sociological 
Conference in 1956 and the Fourteenth German Sociological Conference in 1959. 
Empirical sociology was gaining ground within the profession, prompting Plessner to 
describe the 1956 meeting as an empiricist ‘craftsmen’s uprising’.135 As an advocate 
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of a philosophically inclined understanding of sociology, Plessner increasingly worried 
about the future of German sociology. Towards the end of his two-year term as 
Chairman of the GSA, Plessner pleaded with Bergstraesser to run as his successor in 
order to ensure that sociology guided by ‘purely pragmatic and contemporary interests’ 
would not completely replace ‘historical and theoretical contemplation’.136 Plessner 
feared that due to a surge in younger empirically minded members, it was not unlikely 
that König or Schelsky might manage to secure a majority for the Chairmanship.137 
Bergstraesser however declined to put his name forward, suggesting that Plessner 
should run for a second term.138 Duly re-elected, Plessner organized the Fourteenth 
German Sociological Conference in 1959. In line with the methodological arguments 
of the previous years, the conference was far from uncontroversial. After the release 
of the programme in April 1959, Schelsky caused a major scandal by revoking his 
attendance and the paper he was scheduled to give at the conference. 
  Most scholars have argued that Schelsky’s cancellation was a reaction to the 
GSA’s opposition to a conference in Nuremberg in 1958, which he had helped to 
organize.139 At the time, König above all had campaigned against the conference 
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because of the involvement of several academics with Fascist and National Socialist 
pasts, most prominently Corrado Gini from Italy.140 Thus, at the time the battle lines 
of German sociology were not only drawn between advocates of empirical sociology 
and critical theorists, but also between conservatives like Schelsky and liberals like 
König, as emphasized by Dahms.141 However, in terms of their methodological 
orientation, both were markedly similar. While it is true that Schelsky and König’s 
opinions diverged on whether to engage with unrepentant former Nazis and Fascists, 
we should not underestimate their shared resentment of what they considered 
methodologically misguided conceptions of sociology. In 1959, König and Schelsky 
made common front against the Fourteenth German Sociological Conference for 
methodological reasons unconnected to the Nuremberg conference. Schelsky accused 
Plessner of changing the programme against the will of the rest of the Steering 
Committee, of deliberately assigning unfavourable timeslots to König’s and his papers, 
and of giving the Conference a generally philosophical character.142 In his next letter, 
Schelsky added that the conference had acquired the character of a ‘Frankfurt 
Sociological Conference in Berlin’.143 König also wrote to Plessner to complain about 
the ‘philosophical’ character of the conference, stating that it was at odds with what 
the Steering Committee had agreed upon.144 Twelve days later, König told Plessner 
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that as a sociologist he did not feel qualified to attend a philosophical conference, and 
that he would follow Schelsky in not attending since the latter was the only other 
sociologist among the speakers.145 Indeed, Schelsky himself remarked at the time that 
there was no correlation whatsoever between the viewpoints of individual sociologists 
on the two divisive issues of contemporary sociology: the methodological divide 
within the profession and the question of how to deal with former associates of the 
Nazi regime.146 
  Unlike Schelsky, König did in the end attend the conference, which may 
explain why their shared methodological agenda has not been noticed as an antecedent 
of the Positivism Dispute. The seminars in Niederwald and Tübingen in October 1960 
and in October 1961 were attempts to overcome the bitter conflict between empirically 
minded sociologists and advocates of philosophically oriented versions of sociology. 
At Niederwald, the GSA attempted to inaugurate a genuinely methodological 
discussion and to put an end to the personal element to the disagreements. In the GSA 
Steering Committee’s meeting immediately before Niederwald, Dahrendorf urged that 
organizational questions connected with the IIS, the international body behind the 
Nuremberg conference, should not distract from the discussion of methodological and 
political questions at the seminar.147 Dahrendorf wanted to avoid theoretical issues of 
importance to be crowded out by discussions that had already caused a lot of distraction 
during the preceding year. For the seminar, Otto Stammer, who had succeeded Plessner 
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as Chair in 1959, proposed recent publications on sociological method by Schelsky, 
Adorno, and König as topics of discussion.148 A few months later, Stammer added 
Wilhelm Mühlmann’s ‘Sociology in Germany: Shift in Alignment’ to the reading list 
for the seminar.149 
  A year later, at the GSA’s member’s meeting that was convened in Tübingen 
on the same weekend as the seminar, Otto Stammer told the audience that he took it as 
the main task of his Chairmanship to ‘soften’ the political and methodological divide 
within the Association. In this vein, Stammer stated that Niederwald had been a 
successful first effort, and that Tübingen would be the next step.150 Dahms relates that 
at the Tübingen seminar, the ‘positivist’ side might have been represented by a paper 
by Schelsky or König instead of the one given by Popper. Dahrendorf for his part 
decided to invite Popper because he feared that neither Schelsky nor König would be 
able to build up a strong opposition against Adorno.151 In the preparatory sessions of 
the GSA, Dahrendorf suggested Popper in October 1960 because he felt that it was 
necessary to invite someone from the outside, as new arguments were not to be 
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expected if speakers were drawn from the German sociological profession.152 When 
Popper came to Tübingen, expectations were therefore high for new impulses. These 
expectations were disappointed. In his memoirs, Albert retrospectively observed that 
it would indeed have been more fruitful to have Schelsky or König present, given that 
Popper’s paper lacked reference to the ‘contemporary German constellation’.153 In his 
summary of the discussion at the seminar for the Positivismusstreit volume, 
Dahrendorf also remembered the profound sense of disappointment among the seminar 
audience.154 In fact, at the time Dahrendorf was so disappointed by the seminar himself 
that he advised Stammer that there was no point in transcribing the recording of the 
discussion, a task which had initially been assigned to his office.155 
 
6. Popper, the Frankfurt School, and the Issue of Value Freedom. 
 
  During the Positivism Dispute, members of the Frankfurt School repeatedly 
attacked the idea that social processes and facts needed to be accepted as ‘given’. 
Popper’s statements at the beginning of the first article of the series ‘Poverty of 
Historicism’ from 1944/1945 seem to suggest that he did indeed subscribe to the tenets 
that members of the Frankfurt School were attacking. Here, Popper advocated  
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a methodology which aims at a technological social science. Such a 
methodology would lead to the study of the general laws of social life with 
the aim of finding all those facts which would be indispensable as a basis 
for the work of everyone seeking to reform social institutions. There is no 
doubt that such facts exist. We know many Utopian systems, for instance, 
which are impracticable simply because they do not consider such facts 
sufficiently. The technological methodology we are considering would aim 
at furnishing means of avoiding such unrealistic constructions.156 
 
  Popper’s critique of historicism posited that society was subject to certain 
laws that were invariable across time and space, in analogy with the laws observed by 
natural scientists. Historicists, Popper maintained, denied the existence of such laws. 
Thus, Popper seemed to agree with the German empirical sociologists on whose behalf 
he was expected to speak at the Tübingen seminar. Both Popper and they worried about 
political schemes that disregarded ‘given’ strictures. However, a closer look reveals 
significant differences between Popper and the German sociologists. Popper believed 
in the existence of universal social laws such as that ‘You cannot introduce agricultural 
laws and at the same time reduce the cost of living’, or that ‘You cannot introduce a 
political reform without strengthening the opposing forces, to a degree roughly 
increasing with the significance of the reform’.157 At the same time, Popper attacked 
historicists for insisting instead that discrete historical periods were subject to their 
own social facts and laws, or that human history was subject to any ‘inexorable’ 
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historical laws of development.158 In the third and last article on historicism, Popper 
insisted that  
 
The hope ... that we may some day find the ‘laws of motion of society,’ just 
as Newton found the laws of motion of physical bodies, is nothing but the 
result of these misunderstandings. Since there is no motion of society in 
any sense similar or analogous to the motion of physical bodies, there can 
be no such laws.159 
 
  In The Open Society and its Enemies, Popper had also attacked Hegel for his 
‘ethical and juridical positivism, the doctrine that what is, is good, since there can be 
no standards but existing standards’.160 Here, Popper made the exact point that 
Habermas, Marcuse, and Adorno were later making against positivist sociologists in 
their debates before and after the Tübingen seminar in October 1961. In 1970, Popper 
observed in his passionate critique of the Positivismusstreit volume that: 
 
the main issue of the book has become Adorno’s and Habermas’ accusation 
that a ‘positivist’ like Popper is bound by his methodology to defend the 
political status quo. It is an accusation which I myself raised in my Open 
Society against Hegel, whose identity philosophy (what is real is 
reasonable) I described as a ‘moral and legal positivism’.161 
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  Habermas also picked up on this convergence of arguments, although he 
sought to defend Hegel, stating that he had never meant to espouse the ‘metaphysical 
positivism’ imputed to him by Popper.162 The passage quoted from Popper’s third 
‘Poverty of Historicism’ article seems to contradict his earlier call for a ‘technological 
social science’ only at first glance. For Popper, there was an important difference 
between universal laws and arguments about social facts and laws that only applied to 
certain periods. While Popper’s dismissal of utopian policies that disregarded universal 
laws sounded familiar to his German hosts, his political theory emphasized the extent 
and possibility of rational human choice, in turn dismissing determinist arguments. 
Significantly, the assumption that strictures arise from universal laws rather than 
necessary historical developments implied a much smaller set of constraints. Only 
social phenomena present in every single society in human history qualified as laws, 
meaning that the absence in just one particular society would render a law falsified. 
On the other hand, ‘historicists’ could interpret a higher number of social phenomena 
as necessary, even if they were only present at a particular point in time or space. In 
effect, this created a line of division between Popper, the anti-determinist, and the 
German empirical sociologists, whose arguments about unchangeable social facts were 
primarily of the latter category. Dahrendorf’s political theory revolved around a sharp 
analytical distinction between capitalist and post-capitalist society, attempting to 
replace older versions of liberalism that had been rendered anachronistic by new social 
forces.163 Gehlen’s view on the ‘practical necessities’ that administrations were faced 
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with was that they were conditioned by the circumstances of present ‘industrial 
society’, which he thought constituted a break with the past of the first order.164 
Schelsky also insisted that ‘industrial society’ was essentially different from earlier 
periods, rendering earlier political theories anachronistic. A point central to Schelsky’s 
political thought was that political systems were inevitably bound to be transformed 
by the practical necessities that industrial society imposed on politics; administrators 
would gradually take over more and more decision-making from politicians. For him, 
it was clear that the concept of democracy would lose its traditional meaning.165 König 
for his part submitted that there were no universal laws across time and space. 
Referencing Durkheim, he insisted that the concept of ‘law’ can only be applied to 
‘particular social types at a particular moment of their development.‘166 Not 
unsurprisingly, Popper was perplexed to find himself associated with what he called 
‘historicism’ during the Positivism Dispute.  
  Neither Popper nor subsequent commentators on the Positivism Dispute 
realized that the Frankfurt School primarily engaged with the arguments of German 
empirical sociologists rather than Popper’s diverging arguments. The issue of practical 
necessities caused by ‘given’ social facts was nonetheless at the core of the dispute. In 
1937, Max Horkheimer had already criticized positivism for solely engaging with the 
‘given’ in his seminal essay on the Vienna Circle.167 Herbert Marcuse’s Reason and 
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Revolution of 1941 also sought to highlight the conservative implications of the 
‘positivist’ focus on the ‘given’.168 Adorno made a similar point in his introduction to 
the Positivismusstreit volume published in 1969, where he argued that ‘since Pareto, 
positivist skepticism has been arranging itself with existing power, including that of 
Mussolini’.169 In line with other members of the Frankfurt School, Adorno insisted that 
certain forms of domination and coercion were not ‘given’: 
 
In no way can the possibility that social coercion is an animalistic-
biological heritage be invoked in favour of sacrosanct theory; the 
inexorable spell of the animal realm reproduces itself in the brutal 
domination of society that still carries a natural-historical character. 
However, from this one cannot apologetically deduce the unchangeable 
character of coercion.170  
 
By attributing necessity to contingent phenomena, positivism artificially reproduced 
contingent reality, he concluded.171 
  During the 1960s, Habermas assumed a central position in this debate. His 
exchanges with Albert on the relative merits of critical theory and critical rationalism 
have already been studied. However, it still remains to be shown just why Habermas 
was so preoccupied with positivism in the first place. This chapter suggests that an 
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analysis of the debate about unchangeable ‘givens’ in society must be part of the 
answer. Habermas worried about the political implications of the arguments of 
‘positivist’ sociologists.172 During the 1960s, Habermas repeatedly insisted that society 
was not determined by socio-economic facts, but rather that collectively, humans could 
consciously shape their society and political system. In Erkenntnis und Interesse, 
Habermas thus argued that: 
 
For the individual, the institutional frame of the established society 
constitutes an unchangeable reality. Desires that are incompatible with this 
reality are unrealizable and therefore retain the character of wishful 
phantasies, transformed into symptoms by resistance and forced onto the 
track of substitute satisfaction. For the whole species the boundaries of 
reality are by contrast very well changeable.173 
 
As Habermas later remembered, Gehlen’s anthropological writings on institutions had 
been at the center of his mind when he was writing this passage.174 
  Dahms, Müller-Doohm, and Keuth all treat Habermas’ contribution to the 
Adorno Festschrift in 1963 as his first major intervention in the Positivism Dispute.175 
It is true that this paper inaugurated a new phase of the debate by prompting Popper’s 
                                                           
172 Matthew Specter, Habermas: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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disciple Albert to write a reply in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, which Habermas in turn countered with a new contribution to the 
same journal.176 However, Habermas had already engaged with critical rationalism and 
‘positivist’ sociology in his Habilationsprobevorlesung in Marburg in December 1961 
and a paper given in January 1962 in Berlin, thus shortly after the seminar in Tübingen. 
In his Marburg lecture, published in Theorie und Praxis, Habermas offered an 
interpretation of the shift that differentiated modern from classical political thought. 
Inaugurated by Machiavelli and Thomas More and completed by Hobbes, Habermas 
depicted modern political thought as breaking with the intimate connection between 
politics and ethics that had characterized classical political theory since Aristotle. 
Whereas classical political thought had included the ambition to change human 
conduct by appealing to virtue, modern political thought since Hobbes interpreted 
human conduct as natural and unchangeable.177 Since for Hobbes, political goals 
necessarily arose from human nature, politics was reduced to value-rational technical 
decisions on how best to obtain those goals.  
  In another section of Theorie und Praxis, Habermas expanded on which 
political goals ‘positivists’ took as given, a point that the Marburg lecture had left more 
implicit. According to Habermas, despite its neutralist pretensions, positivism implied 
a society in which the value system was supplied by technology running its course.178 
Habermas worried that technocracy had the potential to determine and change value 
                                                           
176 Hans Albert, ‘Der Mythos der totalen Vernunft: Dialektische Ansprüche im Lichte undialektischer 
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systems.179 Positivists such as Hobbes and Carl Schmitt posited ‘basic values’ such as 
survival, reducing social science to the question of ‘how decision-making systems - 
individuals or groups, certain institutions or whole societies – need to be organized in 
order to satisfy the basic value of survival and to avoid risks in given situations’.180 
Habermas added that Horst Rittel had already laid out the unmistakable consequences 
of technocratic rationalization, namely that ‘that which can be willed … depended on 
that which can be realized’.181 For this reason, Habermas advocated critical theory as 
an intellectual endeavour which saw its task as reflecting on the desirability of the 
social and political goals that positivism regarded as ‘given’. In this way, it was 
Habermas’ opposition to arguments about ‘necessity’ that drove him to reject value 
freedom in the social sciences. Keuth’s insistence that the Positivism Dispute was 
about the question of value freedom, value judgments, and ‘ethical knowledge’ is 
therefore correct in itself. However, by ignoring the larger undercurrent debate about 
necessity and contingency in history and society that preoccupied German sociologists 
during the 1950s and 1960s, Keuth’s analysis fails to point out why the issue of value 
freedom was of such importance to Habermas and other contributors. Indeed, Keuth 
surmises that Habermas rejected value freedom because the question did not arise for 
him, since as a dialectician he thought that ‘that which will be the case equals ought’.182 
This is to miss the point, and indeed to attribute to Habermas the opposite position of 
the one he assumed in the methodological debate on necessity and contingency. 
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Habermas was so preoccupied with the question of value freedom precisely because 
he worried about the implications of the ‘positivist’ position of construing certain 
social phenomena as necessary, and of certain values as arising necessarily. It was 
precisely because Habermas insisted that is does not equal ought that he criticized the 
stipulation of value freedom. 
  Significantly, in his Marburg lecture Habermas explicitly extended his 
critique of modern political thought to critical rationalism, arguing that it had 
abandoned the decidedly normative orientation of classical political theory.183 
According to Habermas, Popper stood in the same modern political tradition as Max 
Weber and Carl Schmitt, since his ‘decisionist’ methodology took norms as given 
instead of subjecting them to philosophical scrutiny as the classical political theorists 
had done.184 By extending this critique to Popper, Habermas associated him with the 
empirical sociologists whose methodological opposition to the Frankfurt School had 
triggered the Positivist Dispute in the first place. In a paper on ‘Critical and 
Conservative Tasks of Sociology’, given in Berlin in January 1962, Habermas offered 
an analysis of sociology’s inherently conservative character by looking at the history 
of sociology from the Scottish Enlightenment to Schelsky. Rejecting Dahrendorf’s and 
Schelsky’s understandings of the tasks of sociology as akin to Weber’s value freedom, 
Habermas pointed out that since the Scottish moral philosophers, liberal and 
conservative sociologists had interpreted history as natural history in the sense that 
they conceptualized social processes and the historical development of society as 
necessary. Thus, sociologists were apologists of states of society which they thought 
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were prescribed by the natural history of society, making their work inherently 
conservative by deriving ought from is.185 In his critique of positivist sociology, 
Habermas’ position was in fact not too dissimilar from Popper, who denied that there 
were any laws of historical development, rejecting ‘the metaphysical doctrine of 
determinism [which] simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or 
unalterable, or predetermined’.186 Against the German empirical sociologists of his 
day, Habermas insisted that human society was not subject to increasingly rigid 
practical necessities. In fact, Habermas asserted that the ‘feasibility of things and social 
relations’ was increasing.187 This conviction also seems to have played a role in 
Habermas’ growing interest in the philosophy of language. Habermas insisted that 
since language was one of the constitutive elements that shaped society and social 
relations, ‘social facts have a different status from natural phenomena’ and could 
therefore not be investigated with methodologies borrowed from the natural 
sciences.188 Behaviour governed by contingent phenomena such as language, he 
insisted, cannot have the same logical status as natural laws.189 
  For Habermas, as for other members of the Frankfurt School, it was clear that 
Weber was an important link in the chain of modern positivist theory. Disagreements 
about Weber among German sociologists came to the forefront at the German 
Sociological Conference of 1964, which focused on Weber to commemorate his birth 
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in 1864. A vigorous contemporary debate on the merits and problems of Weber’s 
political theory had already been sparked in 1959 by Wolfgang Mommsen’s Max 
Weber and German Politics. Mommsen’s book sketched Weber’s involvement in 
German politics in order to highlight the political consequences of Weber’s 
methodological commitments, arguing that Weber’s method and politics were 
inseparable.190 Mommsen laid out the political consequences of Weber’s assumption 
that international competition between states was an inexorable phenomenon that 
statesmen had to accept as a given. For Weber, refusal to do so was a sign of utopianism 
and lack of ethics of responsibility. According to Mommsen’s interpretation, Weber 
conceptualized the role of statesmen as making value-rational policy choices which 
furthered the fortunes of the nation-state within the inexorable competition between 
states.  
  Both Weber’s post-war followers and detractors vigorously seized upon what 
they saw as either his cynicism or realism. Mommsen’s book was discussed by a panel 
at the Weber Centenary, a conference that transformed contemporary discourse on 
positivism. With Talcott Parsons, Raymond Aron, Marcuse, Horkheimer, von Wiese, 
Mommsen, Carl Friedrich, Karl Deutsch, and Bendix as key speakers, the conference 
assembled leading sociologists and Weber scholars not just from West Germany but 
the whole Western world. Habermas’ frequently quoted intervention that Carl Schmitt 
was a ‘legitimate descendant’ of Weber was exemplary for the passionate debates at 
the conference, although Bahrdt noted that Habermas softened his critique over a beer 
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in the evening to say that Schmitt, if anything, was ‘a “natural” son’ of Weber.191 
Marcuse’s paper at the conference criticized Weber in a vein similar to Mommsen, and 
was also widely perceived as a critique of contemporary ‘positivist’ sociology. 
Marcuse took issue with Weber’s positing of a particular historically contingent 
trajectory of modernization as ‘necessary Reason.’192 Marcuse noted that for Weber, 
industrialization was ‘“destiny” [which] lies in the impersonal laws of economy and 
society, independent of individuals, which can only be defied under pain of self-
dissolution. But society is not nature – who decrees this destiny?’193 Again, the debate 
circled around the question of necessity and contingency.  
  In the postscript of the second edition published in 1974, Mommsen discussed 
the debate on Weber at and in the wake of the Centenary Conference in 1964, 
expressing his annoyance about critics of his book who were ‘close to neopositive 
social science’.194 Accordingly, Mommsen defended the interpretations of Marcuse 
and Habermas while criticizing ‘positivist’ and critical rationalist authors such as 
Albert, Gerhard Hufnagel, Ernst Topitsch, and Wolfgang Schluchter. In fact, 
Mommsen accused the ‘positivists’ of taking the argument much further than Weber 
had ever done, in effect backtracking somewhat from his critique of Weber in the book 
itself: 
 
In no case ... can the criterion of ‘realizability’ proposed by Albert and 
Schluchter bridge the distance between responsible decisions, which 
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involve the rational control of the goals and ultimate values guiding them 
by scientific means, and decisions arrived at on the basis of ultimate value 
convictions. Certainly, politics is bound to be successful; but Weber fought 
nothing so much as the maxim that political goals should be adjusted toward 
what is currently realizable. Grand politics is precisely the opposite of 
adjustment to the given circumstances. It aims beyond the ordinary. Only 





  This chapter has sought to provide a broad genealogical overview of a 
German tradition of thinking about modernization and its integral (or not) components 
and a closer examination of the debates within the German sociological profession 
from the early 1950s onwards that stood within this tradition. From Max Weber 
onwards, many German social theorists treated modernization as a process that 
involved traits that could be unpleasant – most prominently bureaucratization – that 
nonetheless had to be accepted as inexorable. While National Socialism for a period 
provided hope for some of those seeking to break out of the iron cage of serfdom, after 
the Second World War the argument that administrative forms of politics would 
become more dominant in modern industrial societies became much more widely 
accepted. Indeed, the administrative work of experts now became celebrated by figures 
like Schelsky and Gehlen, with sociology treated as a discipline that could contribute 
to the education of future administrators. It was these arguments that sparked violent 
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disagreement on the part of the Frankfurt School, and it was the debate that unfolded 
from the mid-1950s onwards that led to the convocation of the now-famous seminar 
held at the University of Tübingen in October 1961 that subsequently acquired the 
name of the ‘Positivism Dispute’. 
  As the main organizer of the Tübingen seminar, Dahrendorf stood at the 
centre of these debates. Its concerns were at the heart of his writings, which invariably 
came down on the side of emphasizing structures and necessity. Writing about 
American sociology in Die angewandte Aufklärung, he asserted: 
 
Many American sociologists are animated by the idea that the social 
scientist is capable of changing reality. While almost all European 
sociologists, despite all of their distancing from the conception of a 
predetermined historical process, conceive of the change of social 
structures as a process that one can study but not create, American 
behavioral scientists conceive of history as feasible.196  
 
As we shall see in the following chapters, this urge to change and control history –
through scientific manipulation or other means — was not something that Dahrendorf 
approved of.197  
 
                                                           
196 Dahrendorf, Die angewandte Aufklärung, (Frankfurt am Main/Hamburg: Fischer, 1968 [1963]), 183: 
‘Die Vorstellung, daß der Sozialwissenschaftler selbst in die Wirklichkeit verändernd einzugreifen 
vermag, beflügelt viele amerikanische Soziologen. Während europäische Soziologen bei aller 
Distanzierung von der Vorstellung eines determinierten Ganges der Geschichte doch fast durchweg den 
Wandel sozialer Strukuren als einen Prozeß hinnehmen, den man als Wissenschaftler zwar studieren, 
aber nicht machen kann, erscheint den amerikanischen Verhaltensforschern auch die Geschichte noch 
als machbar.’ 
197 For Dahrendorf’s critique in this specific instance, cf. ibid., 186. 
89 
 
Chapter II: Dahrendorf’s Materialism 
 
‘I do not believe that you have come to grips with the extremely important idea of ‘objective 
interests’, and indeed of lines of action prescribed for men by the conditions in which they live 
and act. I may not have been terribly clear about this subject, but the idea that such prescriptions 
of the binding character of natural forces exist in social life is central to the type of sociological 
analysis which I have tried to offer, in a variety of publications.’1 (Ralf Dahrendorf to C.G. 




Ralf Dahrendorf was born in Hamburg on 1 May 1929, growing up as the 
precocious son of a prominent politician.2 From 1932 until 1933, Gustav 
Dahrendorf served as a member of the Reichstag for the SPD. Gustav was a 
successful businessman in the co-operative industry and remained a leading 
member of the social democratic milieu even after the party was banned by the 
National Socialists on 22 June 1933. Involved in the conspiracy of the 20 July 1944 
assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler’s life, he was earmarked as the provisional 
Mayor of Hamburg under the new government that was to take over after Hitler’s 
death.3 Gustav spent the rest of the Nazi era in several prisons and concentration 
camps in and around Berlin.4 In December 1944, Ralf was also arrested by the 
Gestapo, and spent two months in a prisoners’ camp near Frankfurt on Oder.5 After 
the end of the Nazi regime, Gustav was a leading figure in the SPD in Berlin and, 
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despite initial sympathies, voted against the merger with the KPD that led to the 
establishment of the SED.6 Fearing reprisal after Gustav was summoned to come 
to the Soviet headquarters, Ralf and Gustav were flown out of Berlin by British 
troops, and Hamburg again became the family’s home.7 While these events were 
taking place, Ralf was obsessed with intellectual matters. For the year 1945, he 
drafted a to do list with items such as ‘politics!!’, ‘study Nietzsche and especially 
Schopenhauer. In general, continue the study of the history of philosophy’, and 
‘Gedanken über Kant: “Von der allmählichen Verfertigung der Gedanken beim 
Reden”’.8 What was this sixteen-year old up to? 
  As shown in the Introduction, there is a consensus in the secondary 
literature on Dahrendorf that depicts his version of liberalism as heavily indebted 
to the liberal theorists Popper, Berlin, Aron, and, in Hacke’s case, Hayek as well. 
Similar to these figures, Dahrendorf is seen as a critic of Marx.9 This chapter seeks 
to challenge these views. In order to do so, it examines Dahrendorf’s political 
leanings and intellectual endeavours during his socialist phase from the mid-1940s 
until the mid- to late 1950s. Secondly, it shows how a materialist reading of history 
and society continued to inform his social and political theory in later years, 
transcending the changes in his political outlook that took place after he started 
calling himself a radical liberal in 1957 and 1958. Thirdly, it contrasts Dahrendorf’s 
materialism with the methodological outlooks of Popper, Berlin, Hayek, and other 
liberals he has been associated with in order to highlight the central role his 
materialist method played in his distinct version of liberalism. 
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2. A Materialist Reading of Marx. 
 
  On Easter 1950, Dahrendorf wrote a letter to an English friend in which 
he agonized about the state of German politics, complaining in particular about 
German liberal economists who argued that unemployment was necessary. The 
letter concluded: 
 
What is really alarming, is the political situation. The audaciousness of 
the Nazis – to found even a party called RSDAP (Right Socialist 
German Workers’ Party). And history proves that it is not possible to 
defend against these blinded by means of what Adenauer would call a 
‘Rechtsstaat’. There is no help: radical means are necessary, even on 
[sic!] the expense of a democracy in the traditional sense.10 
 
While Dahrendorf did not elaborate on what radical means he was thinking of, he 
did have a firm view on what needed to be done in order to advance the cause. 
Attempting to dissuade his friend from becoming a journalist he wrote: ‘Oh, 
Adrian, how has Germany corrupted you all! Do you really think it is the right way 
to make politics via culture? Hang all that journalism on the nail and become either 
an adventurer or an economist or sociologist.’11  
  Little of Dahrendorf’s correspondence from these early years has 
survived. The papers of Gustav Dahrendorf are also incomplete, with private 
correspondence only running up to 1947. Piecing together a picture of 
Dahrendorf’s political sympathies in his early years is therefore a challenge. 
                                                     




However, Dahrendorf did relate in 1965 that when he travelled back to Berlin in 
late January 1945 on a freight train, he was unwilling to believe tales about crimes 
committed by Soviet soldiers that he heard from refugees travelling in the same 
direction. Too much, he said, did he associate the Soviet Union with those 
Communists and Social Democrats who had given him parts of their food rations 
and taught him the songs of the worker movement in the prisoner camp in Frankfurt 
on Oder. Three months later he did know more, he related, but he still registered as 
a volunteer with the Soviet occupation forces, distributing food and supplies.12  
  Not only did Dahrendorf call for radical means that would replace 
traditional democracy and the rule of law in 1950 – his writings from the early 
1950s were also characterized by a distinctly materialist interpretation of history 
and society. In fact, Dahrendorf’s first publication in a periodical was a critique of 
idealist re-interpretations of Marx by Kurt Hiller and Jean-Paul Sartre. Kurt Hiller 
attempted to show that Marx had initially held idealist views before meeting the 
‘“born materialist” Engels’.13 As Dahrendorf pointed out, Sartre’s Materialism and 
Revolution made similar remarks about Marx’s idealism before his, for Sartre, 
‘unfortunate encounter with Engels’.14 Dahrendorf tried to undermine Hiller’s 
argument by arguing that the early Engels had been as much of an Hegelian idealist 
as Marx, stating that ‘Engels and Marx proceeded strikingly parallel from pure 
Hegelianism via the critique of religion of D.F. Strauss and Bruno Bauer to 
Feuerbach and finally to their own political philosophy’.15 In particular, 
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Dahrendorf took issue with Hiller’s critique of Marx’s disdain for the concepts of 
‘fairness’, ‘freedom’, and ‘humanity’, which Hiller wanted to reappraise even 
though Marx had rejected them after meeting Engels.16 In a follow-up article, 
Dahrendorf stated that he had found it imperative to correct Hiller’s misconceptions 
because socialism had to be built on the basis of Marx’s ideas.17 It was unfortunate 
for this purpose that Hiller tried to resuscitate an alleged ‘ethical activist’ who had 
subsequently been corrupted by Engels.18 
  While writing these two articles, Dahrendorf studied philosophy and 
classical philology at the University of Hamburg, leaving the university in 1952 
with a doctorate on ‘The Idea of Justice in the Thought of Karl Marx’, supervised 
by Joseph König. The first sentences of an early draft of the introduction read: 
‘“Towards a new Social Philosophy” – this is what Karl Mannheim called one 
chapter of his book “Diagnosis of our Time”. “Towards a new Social Philosophy” 
– this is also the impulse that has driven and guided me in the present work.’19 In 
his doctorate, Dahrendorf expanded on his critique of Hiller, arguing that Marx did 
not have a concept of ‘justice’. He pointed out that Marx argued that all concepts 
of ‘justice’ were relative since they were determined by relations of production.20 
Marx only had an absolute concept of justice when it came to the communist 
society at the end of history.21 Dahrendorf emphatically agreed with the former 
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while disagreeing with the latter. At the end of the book, Dahrendorf argued that 
one of Marx’s main merits was that by directing attention to socially determined 
interests, his method could inform the sociological analysis of ideas.22  
  The same year, Dahrendorf moved to London to pursue a second 
doctorate in Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Dahrendorf’s decision to attend the LSE was motivated by the fact that his copies 
of Karl Mannheim’s books described him as an LSE professor, apparently unaware 
that the sociologist had died in 1947.23 At the LSE, intellectual engagement with 
Marx, Mannheim, and other materialists continued to dominate Dahrendorf’s work. 
As he recalled in his memoirs, at first he started working on a doctoral thesis on 
intellectuals in British society, a plan that he buried after a few weeks. At the same 
time, Dahrendorf realized that his PhD supervisor T.H. Marshall had a very low 
opinion of Mannheim’s work.24 Dahrendorf wrote his thesis on ‘Unskilled Labour 
in British Industry’ instead, a topic that allowed him to engage with the problem 
that Marx’s prediction about the growth of unskilled labour had turned out to be 
wrong.  
  At the LSE, Dahrendorf found himself in the midst of a cohort of students 
and young lecturers who would became famous sociologists and social scientists 
over the following decades, including David Lockwood, Tom Bottomore, A.H. 
Halsey, Edward Shils, Asher Tropp, Ernest Gellner, Emanuel de Kadt, and Ronald 
Dore. Lockwood, Dahrendorf’s flatmate during this period, later recalled 
Dahrendorf’s instrumental role in organizing the extracurricular student-run 
‘Thursday Evening Seminar’, where sociological theories were discussed that were 
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not taught by LSE lecturers. Dahrendorf, Lockwood remembered, ‘at that time, was 
very much into Marx ... coming from a strong Marxist/Hegelian sort of 
background’.25 With this interest in mind, Dahrendorf helped to set up this seminar 
which revolved around the opposite poles of the sociological theories of Marx and 
Talcott Parsons.26 According to Lockwood, the seminar had a very ‘subversive’ 
character because it was directed against what, at the time, they had perceived as 
an old-fashioned sociology curriculum taught at the LSE, where Marx was not 
really covered while theorists such as Hobhouse and Westermaark received 
disproportionate attention.27 Lockwood also remembered that members of the LSE 
faculty viewed the seminar with extreme suspicion.28 Notwithstanding faculty 
disapproval, the seminar turned out very successful. Parsons and Aron attended the 
seminar to speak to the budding LSE sociologists, while the members of the 
seminar also hired a bus to travel to Cambridge to hear Parsons deliver the Marshall 
Lectures on ‘The Integration of Economic and Sociological Theory’ in 1953.29 In 
1958, Lockwood published his first monograph, The Blackcoated Worker: A Study 
in Class Consciousness. When the book arrived in his post in Hamburg after 
publication, Dahrendorf wrote to Lockwood that he was ‘rather tickled by the sub-
title which is exceedingly appropriate’, referring to the theme of class 
consciousness.30 
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  In parallel to the extracurricular seminar, materialist theorists and ideas 
also dominated Dahrendorf’s regular coursework. In a presentation on Theodor 
Geiger’s book Klassengesellschaft im Schmelztiegel given at Jean Floud’s seminar 
on ‘Property and Social Class’ in April 1953, Dahrendorf apologized for his and 
Geiger’s “Marxian bias”, a bias ‘of which one may think that it is only too absent 
here’.31 By this bias, Dahrendorf meant focusing on the ‘domain of German 
immigrants’ like Marx, Engels, Schumpeter, Sternberg, Mannheim, and Drucker: 
‘the social system as a whole’.32 ‘Geiger’s “bias”’, Dahrendorf stated, ‘will also be 
the “bias” of this paper – a “bias” to which, as a continental, I feel entitled.’33 The 
presentation had two parts. In part one Dahrendorf provided an account of Geiger’s 
argument, before criticizing Geiger’s dismissal of Marx’s concept of ‘objective 
interest’ and ‘class society’ in the second part.34 In a manuscript of a presentation 
dating from October 1953, he stated quite straightforwardly that ‘in every society 
there is one force defending the existing institutions – presumably because in some 
way or other it profits from them – and another one attacking these institutions – 
because it is deprived by them’.35 Similarly, an article Dahrendorf wrote for a 
German audience on the co-operative movement in May 1953 showed his 
materialist convictions: 
 
Programmes and ideals do not have a life removed from the realities of 
social life. They need to be in a certain agreement with given relations 
if they are to be more than empty words, utopian wishful imaginations 
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35 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/496, Dialektik als Methode und Dialektik als 
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and sterile phrases. The capitalist of the nineteenth century, so often 
denounced, as much as he may be obsessed with his ideal to provide 
his workers with a humane standard of living – if he forgot to care for 
his profit he was not far from bankruptcy. The optimistic socialists may 
on the other hand have dreamed sweetly about the society ‘based on 
the free development of everyone’ (Marx) – as long as industrial 
production exists, there will be relations of dominance and 
subordination, privileges, and deprivations.36 
 
A handwritten note shows the topic that Dahrendorf was initially considering for 
his Habilitation, the second thesis required to qualify to teach at German 
universities: ‘On the Concept of Materialism (Matter?): (On the Problem of 
Ideology: Study of the dependence and interrelationship using a case – which one? 
– ) [Habil.?]’.37 
  Aside from being fascinated by Marx and materialism, Dahrendorf read 
widely in expected directions. Notes compiled on books read in 1951 during his 
first doctorate included Martin Buber’s Pfade in Utopia (1950), Hegel, Left-
Hegelians such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and David Friedrich Strauss, 
and other interlocutors of Marx like Max Stirner and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 
Originally, Dahrendorf thought that his thesis would be much wider in scope than 
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it ended up to be. As his notes suggest, he initially envisaged the first chapter of his 
thesis to be on the ‘concept of justice of the so-called Hegelian Left’.38 Even though 
he sympathized with some aspects of their outlook, Dahrendorf was very critical 
of the Left Hegelian self-styled ‘critique’ of abstraction and universalism, which 
concentrated on religion as a source of human alienation. Feuerbach, he noted, 
considered ‘realism’ to be an alienating factor. For Dahrendorf, the consequence of 
this way of thinking was a ‘vague concept of human justice’, limited to the demand 
for the ‘right to freedom’.39 Dahrendorf revisited the Left Hegelians during his brief 
stint as Max Horkheimer’s research assistant at the Institute of Social Research in 
Frankfurt in July 1954. Frustrated with the Frankfurt School’s disregard of class in 
social analysis, their more Hegelian than Marxian orientation, and Horkheimer’s 
autocratic rule at the Institute, Dahrendorf left after only a month, and took up a 
position at the University of Saarland in November.40 In December 1953, he had 
already met the Belgian Marxist sociologist Georges Goriely, who was a professor 
at the university, to talk about the possibility of taking up a position in 
Saarbrücken.41 Dahrendorf’s notes from his time at the Institute in Frankfurt are 
split in two parts. The very short first half comprises notes relating to assignments 
including the ‘Function and Reality of Contemporary Universities’.42 The much 
larger part of notes taken at the time are on books read at the time: Stirner’s The 
Ego and its Own, Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity and his Heidelberger 
Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion, Strauss’ Streitschriften, Ernst 
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Barnikol’s Das entdeckte Christentum im Vormärz (1927), and Bauer’s Disraelis 
romantischer und Bismarcks sozialistischer Imperialismus. 
 
3. Dahrendorf’s Materialism after his Liberal Turn. 
 
  Dahrendorf did not hold on to his radical Marxist views forever. In 
January 1955, in a preface to a collection of his father’s writings, Dahrendorf still 
lamented the fact that the year 1945 had seen a ‘restoration’ rather than a 
‘revolution’, and that many of those who had previously had a revolutionary spirit 
had been ‘bribed’ by the new comforts and security of the 1950s.43 At this point, 
he still thought it necessary to remind the reader that his father had fought for a 
radical transformation of Germany’s economic structure and social values.44 By the 
later 1950s, however, Dahrendorf had moved away from political Marxism. Crucial 
for his transformation was his fellowship at the Center of Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto during the academic year of 1957/1958. This year, 
in his own words, effected a change of heart ‘from traditional Eurpean [sic!] 
conservative socialism to radical liberalism’.45 Dahrendorf’s change of outlook 
during this period was most directly reflected in the very substantial revisions he 
made in the English edition of Class and Class Conflict, published in 1959, two 
years after the German edition. In the preface to the English translation, Dahrendorf 
acknowledged that it was almost a ‘completely new book’.46 Both editions dealt 
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with the question of how structural inequalities of power and authority within 
‘associations’ create social conflict. Based on his materialist convictions, 
Dahrendorf sought to make sense of the nature of power in an increasingly 
bureaucratic society, thus continuing lines of enquiry followed by previous 
contributors to this debate that loomed large in German social thought. In terms of 
emphasis, however, the two editions differed quite significantly. The German 
edition argued that industry was by far the most important conflict-generating 
association in terms of scope, its predominant relevance within the lives of workers, 
and the ‘violent [einschneidende] character of sanctions available for the 
enforcement of obedience’.47 Almost every second citizen in developed societies 
worked in industry, while industrial enterprises were growing into ‘mammoth 
enterprises’ with at times 100,000 or more employees. Moreover, these workers 
spent the lion share of their lives inside industrial plants.48 In industrial society, a 
‘double system of power distribution’ existed in which industrial power at times 
reached dimensions that could almost rival those of political power holders.49 Two 
years later, Dahrendorf’s arguments had evolved, to the extent that he made claims 
diametrically opposed to those of the German edition. Now, Dahrendorf argued 
that ‘the proportion of the populations of post-capitalist societies occupied in 
industrial production has not only failed to increase in the last decades but has, on 
the contrary, decreased.’50 Quoting Fritz Sternberg’s Capitalism and Socialism on 
Trial (1951), Dahrendorf maintained that Europe after the First World War and the 
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United States after the Great Depression had seen a ‘halt in capitalist expansion’.51 
In fact, work was increasingly losing its centrality to peoples’ lives.52 This change 
of focus had significant implications for the future trajectory of Dahrendorf’s 
political thought. As Dahrendorf noted in the preface to the English edition, in the 
two years between the publication of the two editions his interests had redirected 
from industrial to political questions.53 
  Nevertheless, Dahrendorf’s materialist methodological outlook survived 
his revisions of Marx and the change of his political outlook. Class and Class 
Conflict, in his own words, was a contribution to ‘an investigation that is indebted 
to Marx even in its most radical criticisms of his work’.54 Dahrendorf was adamant 
that most writers after Marx misinterpreted the meaning of ‘class’ as pertaining to 
social groups defined by income. This, Dahrendorf pointed out, was not the way in 
which Marx had used the term. Dahrendorf agreed with Marx that the term ‘class’ 
should denote groups united by interests determined by their source of income (in 
Marx’s case, rent, profit, and wage) rather than total amount of income. To make 
this point, Dahrendorf quoted Marx directly, who said that defining classes as a 
concept that described stratification was not the right approach: ‘from this point of 
view, say, doctors and civil servants would also constitute two classes, for they 
belong to two different social groups whose members’ incomes flow from the same 
source’.55 In Dahrendorf’s opinion, the sociological profession was ‘faced with an 
alternative: either we renounce the discredited term “class” altogether and endeavor 
to find a less ambiguous set of terms, or we reject radically all definitions which 
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depart from the original, i.e., Marxian heuristic purpose’.56 In its depiction of 
bureaucrats as participants in the exercise of power in industry and its argument 
that ‘[b]ureaucratic roles are roles of political dominance’, the book advocated 
retaining the concept of class.57 
  In other ways, too, Dahrendorf held on to central Marxian concepts. The 
German version dismissed structural functionalist sociology because it could not 
account for the fact that ‘there are elements or forces in social structures that are at 
the same time their constituent elements [Bestandteile] and contribute to their 
supersession...’.58 In the English edition, the book’s topic was introduced as ‘the 
puzzling fact that social structures as distinct from most other structures are capable 
of producing within themselves the elements of their supersession and change’.59 
Short of using the term ‘dialectic’, Dahrendorf sought to offer a dialectical 
explanation of social change.  
  Class and Class Conflict also retained Marx’s conceptual differentiation 
between ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’, though Dahrendorf adapted the 
terminology to speak of ‘quasi-groups’ and ‘interest groups’ instead.60 He had 
already developed this conceptual distinction during his time at the LSE, and 
mentioned it at the University of Saarland in April 1954, thus at a point in time at 
which his commitment to socialist politics was still very strong.61 Dahrendorf also 
retained Marx’s concept of ‘objective interests’. With reference to Marx’s The 
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Poverty of Philosophy, Dahrendorf stated: ‘Marx equates a “common situation” 
with “common interests” and thereby shows that – as we do here – he bases his 
theory on a quasi-“objective”, nonpsychological concept of interest.’62 To be sure, 
Dahrendorf rejected Marx’s claim that the working class had an objective interest 
in the realization of socialism.63 However, separated from what he considered its 
philosophical parts, Dahrendorf insisted on the validity of the concept. Political 
conflicts such as structurally generated conflicts between elites and the population 
still had to analyzed in these terms. It is from this perspective that Dahrendorf 
criticized Parsons’ fixation on values and norms as social factors that bind societies 
together. Interests rather than values and norms were the deciding factor in 
determining peoples’ political behaviour.64 Indeed, the concept of objective 
interests continued to play a central role in Dahrendorf’s political theory. For him, 
Marx’s concept captured the interest-driven, conflictual nature of society and 
politics, and was vastly superior to explanations in terms of ideas or psychology.  
  During the 1960s, Dahrendorf continued to preoccupy himself with the 
implications of Marx’s work for sociology. Dahrendorf’s attempt to create a new 
sociology, coupled with a strong interest in political revolutions, was thematically 
heavily indebted to the nineteenth-century theorist.65 Nevertheless, explicit 
references to Marx – notwithstanding notable exceptions such as his 1964 lecture 
on ‘Karl Marx and the Theory of Social Change’ at the University of Oxford – were 
not as predominant as they had been in his writings of the preceding decade.66 Even 
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so, Dahrendorf’s lectures made it evident that his conversion to liberalism did not 
entail the adoption of the high regard for ideas that was so prevalent among other 
twentieth-century liberals. In a lecture series on ‘Democracy and Social Structure’ 
given at the Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft in Hamburg in the academic year of 
1959/1960, Dahrendorf criticized the notion that forms of government were 
‘feasible’, the idea that democracy would be possible in Egypt simply ‘if Nasser 
wanted so’.67 This was, Dahrendorf asserted, a naïve view that disregarded 
constraints that particular social structures imposed on politics. Unlike Aron, who 
recalled in his memoirs that his attraction to Weber was due to the fact that Weber’s 
‘philosophical consciousness’ left open the possibility of some degree of human 
choice, however much constrained by societal reality, Dahrendorf faulted Weber 
for his emphasis on ideas in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.68 In 
a draft of his Habilitation lecture at the University of Saarland in 1957, Dahrendorf 
used Weber as an example of those sociologists who ‘only “see what they want to 
see”. In his enquiry into the genesis of industrial capitalism in Europe, Max Weber 
only sees the influence of Calvinism, but not that of technological innovation, for 
example’.69  
  Marx again attracted Dahrendorf’s close attention in the early 1970s, his 
interest apparently reinforced during the last two years of his office as European 
Commissioner (first as Commissioner for Trade in 1970-1972 and as 
Commissioner for Research, Innovation, and Science in 1972-1974). Dahrendorf’s 
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preface (written in February 1973) for the new English edition of Homo 
Sociologicus reiterated the connection between his own theoretical work on role 
theory and Marx’s ideas, emphasizing that his concerns were connected to 
‘complicated questions which have been impressively put by Marx in his 
“Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts” of 1844’.70 In the same year, he also 
reemphasized the centrality of the concept of objective interests to his work. As he 
told the British sociologist C.G. Bryant:  
 
I do not believe that you have come to grips with the extremely 
important idea of ‘objective interests’, and indeed of lines of action 
prescribed for men by the conditions in which they live and act. I may 
not have been terribly clear about this subject, but the idea that such 
prescriptions of the binding character of natural forces exist in social 
life is central to the type of sociological analysis which I have tried to 
offer, in a variety of publications.71 
 
Even though by this time, Dahrendorf was serving on the European Commission 
on a liberal ticket for the Free Democratic Party, he was still thinking in Marxian 
terms. When the German sociologist Dirk Kaesler asked him to write an essay on 
Marx for a compendium in February 1974, Dahrendorf replied that the request 
came at the right moment since he had in fact spent the past few weeks 
‘preoccupying myself quite intensively with Marx’s works’.72 In the article, 
Dahrendorf insisted that his theories were powerful instruments for sociological 
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analysis, and lamented that most interpretations of Marx were skewed towards his 
‘idealist utopianism’ rather than his ‘economic-materialist analysis’.73 A few weeks 
after Kaesler’s request, Dahrendorf described his current intellectual interests to 
another correspondent as follows: 
 
Recently I have begun to take interest in the subject of class and class 
conflict again and perhaps you are interested to know that I have come 
to understand some of the underlying social forces of class conflict 
rather better now than I did 17 years ago when I wrote the class book. 
It would seem to me now the class analysis has to be placed in the 
perspective of social changes as they are effected by new potentials of 
human societies in the advancement of the life chances of man. You 
might argue that here I am trying to translate the language of Marx 
and in particular the dialectic between forces and relations of 
production into a more applicable scheme for modern sociology [my 
italics]. But this still is at an early stage although I hope to be able to 
pursue this once I have moved to the London School of Economics 
later this year.74 
 
  From 13 November 1974 on, shortly after the beginning of his 
Directorship at the LSE, Dahrendorf delivered the BBC Reith Lectures in London, 
his first substantial academic work after four years in the European Commission, 
which was subsequently published as The New Liberty. In the book’s preface, 
Dahrendorf drew attention to the parallel interests of Marx and himself in the future 
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of society. This question had fascinated him ever since writing his first doctorate 
on Marx, having subsequently ‘[devoted] several books to the meaning and the 
realities of social conflict as a motive force of history’.75 In his own words, 
Dahrendorf sought to make sense of the political implications of ‘the force of 
things, things human to be sure but inexorable nevertheless’.76 As discussed in 
further detail in Chapter V, The New Liberty provided a sketch of Dahrendorf’s 
theory that the political upheavals since the student protests of the late 1960s 
constituted the latest instance of political conflict generated by productive 
potentials constrained by the present social structure of society. Present-day politics 
could no longer deal with these contradictions effectively.  
  Dahrendorf’s interest in Marx may also have played a part in motivating 
him to suggest that Leszek Kolakowski should deliver the Hobhouse Memorial 
Lecture in 1976.77 Kolakowski did indeed accept Dahrendorf’s invitation, but 
ended up lecturing on ‘The Concept of Counter-Reformation’ since he wanted ‘to 
get rid of all Marxist stuff when I am ready with the 3-volumes history of Marxism 
which I hope to finish soon...’.78 Over the following years, Dahrendorf sought to 
make sense of the inherent contradictions of modern society that, he thought, gave 
rise to historical change. This would be the main topic of The New Liberty, Life 
Chances (1979), and a book project called ‘Contradictions of Modernity’ that 
Dahrendorf eventually gave up.79 In the Christian Gauss lectures on ‘Life Chances’ 
that Dahrendorf gave at Princeton in late March and early April 1977, he again 
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appraised the analytical value of Marx’s concepts of objective as well as class 
interests.80 Published two years later, Life Chances attempted to offer an 
interpretation of the causes of the ‘legitimation crisis’ of modern societies that 
Jürgen Habermas had highlighted. For Dahrendorf, this crisis was rooted in the fact 
that the post-war consensus had ‘begun to produce its own contradictions, and it 
can no longer deal with them effectively’.81  
  In Dahrendorf’s frequent exchanges with neoconservatives in this period, 
his continuing fascination with materialist ideas remained particularly evident. 
While the student movement prompted many to consider ideas and intellectuals to 
exert great influence on society, Dahrendorf continued to see things differently.82 
In a book published in 1975, Helmut Schelsky – an important intellectual figure in 
Dahrendorf’s earlier years as we have seen in Chapter I – argued that contemporary 
society was dominated by intellectual rather than physical power. In a nod to Max 
Weber, Schelsky argued that society was subject to the ‘class struggle and 
hierocracy of the intellectuals’.83 Dahrendorf reacted with a vitriolic review in DIE 
ZEIT that attacked Schelsky for misrepresenting Weber as someone who thought 
that social domination could be based on intellectual force: ‘Weber knew that the 
Church owned land, but Schelsky forgot about this’.84 Intellectuals were ‘not to 
blame for the energy crisis, they do not solve the conflict in the Middle East, they 
do not ensure job security at Volkswagen, they do not decide on the location of 
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nuclear plants or their nuclear waste deposits, they do not decide on custom rules 
for imports from developing countries’.85 Intellectuals, in other words, were not the 
main power holders. While Schelsky worried about intellectuals, Dahrendorf’s 
review sought to redirect attention to social structure and expressed worries about 
the power of office-holders instead: members of the ‘service class’ who derived 
their power from positions within large organizations in government and in 
business. Intellectuals, he was at pains to say, could not exercise power merely 
through the power of their ideas. Schelsky would be well advised to ‘maybe read 
Marx instead of just misquoting him ... even Weber would already help’.86 It was 
not that Dahrendorf discounted the role of ideas altogether. Three years after his 
vicious critique of Schelsky, he discussed the role of ideas in further detail in a 
volume dedicated to the sociologist Robert Merton. Following Antonio Gramsci, 
he argued that ideas could acquire hegemonic status in societies and thus have a 
real impact on events. Gramsci’s writing on hegemonic ideas would constitute an 
important building block for Dahrendorf’s Life Chances project, which is further 
discussed in Chapter V. While taking inspiration from Gramsci, he continued to 
insist that Marx was right that ideas were effective ‘only under certain conditions. 
They may be a necessary condition of effectiveness, but the sufficient condition is 
the state of social affairs...’.87 Dahrendorf’s particular view on the power of ideas 
and interests in politics was fundamentally at odds with the views of other liberals 
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with whom scholars have associated him.88 In January 1981, Dahrendorf wrote 
disapprovingly of the newly founded Committee for a Free World, of which Aron 
was Honorary President. Dahrendorf took issue with the Committee’s foundational 
manifesto, which argued that the world was confronted with a reinvigorated 
intellectual threat from the left. Dahrendorf was adamant that there could not be 
such a thing: 
 
The reason why one can establish this with some certainty is to be 
found in Marx’s writings: No minority, no matter how intelligent, can 
turn the current of time around, the dominant social forces. But today, 
these are precisely not the forces of radical change, of the traditional 
left, but rather of conservation.89 
 
The signatories of the manifesto, Dahrendorf highlighted, represented precisely 
these dominant social forces.90  
 
4. The Substance of Dahrendorf’s Materialism. 
 
  Even in his early years in which he was committed to political socialism, 
Dahrendorf thought that changes in social structure that had happened over the 
course of the twentieth century falsified significant aspects of Marx’s theories. 
Inspite of Marx’s predictions, the middle class had not disappeared, and unskilled 
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labour was not growing at the expense of skilled labour.91 Still, Dahrendorf 
maintained that Marx’s predictions had been correct until about 1900 or 1910, and 
that even in the twentieth century he was still highly relevant as a methodological 
innovator. He differentiated between a ‘sociological Marx’ who had attempted to 
empirically capture the industrial reality of his own time, and a ‘philosophical 
Marx’ who, influenced by Hegel, had dreamed up a metaphysical systematic theory 
of history based on ‘knowledge from beyond the realm within which sound human 
knowledge was possible’.92 The sociological Marx, however, had been the first to 
focus his research on social conflict, whereas ‘most sociologists after Marx, from 
Spencer to the American functionalists of the present, thought of social conflict as 
an “unnatural” or “pathological” deviation from the normal state of society’.93 This 
interest in social conflict, shared with and inspired by Marx in the 1950s, was to 
remain one of Dahrendorf’s main intellectual concerns throughout his life, finding 
its last major outlet in The Modern Social Conflict (1988).94  
  In later years, Dahrendorf continued to add revisions of Marx’s doctrines. 
In publications, seminars, and lectures, he criticized Marx’s assumption that social 
change must of necessity come about through revolutions that result in changes of 
the ruling class. As he told his students at the Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft in 
Hamburg, Marx was right that the causes of historical change were located in social 
structure, and that social conflict was the cause of historical change. In contrast to 
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Marx, however, Dahrendorf insisted that social structural change was often 
gradual, explicitly rejecting the former’s stadial philosophy of history.95 It was also 
not the case, he observed in a lecture on Marx, that private property was the cause 
of all conflicts. The argument that property and power were necessarily linked also 
fell under his list of Marx’s theoretical errors, as did ‘method: determination’, 
although Dahrendorf’s cursory notes do not say what exactly he thought the issue 
was here.96 Crucially, Dahrendorf also questioned the validity of what he thought 
was an analytical amalgamation of the Industrial Revolution and the French 
Revolution in Marx’s theories. Marx’s analysis of the Industrial Revolution was 
sound, Dahrendorf maintained. During the Industrial Revolution, the ‘expansion of 
productive potential’ was ‘at first constrained by the existing social structure’ based 
on the dominance of land, estates, and guilds.97 Nonetheless, Marx had dramatized 
the Industrial Revolution. After all, industrialization had been a long and gradual 
process.98 Here, Dahrendorf again questioned Marx’s insistence on the 
revolutionary character of social change. Dahrendorf had more qualms with Marx’s 
readings of the French Revolution. Political behaviour during this event could not 
be explained in terms of contradictory interests determined by relations of 
production. The revolution was not about economics but about political domination 
and the removal of a ‘ruling class’.99 Marx had conflated these two separate spheres 
of economy and politics. Ironically, Dahrendorf explained, the case of the Russian 
Revolution was the one historical instance where Marx’s theory was applicable, 
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even though it was generally assumed that this revolution was an event that it could 
not account for. In the Russian case, the processes of the French and the Industrial 
Revolution had come together, although there was no historically necessary reason 
that this should be so.100 Later in his career, Dahrendorf also distanced himself from 
Marx’s assumption that workers had a key role to play in world history. As he told 
a reader of The New Liberty, Dahrendorf thought that Marx had been wrong to 
think that workers ‘[represented] the productive forces of a new society’.101 The 
productive forces and potentials of new societies were encapsulated in parts of the 
‘ruling groups of the day’, and this had always been the case in history.102 
Nonetheless, throughout his career, these critiques of Marx were made from a 
materialist perspective in which social structural processes were privileged in 
analysis, and in which objective interests were accepted as a given part of political 
reality. Rival analyses that disregarded these facts he consistently dismissed as 
utopian.  
   Marx was not the only materialist social theorist who attracted 
Dahrendorf’s attention. Mannheim had not only motivated him to come to the LSE 
– Dahrendorf also continued to employ ideas developed by the Hungarian 
sociologist, although explicit references became less frequent than in the early 
1950s, when Mannheim seemed to be one his central reference points. However, 
his work remained focused on issues that were also central to Mannheim’s Ideology 
and Utopia: the relationship between theory and practice in politics, the 
problematic nature of utopian thought, the impact of interests on conservative 
legitimatory ideologies, and the inherent problems of Weber’s advocacy of value 
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freedom. By arguing that impartial politics in the common interest was impossible 
since ‘all political interest and knowledge are necessarily partisan and particular’, 
Mannheim also anticipated Dahrendorf’s agonistic liberalism.103 Karl Renner, a 
prominent exponent of Austro-Marxism and Austria’s first Chancellor after the 
First World War and first President after the Second World War, was of comparable 
importance for the development of his ideas about the nature of industrial society.  
Attempting to provide a Marxist interpretation of the implications of the rise of 
bureaucratic administration in modern society, Renner developed the concept of 
the ‘service class’, which Dahrendorf adopted and employed prominently in his 
own sociological theory.104 Commenting on the Austrian revisionist Marxist, 
Dahrendorf observed that Renner’s ‘sociological work – if it is known at all – is 
often underestimated’.105 Other important figures for his intellectual development 
were Theodor Geiger and, somewhat later, C. Wright Mills.106 
   What united Dahrendorf with Renner, Geiger, and Mills was his acute 
sense of the political consequences of the rise of bureaucracy and the new social 
group connected to it. As Chapter I has shown, many contemporary social theorists 
assumed that administrative decisions were becoming increasingly central to 
politics and all institutions of social life. Among theorists of the left, the political 
role of the growing numbers of white-collar workers attracted particular attention 
because of its relevance to Marx’s predictions about the future prospects of 
capitalist societies. Dahrendorf and other post-war scholars such as Fritz Croner, 
Michel Crozier, and Lockwood continued where inter-war sociologists such as 
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Lederer and Marschak or Geiger had left off. In contrast James Burnham, 
Dahrendorf did not believe that experts and administrators constituted a new ruling 
class. Rather, the political dominance of the new class was due to its hegemonic 
conquest of the value systems of contemporary societies. While previous societies 
had been dominated by the middle class and workers were expected to dominate 
future ones, the service class dominated the present. This begged various questions 
of social analysis, as the service class was neither the elite nor in the majority: in 
Society and Democracy in Germany, Dahrendorf surmised that it accounted for 
about twelve per cent of the West German population.107 
  In June 1963, Dahrendorf travelled to the United States to give a paper on 
‘Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies’ at a conference 
hosted by the American Academy of Science, an opportunity which he used to 
develop his thoughts on the service class. The values held by members of the 
service class, which he thought were spreading rapidly, transformed the politics of 
developed societies. Administrators tended to have a hierarchical understanding of 
society, which led them to be attracted to political conservatism. At the same time, 
their hierarchical conception of society implied that social mobility was an 
individual exercise that did not depend on rising as part of a group. The degree to 
which members of society considered themselves to be part of a particular class or 
group thus declined. As a consequence, political parties tried to reinvent themselves 
as ‘“people’s parties”, that is, non-ideological election machines appealing to all 
sectors of the electorate alike’.108 And yet, the absence of group ideologies was 
deceptive. What was in fact happening was that the inability of individuals to 
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coalesce as interest groups led to a situation that was ‘often not unlike that 
described so brilliantly by Marx in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
there are large numbers of individuals who cannot form solid political groups and 
represent themselves. They have to be represented, and they love the man who 
pretends to do so...’.109 This concern about societies dominated by the ideology of 
bureaucratic officeholders only grew during the later 1960s and early 1970s, when 
West German politics became increasingly partisan as the situation on and around 
university campuses escalated. For Dahrendorf, the student movement was a 
symptom of the service class society: it was a rebellion against bureaucratization.110 
In DIE ZEIT, Dahrendorf confronted his readers with what he saw as the reality of 
modernity. There were only two options, ‘reform liberalism – or the cage of 
serfdom [Gehäuse der Hörigkeit] of the system of the service class society’.111 
  Not only did Dahrendorf’s analysis of the service class and contemporary 
sociology borrow Renner’s concept. He also employed the terminology and 
approach of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge when discussing the concept of 
the service class. Borrowing Mannheim’s language, Dahrendorf argued that 
contemporary European societies broadly consisted of four social groups: power 
groups, the service class, subordinated groups, and ‘free-floating intellectuals’.112 
Implying a materialist connection between social position and ideology, 
Dahrendorf worried about the ‘enormous expansion of the service class at the 
expense of all others and … the infusion of the values characteristic of this class 
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into the behavior of all others, including even the ruling groups.’113 In 1972, when 
he published the paper in German, Dahrendorf added that the decision in favour of 
republication after several years was due to his conviction that the main argument 
of the paper about the rise of the service class in social structure was still valid.114 
  The issue of ‘ideology’ thus occupied a prominent place in Dahrendorf’s 
lectures and seminars. Weber was faulted for not paying attention to the issue of 
‘ideology’ in his writings on value freedom.115 As far as the service class is 
concerned, one can get a better picture of why he viewed it as a threat to democracy 
by looking at a course on the ‘Ideology’ of ruling classes, given at Constance in 
April 1969. The minutes of the seminar proposed to subdivide ideology into ‘a) 
ideology as situational determination [Seinsgebundenheit] (subconscious 
i[deology]) b) ideology as an instrument of domination (conscious i[deology])’, 
thus on the first point following Mannheim’s terminology.116 Further, the members 
of the seminar discussed the idea whether ideology should be subdivided into two 
categories of ‘a) action-relevant ideology and b) action-irrelevant ideology’, given 
that in some political systems professed ideologies did not in fact influence politics 
very directly, such as the Soviet Union.117 As an example of technocratic ideology, 
the class discussed the political power of the ‘Four Wise Men’ – a body of 
economists who advised the government on macroeconomic policy – over the 
elected government because of their superior technical knowledge.118 For 
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Dahrendorf, their power over government was considerable.119 Technocracy was a 
phenomenon that he felt critics of ideology should particularly focus on, bearing 
two questions in mind: firstly, how do technocrats manipulate office holders, and 
secondly, how can technocratic arguments be studied from the angle of ideology 
critique?120 
  Over the course of the later 1950s and 1960s, Dahrendorf had already 
extended his critique of the service class to prominent strands of post-war sociology 
in both West Germany and the United States, dismissing Parsons’ structural-
functionalism and Schelsky’s thesis that West German society had lost all class 
divisions.121 Dahrendorf’s critique of Schelsky stated that he stood in the tradition 
of the ‘German ideology’, from the preamble of the Anti-Socialist Laws that 
stipulated ‘class harmony’ to Hitler’s ‘people’s community’.122 All these 
conceptions were united in negating the reality of social conflict.123 Dahrendorf 
was determined to point out that depictions of societies as harmonious and 
characterized by value consensus served as legitimizing ideologies for the 
technocratic service class: 
 
And yet the bureaucrats, managers, and all experts form an upper class, 
a ruling class, which must find the ideology of the harmonious 
industrial society useful in order to strengthen its limited basis of 
legitimacy. In at least one sense the modern meritocracy of diplomas 
and certificates has been true to its predecessors: it needs an ideology 
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in order to justify inequality. This myth is supplied by sociology with 
its myth of the industrial society.124 
 
In this vein, Dahrendorf continued a critique of ideology of functionalist sociology 
which, when he made it in his Habiliationsprobevorlesung in 1957 at the 
University of Saarland, still credited Mannheim and Max Scheler’s sociology of 
knowledge for introducing this theme.125 
 
5. Dahrendorf’s Materialism in its Liberal Context. 
 
  Those liberals with whom Dahrendorf has been associated with in the 
historiography evaluated Marx in a radically different way. This divergence 
resulted in very different versions of liberalism – depicting Dahrendorf as a close 
disciple of Popper as well as Hayek and Berlin obscures the essence of his agonistic 
liberalism, which was based on the assumption that politics was an interest-driven 
conflict between groups with opposing objective interests. In The Open Society and 
its Enemies, Popper attacked Marx’s ‘prophecies’ as unfalsifiable consequences of 
Marx’s poor method: 
 
Marxists, when they find their theories attacked, often withdraw to the 
position that Marxism is primarily not so much a doctrine as a method. 
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They say that even if some particular part of the doctrines of Marx, or 
of some of his followers, were superseded, his method would still 
remain unassailable. I believe that it is quite correct to insist that 
Marxism is, fundamentally, a method … By describing Marxism as 
purest historicism, I have indicated that I hold the Marxist method to 
be very poor indeed.126 
 
By contrast, Dahrendorf thought that Marx was still useful precisely for the 
methodological reasons which Popper rejected. While Dahrendorf relegated 
Marx’s mistakes to his ‘philosophical’ side, Popper argued that Marx’s misguided 
prophecy about a future communist society was ‘the main result of his method’.127 
Indeed, Popper thought that Marx ‘was not much concerned with purely 
philosophical issues – less than Engels or Lenin, for instance – and that it was 
mainly the sociological and methodological side of the problem in which he was 
interested’.128 Thus, in different ways, both Dahrendorf and Popper were able to 
associate Marx with methodological and philosophical positions that they opposed, 
respectively. 
  As with Marx’s ‘Hegelian philosophical’ element, Dahrendorf generally 
disliked the idealist methodology that he thought dominated the German 
Geisteswissenschaften. Dahrendorf was adamantly opposed to the notion that the 
natural sciences and the humanities were essentially different, a misconception for 
which he blamed Wilhelm Dilthey.129 In the introductory lecture to his series on 
the ‘Sociological Theory of Revolution’, Dahrendorf criticized historians for 
                                                     
126 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 84. 
127 ibid., 134. 
128 ibid., 102. 
129 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/648, Soziale Rollen und Soziale Normen: Soziologie: 
qu’est-ce que c’est?. 
121 
 
insisting on the singularity of historical events. He denied that this argument 
constituted a convincing case against general theories of revolution. In his view, 
social scientists were akin to meteorologists in that they were looking for general 
causes. Individual events were manifestations of a combination of general causes 
in a particular instance, i.e. the weather condition at a given point in time resulting 
from the particular combination of humidity, temperature, strength of wind, and 
direction of wind.130 Revolutions were no different; they were caused by a certain 
combination of common factors which could therefore be theorized. Dahrendorf’s 
preference for the social sciences over the humanities was also evident in the first 
lecture of the series on ‘Democracy and Social Structure’ quoted above. Here, he 
discussed the social preconditions necessary for a functioning democracy, and 
engaged with the arguments of Carl Friedrich’s Demokratie als Herrschafts- und 
Lebensform. While agreeing with other points that Friedrich made, Dahrendorf 
doubted that Friedrich’s definition of democracy as a ‘life form’ that depended on 
‘belief in the human being’ and a fully integrated ‘common man’ who agreed with 
society’s values, convictions, and interests was tremendously helpful.131 In 
Dahrendorf’s view, the explanatory value of these assertions was limited. The 
decisive questions were: ‘How do values emerge? Under what historical and social 
circumstances [do they] spread? For which groups are they characteristic?’132 The 
question was not what kind of landscape of ideas and values could sustain a 
democracy, but rather what kind of social structure was a necessary condition for 
                                                     
130 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/648, Soziologische Theorie der Revolution SS 
1961(auch Univ. Hamburg, WS 1959/60). 
131 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/636, Demokratie und Sozialstruktur: WS 59/60 
Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft: ‘Glauben an den Menschen’, ‘“Gemeinschaftsmensch” 
(common man)’. 
132 ibid: ‘Woher kommen Werthaltungen? Unter welchen histor. u. soz. Bedingungen 
Verbreitung? Für welche Gruppen charakterist.?’  
122 
 
it. In Dahrendorf’s words, it was necessary to get from the ‘thin air of attitudes, 
opinions, and also intellectual history into the thicker (in all respects) social 
stratification, power relations, and contradictions … Who would want to prove the 
claim “in Weimar Germany there was no belief in the human being”? Here [there 
is a] need for more precise claims’.133  
  Opposition to Hegelianism united many liberal political theorists in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.134 Dahrendorf’s anti-Hegelianism took the form 
of methodological opposition to philosophical speculation, be it ‘Marx the 
philosopher’ or the Geisteswissenschaften with their emphasis on ideas rather than 
material forces. However, his reception of Hegel was profoundly at odds with that 
of Popper, Berlin, and Hayek. In Berlin’s view, Hegel’s mistake was his belief in 
supra-individual metaphysical entities, the ‘great social forces’ that Hegel thought 
determined human history.135 Against this view, Berlin argued that history could 
not be written without a focus on ‘character, purposes and motives of 
individuals.’136 Hayek similarly made the case for methodological individualism in 
his critique of Comte:  
 
Like Hegel he treats as ‘concrete universals’ those social structures 
which in fact we come to know only by composing them, or building 
them up, from the familiar elements; and he even surpasses Hegel in 
claiming that only society as a whole is real and that the individual is 
only an abstraction.137 
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As shown in the Introduction, Hayek considered sociology of knowledge to be the 
most conceited subdiscipline of sociology. Popper criticized Hegel along similar 
lines, and dismissed the sociology of knowledge of Scheler and Mannheim as a 
‘Hegelian version of Kant’s theory of knowledge’.138 For Popper, the sociology of 
knowledge amounted to a closed ideological system that ‘[destroyed] the 
intellectual basis of any discussion’ by dismissing the opinions of adversaries as 
ideology determined by their social position.139 Tellingly, Dahrendorf found it 
possible to praise Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies by saying that ‘there 
is little to add to his incisive analyses’, and to add in the footnote pertaining to the 
same sentence that Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia offered another important 
contribution to the same topic.140 
  Dahrendorf’s critique of Hegel neither included support for 
methodological individualism, nor did he consider sociology of knowledge to be 
the disastrous and fundamentally misconceived ‘aftermath’ of Hegel. As pointed 
out above, the influence of social context on the development of ideas was one of 
his main intellectual concerns throughout his entire career. Indeed, Dahrendorf was 
skeptical of methodological individualism, criticizing social psychology for 
attempting to explain social phenomena by reference to individuals.141 His 
preference for the analysis of society did not imply the existence of supra-
individual metaphysical structures that worried Berlin and Popper. Dahrendorf 
pointed out that society was a fact, but not a thing.142 It consisted of individuals, 
                                                     
138 Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 213. 
139 ibid., 216. 
140 Dahrendorf, ‘Out of Utopia’, 117. 
141 See for instance Dahrendorf’s critique of the approach of social psychology to the sociology of 
industry in BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/496, ‘Mensch und Arbeit’ [no date]. 
142 In other words, society was not an entity in the ontological sense for Dahrendorf. 
124 
 
and was in this sense not a thing. But at the same time it was more than the sum of 
its individuals, acting on individuals and constraining their autonomous freedom, 
and thus was a fact that needed to be examined.143 Dahrendorf still made this point 
in a letter to Amartya Sen in December 1975 in a way that highlighted his 
intellectual distance from economics: ‘sociology ... is about the way in which social 
choices cannot be derived from an assumption of individual choosers, because even 
the (apparently) most individual choices are socially structured’.144  
  The considerable distance between Popper and Dahrendorf was also 
evident in their diverging uses of the term ‘ideology’. For Popper, ‘ideology’ 
signified intellectual positions that sheltered themselves from the possibility of 
being falsified.145 Dahrendorf, by contrast, used the term to describe intellectual 
justifications of interested positions of groups within social conflict.146 
Furthermore, Popper (as did Berlin and Hayek) shared Hegel’s conviction that 
history was primarily about ideas rather than socio-economic factors. Dahrendorf 
in turn criticized this emphasis on ideas when he dismissed the views of 
‘hegelianizing historians’.147 Dahrendorf’s references to The Open Society and its 
Enemies obscure this crucial difference. In criticizing Hegel, Dahrendorf was doing 
something very different. Both the anti-Hegelianism of Dahrendorf and that of 
Popper, Berlin, and Hayek amounted to an implicit critique of each other as well 
as Hegel, even if this may have been unintentional.  
                                                     
143 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Homo Sociologicus: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der 
Kategorie der sozialen Rolle’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 10 (1958), 
198-9. 
144 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/331, Ralf Dahrendorf to Amartya Sen, 27 December 
1975. 
145 Karl Popper, Ausgangspunkte: Meine intellektuelle Entwicklung (Munich: Piper, 2012), 42. 
146 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/630, Aufbaukolloqium Prof. Dahrendorf, Protokoll der 
Sitzung vom 21.4.1969. 
147 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Demokratie und Sozialstruktur in Deutschland’, European Journal of 
Sociology 1 (1960), 89: ‘hegelisierender Historiker’. 
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  It is important to note that at least until the late 1970s, Dahrendorf’s 
critique of Hegel was purely methodological.148 In his early years, through the 
medium of Marx, Dahrendorf definition of ‘freedom’ was indebted to Hegel. In an 
untitled manuscript dating from 1957, Dahrendorf highlighted that Marx saw 
freedom as located in the ‘realm of freedom’, which was different from the ‘realm 
of necessity’, arguing that the realization of the former stood at the heart of Marx’s 
vision of communist society.149 The manuscript endorsed Marx’s definition of 
freedom as human action based on autonomous volition rather than external 
necessity, arguing that it was ‘incomparably deeper and wider-reaching than the 
whole catalogue of the liberal freedoms that are so often praised – and are to be 
praised’.150 The latter were merely formal; their existence did not mean that they 
would actually be used. Marx’s concept of freedom as autonomous human action, 
by contrast, was active rather than formal. It followed that it was problematic if 
people made no use of their autonomy, a phenomenon that he thought characterized 
the modern world in particular. While workers of older generations used their 
leisure time for their own development as autonomous beings, for instance by 
cultivating their garden, acting, or craft work, more and more workers were using 
their time off work for passive pastimes such as attending football games or going 
to the cinema. This, he argued, was a consequence of the increasing alienation of 
the worker by their labour.151 Freedom thus had an explicitly normative element 
for Dahrendorf. In a seminar on Weber at the University of Constance, one of his 
                                                     
148 For later readjustments, cf. Dahrendorf, Life Chances, re-iterated in Ralf Dahrendorf, Law and 
Order (London: Stevens and Sons, 1985). Further, cf. Chapter V of this thesis. 
149 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/635, Ralf Dahrendorf, untitled manuscript (52 pages): 
‘Reich der Freiheit’, ‘Reich der Notwendigkeit’. 
150 ibid: ‘unvergleichlich tiefer ist und weiter geht als der ganze Katalog der vielgepriesenen – und 




students criticized Weber for leaving the individual the ‘freedom to be stupid’, 
provoking Dahrendorf’s reaction that this was not Weber’s position: ‘Now you are 
turning him into a Schelsky’.152 The point where Dahrendorf disagreed with Marx 
was the separation of the realms of freedom and necessity over time, that is, that 
freedom was only possible in a future communist society. Dahrendorf criticized 
that this was tantamount to sacrificing the autonomous development of people in 
the present for the sake of the tenuous possibility of freedom for others in the 
future.153 
  This definition of freedom, borrowed from Marx and Hegel, characterized 
much of Dahrendorf’s early writings, in particular his works on role theory, mass 
society, and the sociology of the firm. In the essay ‘Homo Sociologicus’, first 
published in the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie in 1958, 
Dahrendorf attempted to convince his colleagues that social constraints, imposed 
on the individual through the medium of role expectations, should be at the centre 
of their research: ‘homo sociologicus, man as the bearer of socially predetermined 
roles’, was the subject of sociology.154 Dahrendorf defined these roles as: 
 
a constraining force on the individual, whether he experiences them as 
an obstacle to his private wishes or a support that gives him security. 
The constraining force of role expectations is due to the availability of 
sanctions, measures by which society can enforce conformity with its 
prescriptions. The man who does not play his role is punished; the man 
                                                     
152 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/630, Kolloqium Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, Ph.D.: 
Herrschaft und Gesellschaft. Protokoll der 2. Sitzung vom 12. Mai 1966: ‘Freiheit, dumm zu 
sein’, ‘“Jetzt machen Sie ihn zu einem Schelsky’”. 
153 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/635, Ralf Dahrendorf, untitled manuscript (52 pages). 
154 Dahrendorf, ‘Homo Sociologicus’, 183: ‘Homo Sociologicus, der Mensch als Träger sozial 
vorgeformter Rollen’. Translation taken from the English version in Ralf Dahrendorf, Essays in 
the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 24-5. 
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who plays his role is rewarded, or at least not punished. Social pressure 
to conform to prescribed role expectations is by no means peculiar to 
certain modern societies, but a universal feature of social forms.155 
 
Dahrendorf argued that genuinely free acts were possible within society, even if 
the ‘range of freedom’ was small.156 The sociologist ought to attempt to contribute 
to a society in which this range was bigger; he should ‘[select] his research projects 
with an eye to what may help liberate the individual from the vexations of 
society’.157 Dahrendorf’s Marxian definition of freedom as autonomy jeopardized 
by the alienation of the worker by his labour also prompted him to concern himself 
with the sociology of industry.158 Dahrendorf himself noted in a book review that 
this field of inquiry was inspired by the arguments about alienation by Left-
Hegelians and the early Marx.159 It was precisely this emphasis on a Marxian 
understanding of freedom and the concern about alienation that came with it that 
Dahrendorf’s critics found objectionable. In fact, the publication of Homo 
Sociologicus precipitated one of the most heated controversies among West 
German sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s.160 For Friedrich Tenbruck, the case 
was clear that Dahrendorf was operating with an illusionary ideal of freedom and 
                                                     
155 ibid., 194: ‘ein Zwang, der auf den Einzelnen ausgeübt wird – mag dieser als eine Fessel seiner 
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Rollenerwartungen beruht darauf, daß die Gesellschaft Santionen zur Verfügung hat, mit deren 
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the Theory of Society, 38. 
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the Theory of Society, 43. 
157 ibid., 373: ‘die Probleme seiner Forschung unter dem Aspekt ihres Gewichtes für die Befreiung 
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Theory of Society, 87. 
158 Ralf Dahrendorf, Industrie- und Betriebssoziologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965 [1956]). 
159 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/496, ‘Mensch und Arbeit’ [no date]. 
160 Joachim Fischer, ‘Die Rollendebatte: Der Streit um den “Homo Sociologicus”, in Georg 
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individuality that had been long disproved by Gehlen, cultural anthropology, and 
historicism.161 Dahrendorf’s attention was one-sided, with cultural factors such as 
shared ‘ideas, values, and techniques’ falling by the wayside.162  
  Dahrendorf’s notion of freedom also prompted him to take a keen interest 
in Alexis de Tocqueville’s writings on modern democratic society and the post-war 
sociological debate on the ‘mass society’. Dahrendorf shared David Riesman’s 
anxiety about the ‘other-directed Man’ expressed in The Lonely Crowd (1950), 
while pointing out that Riesman was less original than he would like to be, since 
much of the argument had already been made by Tocqueville.163 In his essay on 
Riesman’s book, Dahrendorf pointed out that there really was a point at which 
equality threatened freedom.  
  The threat that equality posed to freedom was a trope that was also 
employed by two other liberals with high regard for Tocqueville: Hayek and Jacob 
Talmon. How similar were their ideas? In Society and Democracy in Germany 
Dahrendorf stated that:  
 
When I use the word ‘liberal’ in this study I am not referring to the 
rather unfortunate history and present state of German liberalism, but 
to what F.A. von Hayek has called the Constitution of Liberty and what 
has been wished for so long and so vainly by ‘the democrats not 
established by party membership’ in Germany…164  
 
                                                     
161 Friedrich Tenbruck, ‘Zur deutschen Rezeption der Rollentheorie’, Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 13 (1961), 31. 
162 ibid., 8: ‘Ideen, Werte und Techniken’. 
163 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Demokratie ohne Freiheit: Versuch über die Politik des außengeleiteten 
Menschen’, in Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Freiheit: Zur soziologischen Analyse der 
Gegenwart (Munich: Piper, 1962 [1961]). 
164 Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, 22. Translation taken from Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968), 13. 
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Seven years later, in 1972, Dahrendorf praised Hayek again, counting him among 
the ‘great liberals among the social scientists of our time’ alongside Friedman and 
Popper.165 Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, in turn, was the third 
item on the recommended reading list appended to his essay on Riesman and 
Tocqueville.166 In Society and Democracy in Germany, Dahrendorf also praised 
Talmon’s analysis that democracy could lead to totalitarianism.167 
  Dahrendorf’s references to Hayek and Talmon should not obscure the fact 
that his interpretation of Tocqueville’s subject – modern democratic mass societies 
– was profoundly different. As with Berlin and Popper, Dahrendorf found it 
expedient to reference the works of liberals whose views in fact diverged from his 
own ones. Not only did Talmon think that ideas, rather than socio-economic forces, 
had been the central motive force in history since the French Revolution.168 Talmon 
also worried about ‘totalitarian democrats’ who wanted to enforce economic 
equality by means of the state.169 Similarly, Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty 
made it clear that liberty should only be understood as the absence of coercion of 
individuals. Majoritarian democracy, like any other form of government, was a 
threat to individual liberty, and should be constrained by strict constitutional 
limits.170 Furthermore, Hayek was primarily interested in Tocqueville as a scholar 
of democratic institutions, whereas Dahrendorf’s fascination lay in Tocqueville as 
a scholar of democratic society. This reflected a more general difference in outlook. 
Hayek and Talmon were deeply troubled by the potential coercion of individuals 
                                                     
165 Dahrendorf, Konflikt und Freiheit, 9: ‘die großen Liberalen unter den Sozialwissenschaftlern 
unserer Zeit’. 
166 Dahrendorf, ‘Demokratie ohne Freiheit’, 441. 
167 Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland, 21. 
168 Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker & Warburg, 1955), 
69-70. 
169 ibid., 50-65. 
170 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 159. 
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by democratic states. Dahrendorf’s point was that it was democratic society that 
liberals should worry about. Democratic society forced the individual into 
conformity, demanding ‘equality of character’.171 It created individuals who were 
averse to individuality and conflict, seeking conformity and shying away from 
formulating their own interests. This destroyed the necessary precondition of 
pluralistic democracy.172 This was the paradox of democracy as Dahrendorf saw it: 
democracy as a form of government depended on autonomous individuals, while 
democracy as a type of society tended to destroy the autonomy of individuals.173  
  Indeed, Dahrendorf’s version of liberalism was diametrically at odds with 
Hayek’s liberalism. Hayek’s intention behind his advocacy of constitutional 
constraints was to limit the scope for coercive power in the economic realm, which 
would for instance include strict limits on trade union privileges.174 From 
Dahrendorf’s perspective, this was a foolish attempt to interfere with social conflict 
and to establish harmony, a false harmony since it was enforced by the state. In 
1957, Dahrendorf told the conflict seminar of the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences: 
 
My assertion is that no effective regulation of conflict can be expected 
unless the actions of those involved are inspired by the recognition of 
conflict as ubiquitous. Such recognition is as plausible in theory as it is 
uncomfortable in practice, where several consequences follow from it 
which are by no means generally accepted: (a) However unpleasant 
particular conflicts may be, their suppression must never even be 
considered. Legislation restricting strikes or the operation of political 
                                                     
171 Dahrendorf, ‘Demokratie ohne Freiheit’, 326. 
172 ibid., 333. 
173 ibid., 326-7. 
174 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 2009 [1960]), 233-47. 
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organizations is never an effective means of regulating conflict. (b) It 
is equally ill-advised to approach conflict situations with a legalistic 
view according to which there is an ultimate ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ which 
provides a measure to judge the merits of conflicting issues. (c) Rather 
than discouraging it, conflict should actually be encouraged…175 
 
This was to remain Dahrendorf’s position for the rest of his life. As Chapter VI 
shows, it formed an integral part of his critique of those economic theories that 
became popular in the later 1970s and 1980s. Dahrendorf’s liberalism avowedly 
diverged from that of both Popper and Hayek. As he put it in ‘The New Liberty: 
Comments on Italian Critics’:  
 
The notion of liberty underlying my analysis is in fact not merely 
Hayek’s or Popper’s. That is to say, it is not merely a notion of absence 
of constraint, important as this notion is in any concept of liberty. But 
I would add – and this is where the activist element comes in – that 
liberty demands of us to do everything in our power to extend the 
frontiers of the human potential ... The active liberal can never be 
satisfied with the conditions with the conditions which he finds; he will 
be eager to help in pushing the boundary of freedom further out. There 
may or may not be a limit to this process – it is probably better to 
assume that there is not –, but in any case we can and must proceed 
seeking more liberty for more people.176 
 
  For Dahrendorf, history was a process of human improvement in which 
an increasing number of individuals and groups gradually obtained and made use 
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of life chances. The suppression of such interests could not work in the long run – 
any sustainable liberal order had to keep avenues open for individuals to pursue 
their objective interests. The assumption of the centrality of social forces to politics 
rendered Dahrendorf incapable to agree with Hayek and Popper. This was still the 
case in 1988, when Dahrendorf used the opportunity of an article Popper published 
in The Economist to make a point that had long been left implicit in his political 
commentary.177 In reaction to Popper’s advocacy of first-past-the-post voting 
systems, Dahrendorf argued that such a system had worked well in the age of a 
democratic class struggle between two large voting blocks, but that modern social 
forces rendered it dysfunctional. In modern societies, Popper’s ideal of democracy 
incapacitated interests to successfully manifest themselves in parliamentary 
politics. His ideas about democracy therefore had to be rejected: ‘when it comes to 
detail, the great man is too remote, for we have to take into account the real 




  This chapter has sought to flesh out the impact that Dahrendorf’s early 
engagement with Marx and other materialist sociologists had on the long-term 
trajectory of his liberalism. It has established that assumptions about the so-called 
‘binding character of natural forces’ were a central element of the theoretical 
underpinning of his agonistic liberalism. He was convinced that it was unrealistic 
to hope that individuals and groups could be persuaded to abandon the pursuit of 
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their interests for the greater good of society. In order to ensure that social conflicts 
did not escalate into violent revolutions, it was necessary to construct a 
constitutional system that could act as a parliamentary arena within which objective 
interests could be pursued in non-violent ways.  
  This was the central materialist conviction that he retained for the rest of 
his academic and political life. Assumptions based on this commitment played a 
key part in his attempt to reform sociology (Chapter III), his rejection of idealism 
and involvement in university reforms (Chapter IV), as well as his critique of 
neoconservatism (Chapter V) and neoliberalism (Chapter VI). In the early 1990s, 
long after social structural issues had stopped attracting the interest of social 
scientists in the same way as they had in the immediate post-war period, 
Dahrendorf was still fascinated by the theorists whose works he had devoured in 
his youth. In November 1991, he told the Bielefeld literary historian and critic Karl 
Heinz Bohrer that it could be worthwhile to re-open the Mannheim debate of the 
late 1920s.179 This came a few months after Daniel Bell had sent him his most 
recent publication on ‘The Misreading of Ideology: The Social Determination of 
Ideas in Marx’s Work’, with the following words of introduction: 
 
Dear Ralf: I suspect that you no longer have a taste for this alte quatsch. 
But one cannot wholly escape one’s past or the need to exorcize old 
demons. Hence the enclosed. Engels once remarked that he was weary 
of the old Hegelianism, when he went back and found the neglected 
‘theses on Feuerbach.’ I have been weary, too, but the only justification 
I have, intellectually, is that I have rescured [sic!] that queer character 
Max Stirner from the ton of scheiss that Marx heaped upon him … The 
                                                     




issue is the relation of ideology to the sociology of knowledge, a 
problem introduced by Karl Mannheim (in English) in 1936, but 
marred by a weak epistemology and a muddled set of thoughts on the 
relation of the social location of groups to particular idea systems.180 
 
Dahrendorf told Bell that he had thoroughly enjoyed the piece, and that it had 
prompted him to look at Stirner again. Moreover, he added: 
 
I love some of the German misprints in your piece, most of all Ludwig 
Feuerbauch on p.35. There really should be such a person, Firebelly, 
not a bad name. But seriously, Dan, you just know too much. And the 
wonderful thing is that you do not feel a (Habermasian) need to put it 
all in its place in a great philosophy of history, let alone a (Parsonian) 
need to place it in a great big bourgeois mansion. You are wonderful. I 
have just read a brilliant critique of Hayek (a thesis for the Hochschule 
St. Gallen in Switzerland) by a man called, Roland Kley. He shows that 
Hayek’s ‘scientific liberalism’ cannot be that at all. (Hayek, as you 
know, claims that there is no disagreement on ends, but only on means, 
and that therefore the merits of socialism and liberalism can be decided 
‘scientifically’. Socialism is not morally or politically wrong, but an 
error, a mistake, a ‘fatal conceit’.) Ideology: pretending that something 
is true which is merely useful for certain purposes.181 
 
Coming more than thirty years after his attempt to overcome Parsons’ dominance 
in sociology, Dahrendorf had lost nothing of his frustration with a strand of 
sociology that he thought had become influential because of its ideological 
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usefulness. What was new was that Hayek and others had given him a second set 





Chapter III: A New Sociology 
 
‘Of course I have a completely different opinion than Dahrendorf. He just happens to have a 
father complex towards Talcott Parsons and holds a grudge against him because he isn’t Karl 




In February 1962 Dahrendorf delivered a paper at the Theological Department of 
the University of Heidelberg. 32-years old at the time, the young sociologist used 
the opportunity to comment on the arguments about the social function of religion 
of Talcott Parsons and those expressed by his student Kingsley Davis in Human 
Society (1949). For Davis, religion played a key role in stabilizing society. It 
ensured that a sufficient degree of consensus and shared goals was present in 
society, something that rationality alone could not create. In fact, without a 
‘“system of supernatural faith”, values remained open to being questioned.2 
Dahrendorf, by contrast, wanted to suggest the opposite. ‘Might it not be the case’, 
he asked, that the ‘legitimacy of norms’ depended on domination rather than shared 
acceptance?3 In any case, he said, the integration of societies was incredibly 
difficult to measure scientifically. In some scenarios, such as civil wars, it might be 
easy to say that a society was insufficiently integrated, but less extreme cases posed 
                                                 
1 René König to Alfred von Martin, 5 December 1961, in René König, ‘Briefwechsel’, 1003: 
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taxing problems. In many societies, ‘seemingly strict and monolithic structures’ 
such as organized churches will conceal actually existing ‘internal disintegration’.4  
  Seven months later, from 2 to 8 September 1962, the International 
Sociological Association gathered in Washington, D.C. for the Fifth World 
Congress of Sociology. Among large numbers of panels at a conference that by any 
comparable standard was gigantic, one group of sociologists, namely Ernest 
Gellner, Kingsley Davis, Robert Merton, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Paul-Henry Chambart 
de Lauwe, Filippo Barbano, E. Vogel, Joseph Ben-David, and Dahrendorf, 
congregated to listen to and discuss Neil Smelser’s paper on ‘Notes on 
Functionalism and Scientific Analysis’.5 As his private notes suggest, Dahrendorf 
used this opportunity to describe functionalism as a language more than a theory in 
an attempt to challenge four ways in which its proponents justified it: ‘a) “can be 
applied” – of course: almost every language [ill. word] descr. reality why this and 
no other? ... b) generates problems – what a gigantic effort to do so. c) “helpful”, 
“useful” – weak claim d) all sociology is functional: of course, translation 
possible’.6 There was no scientific way of evaluating functionalism’s merits, he 
alleged: ‘internal coherence irrelevant, application arbitrary ... For that reason 
justified to apply extraneous criteria: moral, political (Utopia).’7 Dahrendorf also 
took notes on Merton’s intervention in the discussion, jotting down Merton’s 
comparison of structural-functional sociology and its alternatives. On the list of 
these alternatives, in Dahrendorf’s own rendition that mixed German and English, 
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the last item was ‘factor theorems (“determinismus”)’.8 Why was Dahrendorf so 
exercised by sociological theories developed in the United States, and why did he 
pick up immediately on one of America’s leading sociologists’ contrasting of 
structural-functionalism with determinism? 
  This chapter focuses on Dahrendorf’s critique of Parsonian structural 
functionalism and other variants of sociology current in the post-war period, as well 
as his attempt to devise a new sociology that could replace it. It shows that his 
exchanges with Parsons, other structural functionalists, and critics of his own social 
theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s revolved around the question of modern 
sociology’s thematic focus and methodological preconceptions. Whereas Parsons 
and his followers emphasized the importance of values and morality as an 
integrative force in society, scholars like C. Wright Mills and Hans Gerth 
emphasized the centrality of material and socio-economic conflict to sociological 
enquiry. Dahrendorf sided with the latter group, and sought to establish an 
intellectual alliance with this tradition of American sociology during this period. 
Drawing attention to Dahrendorf’s transatlantic activities and attempts to establish 
himself as a scholar in the United States, this chapter highlights the centrality of 
American social scientific debates to his intellectual interests. In the German debate 
sparked by the publication of the two ‘Homo Sociologicus’ essays in the Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie in 1958, the issue of material 
versus cultural factors emerged as well. For Dahrendorf, this question was closely 
connected to the role of causality in sociological explanation, and in this way his 
interventions in this debate corresponded closely with his involvement in the 
                                                 




Positivism Dispute. By uncovering the nature of Dahrendorf’s sociology during 
this period, the present chapter seeks to explain his attempt to reconcile his 
commitment to a conception of sociology that understood itself as the study of 
material social conflict and non-random social facts with a critique of value-
freedom and technocracy, a combination of positions that effectively put him in 
between the two main camps within the German Sociological Association. It argues 
that Dahrendorf’s position is best described as that of a ‘liberal in despair’, in 
analogy to Wolfgang Mommsen’s description of Weber. The role of the social 
sciences in industrial society was not something he solely celebrated – sociology 
was a double-edged sword for him. It was both a necessary tool for the 
liberalization of modern society and a discipline that potentially facilitated 
bureaucratic and state domination over citizens.9 It was precisely his optimistic 
conviction that the social sciences had a vast potential to create accurate and 
scientific knowledge about the nature of modern societies and human action that 
caused his liberal despair about the potential abuses of social scientific knowledge 
by incumbents of power. 
 
2. The State and Potential of Sociology. 
 
  During the decades following the Second World War, the sociological 
discipline experienced a period of expansion in both Europe and the United States. 
In West Germany, this took place after a hiatus during Nazi rule, when sociology 
was treated unfavourably by university administrations and the state.10 The 
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negative effect this had on the development of the discipline was exacerbated by 
the emigration of many prominent sociologists. From the second half of the 1940s 
onwards, German sociologists generally felt that they stood at the beginning of the 
foundation of a discipline whose true potential still lay in the future. On the 
theoretical level, many practitioners were convinced that their generation was 
creating the groundwork that could be used by later generations of researchers to 
better explain the inner workings of society. Dahrendorf shared this view and 
considered German sociology to still be in its infancy. The theoretical groundwork 
that was necessary to establish it as a scientific discipline still had to be laid.11 
Central categories such as role or status that, he said, should be used in the same 
way by all members of the profession were still left undefined.12 These impressions 
were not restricted to Germany.13 Parsons’ structural-functionalist theory, 
produced during the post-war period and widely discussed on both sides of the 
Atlantic, attempted to systematize sociology and create a commonly accepted 
theoretical framework for the discipline.14 Part of this effort was finding a ‘common 
language for the area of social science’.15 Parsons further observed that ‘the 
development of sociology stands at present in an early stage’.16 In West Germany, 
Dahrendorf echoed Parsons, speaking of a need for a common language and 
commonly-agreed terms, citing structure, manifest and latent function, role, or 
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Sociological Review 24 (1959), 548. 
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position as examples.17 Further work was needed, he said, to systematize sociology 
and formulate theories that could be applied to whole societies. For him, societies 
were holistic entities, which meant that social phenomena in one realm could be 
explained by recourse to the social structure of total societies.18  
  Despite his theoretical opposition to Parsons, Dahrendorf shared many of 
the methodological and theoretical assumptions that were at the root of the 
American sociologist’s works. He certainly preferred the ‘“social system” of 
“structural-functional theory”’ to much of contemporary German sociology, which 
in many ways struck him as backward and isolated.19 It was clear to him that 
sociology was much more advanced in the United States than anywhere else, and 
that it was imperative to further the European reception of American theory.20 
Furthermore, Dahrendorf shared the conviction of Parsons and his collaborator 
Edward Shils that the prognosis of social processes was one of the main tasks of 
sociologists.21. Dahrendorf also had no qualms to adopt Crane Brinton’s theory of 
revolution, which Brinton developed in close association with Parsons and the 
‘Pareto and Methods of Scientific Investigation’ seminar at Harvard.22 Similar to 
Brinton, he was interested in discovering regularities and patterns of revolutions in 
order to develop a general theory. Last but not least, Dahrendorf agreed with the 
Parsonian impulse to distil ‘social universals’ that were present in all human 
societies.23 Against anthropologists who argued that power was not a phenomenon 
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present in all societies, and drawing on the work of Parsons’ students Davis, David 
Aberle, Albert Cohen, Marion Levy Jr., and Francis Sutton on the “functional 
prerequisites of societies” as well as Parsons’ The Social System, he attempted to 
flesh out one social universal that he thought was present in any society. What set 
him apart from Parsons and his students was the point that this universal was the 
presence of unequal distribution of power and domination.24 
  In line with this optimistic atmosphere and concurrent hopes about the 
prospects of sociology, practitioners were gaining an increasingly important 
foothold in administration and politics. In the United States, the Kennedy 
Administration included many prominent social scientists.25 The expectation to be 
living in an increasingly rationalized and bureaucratic society led sociologists to 
believe that their research would become increasingly influential in policy-making. 
This created an atmosphere in which laying the theoretical foundation for future 
research was regarded as an exercise of paramount importance. For Dahrendorf as 
for many other sociologists at the time, reforming sociological theory and society 
were therefore inseparable projects. The assumption to be living through a 
foundational period for sociology gave impetus to Dahrendorf’s attempt to supplant 
structural-functionalism with a more realistic conflict-oriented sociology. The 
attempt to replace Parsonian sociology was central to his intellectual work from his 
Ph.D student days at the LSE, when he invited Parsons to speak at his seminar, 
until the publication of Die angewandte Aufklärung in 1963. It was central too to 
‘Elements of Sociology’, an unpublished general treatise on sociological theory on 
which he was working between 1962 and 1964. 
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3. Engaging with America: Structural-Functionalism as Ideology. 
 
  Dahrendorf’s intellectual and political success in Britain entailed 
numerous appointments to public offices, from the Directorship of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science in 1974 to being raised to the peerage 
in 1993 as Baron Dahrendorf of Clare Market in the City of Westminster. Much 
has been made of the central role of Britain in the development of Dahrendorf’s 
thought and life.26 Indeed, in his later writings, Dahrendorf frequently expressed 
his admiration for British politics and society.27 However, his move to London in 
1974 was never preordained. In fact, apart from pursuing a PhD at the LSE from 
1952 to 1954, Dahrendorf’s frequent stints at American campuses and engagement 
in American intellectual life had a much larger impact on him, particularly during 
the 1960s.  
  In 1957, Dahrendorf crossed the Atlantic for his first appointment at an 
American academic institution. At the Center for the Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) in Palo Alto near Stanford University, he worked 
alongside Milton Friedman, David Landes, Robert Solow, Louis Gottschalk, 
Joseph Ben-David, Philip Rieff, John Bowlby, Frank Newman, Fritz Stern, and 
indeed Parsons and Brinton. As we have seen in Chapter II, his time at the Center 
had a profound political impact on the young German sociologist. In Palo Alto, a 
close life-long friendship developed between Stern and Dahrendorf. Stern helped 
Dahrendorf secure a visiting fellowship at Columbia University for the spring term 
of 1960. Five years later, using his contact with Felix Gilbert, Stern helped 
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Dahrendorf secure an appointment at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton. 
In the end, Dahrendorf was unable to take up the appointment at the IAS, as it 
clashed with inescapable duties at the University of Constance. Dahrendorf’s 
decision in favour of Constance put an end to a period during which he had toyed 
with the idea of coming to the United States on a permanent basis.28 The University 
of Connecticut in Storrs offered him a permanent professorship in late 1963, and 
he sounded out Seymour Martin Lipset whether he should take up the offer. Lipset 
advised that it was not a leading institution and suggested that he could see what 
other universities might be interested in offering him a position.29 Nine months 
later, Dahrendorf received a letter from Page Smith saying that ‘Professor Martin 
Lipset spoke so highly of you that I was stimulated to read some of your articles’, 
and asking whether he would consider an appointment at the University of 
California at Santa Cruz.30 In November 1964, he also received an offer from the 
University of Michigan.31 
  In the end, Dahrendorf did not take up any of these offers. However, the 
coming years frequently brought him to American campuses. In April and May 
1966, he returned to Columbia for a visiting appointment at the European Institute 
and the Department of History, again organized by Stern.32 In February 1968 he 
gave four seminars at Harvard on education in post-war Germany as part of a series 
on ‘Changes in Education in Post-War Western Europe’ organized by Henry 
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Kissinger, Stanley Hoffmann, and Laurence Wylie.33 Kissinger and Dahrendorf 
had first met at a conference run by the Rockefeller Foundation in Bellagio, Italy 
in 1963. In the aftermath, Kissinger sought to get Dahrendorf to come to Harvard 
for six weeks from March 1964 on (an opportunity not taken up).34 Dahrendorf in 
turn tried to get Kissinger to come to the University of Tübingen, first as a 
permanent appointment as Professor of Political Science, then as a visiting 
professor.35 Even though the election campaign for the state parliament in Baden-
Württemberg – in which Dahrendorf was running for office for the Free Democratic 
Party – was already well under way, when he visited Harvard in February 1968, he 
took the opportunity of his trip to Cambridge, Massachusetts to also visit New York 
and meet Stern. William Goode and Dankwart Rustow, two other Columbia 
friends, also heard from him that he would be in town.36 In this way, the United 
States and American debates occupied a central part of his intellectual universe in 
the 1960s. Dahrendorf in turn was considered one of the world’s foremost 
sociologists by American colleagues. Even though he had snubbed the Sociology 
Department in favour of the History Department in 1966, Merton approached 
Dahrendorf again in January 1968 to ask whether he would be interested in another 
Visiting Professorship at the Sociology Department.37 With the exception of 
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Germany itself, America and its research output thus attracted Dahrendorf’s 
interest more than any other country.  
  In 1951, Parsons published The Social System, a book that would draw a 
lot of attention from other sociologists for the next decade. Together with Marx, 
Parsons’ structural-functional sociology formed the focal point of Dahrendorf’s 
own work during these years. Dahrendorf and Parsons met at least twice after 
Parsons attended the Thursday Evening Seminar at the LSE. In the summer of 
1956, both attended a seminar in Salzburg where Dahrendorf impressed the 
American sociologist enough to get him to write a reference for him for his 
successful application to CASBS in Palo Alto.38 Indeed, Merton attempted to get 
the Center to defer Dahrendorf’s offer by a year so that his fellowship would not 
coincide with Parsons’ own fellowship. At this point, Merton assumed that 
Dahrendorf’s obsession with Parsonian sociology was a sign of his intellectual 
affinity with the Harvard scholar: 
 
He soaked up a great deal of Talcott’s theory by reading and during this 
past summer at Salzburg, glazed this over with a good many weeks of 
close contact with Talcott. If he should now have a full year at the 
Center together with Talcott, this might be too much of a good thing.39 
 
In the end, Merton’s concern proved unfounded. Dahrendorf and Parsons did spend 
the same academic year in Palo Alto, and yet the former’s writings took on a 
decidedly anti-Parsonian pitch. Indeed, Merton himself would only a few years 
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later find himself included in Dahrendorf’s indictment of American sociology, 
cited as a prime example of its alleged conservative character.40 
  In Palo Alto, Dahrendorf prepared the English edition of Class and Class 
Conflict and wrote the manuscripts of ‘Homo Sociologicus’ and ‘Out of Utopia’. 
The latter amounted to a thorough critique of the assumptions that Parsons’ work 
rested on, expanding on a critique of Parsons published in the Kölner Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie in 1955. ‘Out of Utopia’ argued that Parsons’ 
conviction that social integration was based on shared values and his interest in 
social stability and equilibrium epitomized the utopian character of the 
conservative character of contemporary sociology.41 Dahrendorf first presented this 
paper at Berkeley during his CASBS fellowship before publishing it in the 
American Sociological Review in 1958.42 In addition to these publications, 
Dahrendorf also worked on a collection of essays on structural-functionalist theory, 
which he intended to translate into German but that ultimately remained 
unpublished. Its table of content nonetheless gives an idea of Dahrendorf’s interests 
at the time: in addition to Parsons and Merton it included works by Alfred 
Radcliffe-Brown, Alexander Lesser, Bronislaw Malinowski, Kingsley Davis, 
Wilbert E. Moore, Melvin Tumin, Dorothy Gregg, D.F. Aberle, A.K. Cohen, M.J. 
Levy Jr., and F.X. Sutton.43  
  With his critique of structural-functionalism, Dahrendorf contributed to a 
slowly but steadily increasing chorus of critics in the mid- to later 1950s. Growing 
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out of the meetings of the Thursday Evening Seminar, Lockwood published a 
critique of Parsons in the British Journal of Sociology.44 Pointing to the role of 
power, interests, and interest conflicts in societies characterized by limited 
resources, Lockwood criticized Parsons for an allegedly thematically restricted 
version of sociology that focused on values and norms as the sources of social 
structures.45 Apart from thanking Dahrendorf for ‘many discussions on this and 
other aspects of sociology’, Lockwood’s interaction with his German colleague 
was evident in his drawing on Renner and Geiger to make his case against 
Parsons.46 Lewis Coser in turn sought to integrate the concept of social conflict into 
the structural-functionalist model.47 In works published in 1958, 1959, and 1960, 
respectively, Barrington Moore, Dennis Wrong, and Daniel Bell all levelled the 
charge of a conservative bias against American sociology.48 
  The most prominent critic of Parsons, however, was C. Wright Mills. In 
1959, Mills published The Sociological Imagination, a critique of American 
sociology in which Parsons featured as one of his main targets of criticism. 
Building on The Power Elite (1956), the Columbia sociologist tried to chip away 
at the arguments of sociologists who depicted America as a well-integrated society 
with a generally accepted value system. Mills’ critique of Parsons paralleled 
Dahrendorf’s in striking ways – Parsons’ systems theory, Mills stated, failed to take 
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social change and history into account, and it disregarded the role of power in 
society.49 Mills also took issue with Parsons’ heavy emphasis on norms and values 
as the main force of social integration – legitimating symbols and norms were more 
often imposed by ‘institutional rulers’ than voluntarily shared and accepted. In 
contrast to Dahrendorf, Mills was franker about the intellectual origins of his 
critique. Thus, in presenting his views on Parsons he added: ‘I have, of course, just 
paraphrased Marx and Engels speaking of Hegel’, quoting The German Ideology.50 
Last but not least, Mills also paralleled Dahrendorf in arguing that Parsons’ 
sociology was rooted in ideology.51 Mills was unpopular among many other 
American sociologists, but in Die Angewandte Aufklärung (1963), a critique of 
American sociology only published in German, Dahrendorf praised him as a rare 
example of, in his words, ‘critical sociology’ in an otherwise conservative 
discipline.52 Dahrendorf depicted Mills as part of a radical minority position in 
American sociology. This critical tradition also included Thorstein Veblen, Robert 
Lynd, and the sociological tradition of the University of Wisconsin, competing with 
a conservative tradition running from William Graham Sumner to Parsons.53 
Dahrendorf never explicitly defined what he meant by ‘conservative sociology’, 
but his consistent use suggests that what it referred to the tendency of certain 
American and European scholars to put the role of values shared across society and 
social integration at the heart of their enquiries.  
  When Dahrendorf started lecturing on social structure at the University of 
Saarland in the academic year of 1955/1956, he drew extensively on Character and 
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Social Structure (1953), which Mills had co-written with his teacher Hans Gerth, a 
German émigré sociologist at the University of Wisconsin.54 When Mills died 
prematurely in 1962, he wrote an obituary for the leading German sociology journal 
Kölner Zeitschrift.55 For Dahrendorf, Mills was one of the few American social 
scientists who recognized the existence of power imbalances and social conflicts 
within society, and criticized the rest of the discipline’s unwillingness to engage 
with Mills’ arguments as a mark of its ideological status. Arguing that The 
Sociological Imagination was probably Mills’ most important but not his best 
work, Dahrendorf again drew attention to Gerth and Mills’ Character and Social 
Structure, which he saw as being caught between the poles of the ‘conservative 
historian Weber and the radical analyst and polemicist Marx’.56 Mills’ The Power 
Elite, he maintained, had to be taken with a pinch of salt as a book that mixed 
analysis and ‘poorly substantiated polemics’.57 Dahrendorf nevertheless criticized 
that, for American commentators, the title ‘The Power Elite’ had constituted 
sufficient ground to caricature Mills as a radical. The outcome, he claimed, would 
have been the same in West Germany if anybody had written a book with its title 
there.58  
  Dahrendorf habitually sided with Mills in the debates the Texan had with 
other members of the American sociological profession. As far as the central 
phenomenon of ‘power’ was concerned, Dahrendorf found Mills’ conception to be 
superior to that of Parsons. Parsons’ opinion that power was best defined as ‘the 
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capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for 
which a general “public” commitment has been made, or may be made’, expressed 
in a book review of Mills’ The Power Elite, struck Dahrendorf as exemplary of 
Parsons’ assumption of widespread social consensus.59 Parsons further objected to 
Mills’ definition of ‘power’ as power exercised over others rather than as ‘a facility 
for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system’.60 In 
Die Angewandte Aufklärung, Dahrendorf reported that it caused him ‘almost 
physical torture’ to read a long footnote heavily critical of Mills in Lipset and Neil 
Smelser’s ‘Change and Controversy in Recent American Sociology’, published in 
the British Journal of Sociology in 1961.61 In the footnote, Lipset and Smelser 
depicted Mills’ popularity outside academia as curious given his work’s lacking 
relevance to contemporary sociology. Dahrendorf felt the need to quote the whole 
footnote running over an entire page.62 In spite of this critique, Dahrendorf sent 
Lipset a copy of the book after publication. He received a polite reply, part of which 
tried to give Dahrendorf ‘the background of that famous footnote on Mills’: 
 
The footnote on Mills was actually inserted on the galleys. The reason 
why I did so, and it was completely my own responsibility, not that of 
Smelser, was that a few days before I received the galleys from the 
British Journal of Sociology, I read an article by Mills which appeared 
in the New Left Review. In this article, which was, as I recall, largely 
his impressions based on a tour of Europe, particularly eastern Europe, 
Mills suddenly lashed out at Dan Bell. He had a paragraph in the article 
which, out of nowhere, suddenly accused Bell of being a gossip, a 
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malevolent individual who was not really interested in ideas, but just 
in chattering about people, and much worse. He also attacked Bell for 
his politics in the same personal fashion. As you may imagine, I was 
somewhat angry at Mills for this and the footnote was my retaliating at 
him. It had no deeper significance than this. I thought also, as I recall 
my feelings at the time, that I ought to mention, if I was going to put 
this footnote in, some facts concerning Mills’ relationship with 
American sociology since he had been going around Europe pretending 
that he was a victim of McCarthyism and of persecution by Lazarsfeld 
and Merton. There was simply no truth in this as he well knew ... This 
may all sound very bitter but he was not a nice man.63 
 
  Reflecting on these acrimonious debates among American sociologists, 
Dahrendorf observed that by European standards the radicalism of American 
critical sociologists was in fact quite moderate. According to him, it was no 
coincidence that in the United States both progressive and conservative sociologists 
concurred in their reverence of Weber.64 At this point in time, Weber still 
symbolized social scientific ‘conservatism’ to him; the American reception of 
Weber seemed to have interested him for years already. A reply by René König to 
Dahrendorf from October 1958 shows that Dahrendorf had suggested approaching 
Reinhard Bendix about writing an article about ‘Max Weber in America’ for the 
Kölner Zeitschrift.65 In his attempt to undermine the dominant ‘conservative’ strand 
of American sociology, Dahrendorf also made common cause with associates of 
Mills who he assumed shared his intentions. As editor of the European Journal of 
Sociology, he approached Gerth, who had co-translated a selection of Weber’s 
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essays with Mills, about writing an article about ‘Max Weber in America’. 
Dahrendorf advised Gerth that the editors were looking for a ‘well-informed 
article’, but added that ‘informed does of course not mean that the article must not 
be polemical; to the contrary, we are looking for a particularly critical article – 
otherwise we would not be asking you...’.66 This request came less than a year after 
Dahrendorf had met Gerth at the University of Wisconsin at a point between 
February and early April 1960 when he gave a guest lecture on ‘Democracy and 
Social Structure in Post-Nazi Germany’, invited by Howard Becker.67 
  Gerth and Mills broadly shared Dahrendorf’s methodological orientation. 
In the introduction to From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, the two depicted 
Weber as someone who ‘does not squarely oppose historical materialism as 
altogether wrong; he merely takes exception to its claim of establishing a single 
and universal causal sequence.’68 Weber’s writings partly had to be understood ‘as 
an attempt to “round out” Marx’s economic materialism by a political and military 
materialism.’69 This interpretation of Weber put the two scholars at odds with 
Parsons, who insisted that Weber, like Durkheim, generally ‘looked to the “ideal” 
as contrasted with “material” factors for the key concepts – such as values and 
institutionalized norms – of their analyses’.70 Both Gerth and Mills were also 
interested in Mannheim and the sociology of knowledge. Before emigrating, Gerth 
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had attended Mannheim’s seminar at the University of Heidelberg. Both at 
Heidelberg and from 1930 at the University of Frankfurt, he had worked as 
Mannheim’s assistant.71 Mills on the other hand published on the sociology of 
knowledge in the late 1930s.72  
  Other sociologists close to Mills also came to value Dahrendorf as a 
champion of a movement trying to establish a new sociology. William Goode, a 
sociologist at Columbia University, invited Dahrendorf to sit on a panel on ‘An 
Evaluation of the Decade in Sociology, 1950-1960’ at a meeting of the Eastern 
Sociological Society in April 1960. As Parsons was going to be on the panel, Goode 
wrote that Dahrendorf would be better placed to confront him than others: ‘My 
good friend Mills scorns the Establishment, but hasn’t bothered to understand it.’73 
The Austrian-American sociologist Peter Berger wrote to Dahrendorf in May 1964, 
urging him to publish an American translation of Die angewandte Aufklärung, as 
he thought the time was ripe given that the ‘ideological “establishment”’ of 
American sociology had started to ‘shake a little bit’.74 Berger was not the last one 
to express this wish: Mills’ student Irving Louis Horowitz, himself a strong critic 
of what he took to be the mainstream of American sociology, also pressed for a 
translation in early 1966.75 In the same letter Horowitz also expressed his 
amazement at Dahrendorf’s return to Columbia University as a visiting scholar at 
the Department of History rather than the Department of Sociology in 1966:  
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What irony. What unbelievable nonsense that you should be invited in 
the History Department and not to the Sociology Department. Perhaps 
you now realize why Columbia University no longer ranks as a 
foremost center of sociology in the United States. What a bunch of 
revanchists. Apparently to criticize them is to be cast into darkness. But 
you can have the joy of snubbing Lazarsfeld, Merton, et al, on a daily 
basis as you chat with your fellow ‘historians’.76 
 
Dahrendorf’s affinity with the ‘critical’ tradition in American sociology then 
provides some perspective on why he felt drawn to Veblen’s Imperial Germany 
and the Industrial Revolution. Dahrendorf took copious notes on the book while 
working on Society and Democracy in Germany (1965) and used it extensively in 
lectures.77 Many of Veblen’s ideas that Dahrendorf noted down on paper 
foreshadowed Dahrendorf’s own account of German social structure and history. 
Among other things, Dahrendorf took note of Veblen’s emphasis on Germany’s 
aristocratic elite, its relatively late industrialization, the subsequent dominance of 
the state in economic activity that resulted from this delay, and the submissiveness 
of the German labour movement.78  
  How did Dahrendorf’s vision for sociology differ from that of Parsons 
more specifically? Already in his own student days, Parsons had insisted ‘that the 
economic and social order was a matter of human arrangements, not one of 
inevitable natural law, and hence that it was subject to human control’.79 In The 
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Structure of Social Action (1937), Parsons sketched an outline of a voluntarist 
tradition of sociological thought exemplified by Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, 
Durkheim, and Weber, which he claimed had successfully consigned the 
‘untenable positions’ of ‘positivistic social thought’ to history.80 By positivism, 
Parsons referred to intellectual traditions such as utilitarianism, behaviourism, and 
Social Darwinism.81 All of these currents of thought, he claimed, ‘ultimately flow 
into the same sea, that of mechanistic determinism’.82 In contrast, Parsons was 
searching for alternatives that concentrated on the subjective and voluntary realm 
of action, and sought to move away from the ‘minimization of the role of 
noneconomic factors’.83 In this way, Parsons’ sociological project was 
diametrically opposed to the one that Dahrendorf developed twenty years later.84 
This was also true for Parsons’ interpretation of the roots of National Socialism, a 
topic that preoccupied him during the Second World War. According to his 
analysis, the origins of National Socialism and totalitarianism lay in social anomie, 
that is, Germany’s insufficient social integration.85 This analysis chimed with the 
later observations of The Social System (1951), where Parsons further developed 
his structural-functionalist theory. In many ways, Parsons was here concerned with 
the question of how societies integrate and stabilize, including aspects such as the 
inculcation of values in children, how social roles are acquired, and how societies 
deal with deviant behaviour. 
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  Parsons’ The Structure of Social Systems famously begun with the 
observation that ‘Spencer is dead. But who killed him and how? This is the 
problem’.86 Parsons’ critical assessment of Spencer, whose theories were based on 
the assumption of omnipresent conflict, and his appraisal of Spencer’s assassins 
dovetailed with his preference for consensus-oriented theories. Dahrendorf 
objected to Parsons’ death pronouncement, arguing that Spencer was still half-alive 
given that his biological conception of society lived on in the works of Malinowski, 
Radcliffe-Brown, and indeed Parsons himself. Many sociologists still worked with 
the assumption that every part of society had a particular function within a 
harmonized system that worked like a biological organism.87 According to 
Dahrendorf, Parsons’ interest in social integration was characteristic of American 
sociology more generally. From Sumner and Franklin Henry Giddings to the 
Chicago School of Albion Small, W.I. Thomas, Robert E. Park, and Louis Wirth, 
Parsons’ predecessors had been interested in community, attachment, and the 
‘secure order of social affairs’.88 America’s actual problems, ‘equality and its 
perils, social stratification, and class structure’, were only studied by those standing 
on the periphery of the discipline.89 On the other hand, Parsons also epitomized the 
reluctance of American sociologists to take economic and political factors into 
account. The European tradition of sociology was often ignored in the United 
States, and when this was not so it was caricatured and reduced to palatable facets. 
Thus, Vilfredo Pareto had been ‘“biologized” (Henderson) and “psychologized” 
(Parsons)’.90 
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  Dahrendorf was adamant that American sociologists read European 
authors selectively, and that only such theories that chimed with pre-existing 
American values found their audiences. Commenting on the reception of European 
sociology in the United States, he argued that thinking about this matter in terms 
of ‘influence’ was ‘a very misleading figure of speech. It would be quite 
unhistorical to think that any social norm, i.e. any value embodied in the institutions 
of a society, could simply be the result of an outside influence of whatever 
kind...’.91 Americans would still have had an individualist ethos in Spencer’s 
absence, and would have been ascetic Puritans had Weber never written about 
Puritan economic ethics. Thus, Dahrendorf also found it telling that Bendix’s 
biography of Weber reduced the German scholar to a sociologist of religion and 
theorist of rationality, while his political interests fell by the wayside.92 
  Bendix’s interpretation of Weber was part of a broader attempt to move 
beyond overly economic interpretations of politics. In a programmatic article co-
authored with Lipset in 1957, Bendix argued that Fascism was a case in point that 
should prompt sociologists to take seriously psychological and ideal factors, rather 
than treating them as derivatives.93 Dahrendorf in contrast regretted that Marx was 
completely absent from American sociology.94 In fact, he was puzzled that ‘many 
Americans regard Weber as a progressive’.95 Even more so, Dahrendorf said, 
themes such as class, violence, or revolution did not interest the majority of 
American social scientists. George Sorel’s Reflections on Violence were ignored, 
and he recounted in 1961 that ‘when I recommended the book to some American 
                                                 
91 Dahrendorf, ‘European Sociology and the American Self-Image’, 329. 
92 Dahrendorf, Die angewandte Aufklärung, 128. 
93 Job Dittberner, The End of Ideology and American Social Thought, 1930-1960 (UMI Research 
Press, 1979), 246-7. 
94 Dahrendorf, Die angewandte Aufklärung, 128. 
95 Dahrendorf, ‘European Sociology and the American Self-Image’, 341. 
159 
 
graduates in sociology, I found them deeply shocked after reading it’.96 Indeed, 
Dahrendorf’s positive thoughts on Sorel further demonstrate his intellectual 
distance from the liberal tradition of Popper and Berlin, laid out in Chapter II. For 
Berlin, Sorel epitomized anti-liberal attitudes.97 
  It is thus not surprising that Dahrendorf followed Lockwood in criticizing 
Parsons for his reception of anthropological conceptions of culture, and for 
prioritizing culture over economics and politics. Nonetheless, Parsons’ focus on 
norms and values was much more important to him.98 In ‘Out of Utopia’, he plainly 
stated: ‘That societies are held together by some kind of value consensus seems to 
me either a definition of societies or a statement clearly contradicted by empirical 
evidence...’.99 Dahrendorf worried that Parsons’ assumptions about social 
equilibrium and universally accepted values within societies led sociologists to 
focus on a biased set of research questions connected to ‘reproduction, 
socialization, and role allocation’ such as the family, educational institutions, and 
the division of labour.100 By virtue of its alleged ideological refusal to engage with 
social conflict, structural-functionalism was inherently biased in favour of the 
status quo.101 Just three years earlier, Adorno had published a critique of Parsons 
that had made similarly critical points about the role of norms and values in 
structural-functionalism.102  
  In its essence, Dahrendorf’s critique amounted to questioning the 
counterfactual assumptions underlying Parsons’ system – Parsons’ assumption that 
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stability was the regular state of social affairs would lead sociologists to focus on 
the wrong problems. Assuming that stability was normal would prompt researchers 
to ask why certain societies were unstable. For Dahrendorf, this amounted to asking 
the wrong questions. Conflict and instability were the natural state of affairs and 
did not have to be accounted for – it was their absence that had to be explained. It 
was a fact that social conflict, whether democratic or violent-revolutionary, had to 
be accepted as an inevitable aspect of all human societies. This made a conflict-
oriented alternative theory essential to allow sociologists to raise questions about 
matters that in Parsons’ framework appeared to be normal. Vice versa, 
Dahrendorf’s model stipulated that conflict was natural, rendering enquiries into 
pathological causes of conflict meaningless.103  
  From this perspective Dahrendorf took issue with Elton Mayo’s The 
Human Problems of an Industrialized Civilization, which sought to account for 
labour disputes and unrest by way of analysing alleged pathological features of 
union leaders, including personal histories of social inclusion, traumatic childhood 
experiences, and inability to find enjoyment. For Dahrendorf, this was a telling 
example of a sociological trend that regarded material social conflict as a social 
irregularity.104 For similar reasons he rejected Mayo’s work on the Hawthorne 
Experiment, which emphasized the positive effect that worker groups had on 
productivity by helping to reduce social anomie.105 While Mayo’s study 
emphasized belonging and happiness, he stated that it ignored wages, working 
conditions, and relations of domination.106 This applied to others, too. Yankee City, 
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a sociological study of Newburyport, Massachusetts by Mayo’s student W. Lloyd 
Warner, had initially been intended as a study of the community of Cicero, the 
suburb of Chicago in which the industrial plant of the Hawthorne Experiment was 
located. Dahrendorf was intrigued that Warner had eventually decided against 
Cicero on the basis that it was highly dysfunctional and disintegrated.107 Instead, 
he chose Newburyport because its society had been stable over a long period and 
was dominated by a particular group ‘with a coherent tradition’.108 
 
4. Reforming Sociology from ‘Homo Sociologicus’ to the ‘Elements of 
Sociology’. 
 
  Given Dahrendorf’s disagreement with Parsons on the role of conflict in 
society, it is not surprising that his attempt to re-define Parsons’ concept of ‘role’ 
in his ‘Homo Sociologicus’ articles involved trying to move away from voluntarist 
conceptions of social action, emphasizing instead constraints imposed on 
individuals by others in society. The articles made it clear that he conceived of 
sociology as the study of social phenomena that could not plausibly be explained 
as coincidental. Individual human behaviour could not be explained in this way, as 
was the case for the allocation of social positions.109 The articles advocated 
sociological research into the constraints imposed on individuals by society 
through socially prescribed ‘roles’. Such constraints, which he said were often 
tremendous, played a considerable role in influencing individual behaviour. Any 
attempt to understand social action therefore had to involve a close examination of 
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the roles that individuals played in society. At the same time, he made it clear that 
he did not think that roles predetermined individual behaviour completely – 
behaviour was ‘bounded rather than determined’, meaning that individual freedom 
was possible within prescribed corridors of socially acceptable behaviour.110 
Moreover, he also stated that questions about the extent of freedom of behaviour 
within certain roles could not yet be answered satisfactorily given the current state 
of sociological research.111 
  Most German sociologists did not receive Dahrendorf’s re-interpretation 
of the concept of ‘role’ positively. For Friedrich Tenbruck, Dahrendorf’s ideal-
typical conception of human nature in society amounted to little more than 
ideology. Insisting that the phenomenon of alienation was limited to a particular 
kind of society and not nearly as ubiquitous as Dahrendorf alleged, Tenbruck 
insisted that the young sociologist greatly overestimated the constraints that society 
imposed upon the individual.112 He claimed that the tradition of Historismus 
contained everything that was to be said on the issue of individual agency within 
society, whereas sociology had not been able to add anything of substance to the 
debate.113 Moreover, Tenbruck emphasized the fact that Dahrendorf’s framework 
failed to take account of culture, being unable to explain social change that was 
‘rooted in cultural rather than in structural causes’.114 Correspondingly, Tenbruck 
hoped that exchanges with cultural anthropology could keep sociologists from 
committing the mistake of taking the ‘peculiarities of modern society as 
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characteristics of society as such’.115 Helmuth Plessner’s comment on ‘Homo 
Sociologicus’ in turn took issue with Dahrendorf’s avowed critique of society’s 
constraining character on the individual. According to Plessner, this was liable to 
lead to an attitude of withdrawal from society, which would be detrimental to 
democracy.116 Moreover, Plessner feared that since role analysis focused on 
external behaviour, shunning academic enquiry into the inner reality of human 
agents (Verstehen), it could only offer a very limited account of social action.117 
Directly linked to their interventions in the debate that led to the Positivism 
Dispute, Gehlen and Schelsky criticized ‘Homo Sociologicus’ for its moralistic 
bent. In a review for the Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Gehlen 
argued that social scientists should accept the society they lived in and refrain from 
value-laden agitation.118 Schelsky’s comments went into a similar direction, 
criticizing Dahrendorf for introducing moralism into his sociological theory.119 
  Approval for Dahrendorf’s theoretical construct came from Hans Paul 
Bahrdt, who observed that Dahrendorf’s causality-oriented approach in ‘Homo 
Sociologicus’ was helpful, and indeed ‘unavoidable if social mass phenomena need 
to be explained’.120 Even though some sociologists tried to avoid the question of 
causality, Bahrdt insisted that this was impossible, making fun of scholars who 
‘insist on the freedom of Man who could do everything differently than he in fact 
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does – fortunately for the sake of science – with high statistical probability’.121 This 
was not a plea for determinism, as Bahrdt made clear.122 Rather, Bahrdt felt that 
his conclusions followed logically from the observable regularities of social affairs.  
  After the debate on ‘Homo Sociologicus’ had run its course in the early 
1960s, the concept of ‘role’ still remained central to Dahrendorf’s theoretical 
concerns. While working on the manuscript of the unpublished ‘Elements of 
Sociology’, he ran research seminars at the University of Tübingen on the genesis 
of roles and related issues from November 1963 to July 1964. Dahrendorf wrote a 
first draft of ‘Elements of Sociology’ in 1962 and produced a revised edition in 
1964.123 The only part of these two versions that was ever published was the 
introduction to the second version, which came to form the introduction to Pfade 
aus Utopia (1967). In addition to that, minutes from the research seminars give an 
idea of the content and intention of his work. As the minutes suggest, ‘Elements of 
Sociology’ was conceived as nothing less than a first exposition of a predictive 
framework for the explanation of social action. In terms of scientific aspiration, it 
equalled Parsons’ systems theory. Dahrendorf attempted to specify the use of 
concepts (the four key concepts of ‘Elements of Sociology’ were ‘position’, ‘role’, 
‘role expectations’, and ‘sanctions’), used equations to express theoretical 
propositions about sociological phenomena (a practice inspired by S.F. Nadel and 
Theodor Geiger), and insisted that coincidental aspects of individual instances 
should be ignored.124 The central question that Dahrendorf sought to answer with 
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‘Elements of Sociology’ was how norms were generated and sustained, and what 
mechanisms were at play in compelling individuals to abide by them. In this way, 
the project was set to undermine the central assumption of Parsons’ sociological 
theory, namely that norms and values were shared and accepted rather than 
imposed by one group on another. Dahrendorf was particularly interested in extra-
legal norms: what institutions and mechanisms set norms that obliged individuals 
to act in certain ways?125 On this point, he thought to be departing from Weber. On 
a handwritten note, he observed that Weber was only interested in legal norms.126  
  During the seminars, Dahrendorf made it clear that he thought that within 
this framework, human social action became to a very large degree predictable. In 
the first seminar, his assistant Wolfgang Zapf (who was appointed Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Frankfurt in 1968) raised the critical question 
whether seeing roles as exclusively constraining and forces shaping individuals 
exhausted the subject. Using the example of Heinrich Himmler as ‘Reichsführer 
SS’, Zapf argued that in some cases individuals managed to create and shape roles 
for themselves, and that these roles are so intrinsically linked to a particular person 
that their ‘field collapses with their own person’.127 Dahrendorf replied that in the 
vast majority of cases individuals did not have the power to shape their roles in this 
way.128 At the beginning of the next seminar in early December 1963, Dahrendorf 
advocated ‘“hygienic” sociological thinking’ to avoid the pitfall of paying too 
much attention to individual coincidental factors.129 Zapf raised the issue again at 
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the end of the seminar, this time drawing on the example of Uwe Seeler, the star 
player of Hamburger SV, the football club that Dahrendorf supported. Asking 
whether Seeler had shaped the role of ‘center-forward in the German national 
team’, Zapf was told that ‘in this case one may speak of “charisma”, which 
positionally stabilizes particular aspects of an individual and in this sense 
bequeaths’ it to future incumbents of the role.130 
  In the introduction to the second edition of ‘Elements of Sociology’, 
Dahrendorf further engaged with this question and with some of the critiques 
levelled at Homo Sociologicus. Prominently, he restated his conviction that 
sociology studied social action with the explicit intent of uncovering causality. In 
his own words, science was the pursuit of knowledge of ‘conceived necessity’, 
meaning that it dealt with causal regularities that common sense showed could 
nonetheless be broken in individual instances.131 Still, the notion that social action 
could not be studied in terms of causation or regularity struck him as nonsensical. 
He suggested to consider for a moment what random social action would amount 
to: ‘if we shake somebody’s hand for the purpose of salutation the chance is equally 
great that the person spits us in the face, does not see us or kisses us on the forehead, 
threatens us with a pistol, or that he also shakes our hand’.132 These concerns also 
figured in Dahrendorf’s research seminars on role genesis. When Zapf spoke about 
the relevance of Weber’s thought to the genesis of roles in July 1964 (Zapf here 
argued that Weber did not think in terms of ‘roles or social structures in the modern 
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sense’, and that he did not in fact have a concept of society because for him all 
action was individual), Dahrendorf commented that Weber conceived of social 
change as accidental.133 In contrast to Weber (or rather, in contrast to the Weber 
that he thought he knew), he sought a theory of social change that was precisely 
not based on coincidence.134 As far as Zapf was concerned, their methodological 
differences continued over the coming years. As he put it to William Goode in 
January 1968: 
 
Some like my own disciple, Wolfgang Zapf ... consider macro-
sociology as an area of comparative history in which the traditions of 
political economy, historical analysis, strategic and international 
theory, and sociology converge. Others like myself still hope for the 
possibility of propositions which are meaningful and applicable to 
societies under very different conditions.135 
 
By this time, however, he had already abandoned the ‘Elements of Sociology’ 
project and conceded to Goode that ‘it is precisely in this area that is to say in the 
area of theories of mobility, of stratification, of conflict, and change that I perceive 
least progress and am therefore most unhappy.’136 
 
 
                                                 
133 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/627, Protokoll des Forschungskolloquiums vom 
21.7.1964 (4. und letzte Sitzung im Sommersem. 1964): ‘weder Rollen noch Sozialstruktur im 
modernen Sinn’. 
134 The notion that social change and reality is not random was central to Weber’s probabilistic 
conception of causality, cf. Max Weber, ‘Objektive Möglichkeit und adäquate Verursachung in 
der historischen Kausalbetrachtung’, in Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988). 





5. The Problem of Value Freedom in Post-War Sociology. 
 
  Dahrendorf’s uneasiness about structural-functionalism was inherently 
connected to his critique of value freedom. Following Weber, Parsons was an 
adamant advocate of stringently separating between normative judgments and 
scientific research.137 At the Weber Centenary in Heidelberg in April 1964, Parsons 
delivered a paper on ‘Value-Freedom and Objectivity’.138 Dahrendorf for his part 
alleged that separating values and research ineluctably pushed sociology in a 
conservative direction.139 This was particularly so in the case of American 
sociology. In 1958, reflecting on his time at CASBS in Palo Alto, he wrote:  
 
in Germany (as in all Europe) the “value-free” sociologist position is 
still a polemical position not accepted by many. In the US it is the other 
way; and for the first time I realized the challenge of social science to 
moral thought, the intrinsic dangers of “value-free social science” – this 
of course, from my impressions of American society as well as 
American sociology.140 
 
What did this critique of value freedom amount to?  
  During the two-and-a-half decades following the Second World War, the 
issue of value freedom was the source of some of the most heated debates in the 
social sciences in West Germany. As Chapter I shows, this figured prominently in 
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the Positivism Dispute. Dahrendorf himself treated the methodological debates of 
the day as an extension of the early twentieth-century debate on value freedom and 
objectivity that had motivated Weber and others to establish the German 
Sociological Association in January 1909. As far as Dahrendorf was concerned, 
hardly anything new had been added to the arguments exchanged in the early 
twentieth century.141 During the methodological debates of the mid-1950s to early 
1960s, he advocated an empirical understanding of sociology that sought to 
investigate social processes that were not subject to change by immediate human 
agency. However, as Chapter II shows, he also had a distinct concept of ideology, 
and argued that our understanding of the world is often swayed by interests and 
value preferences. At the same time, he feared that value-free social science would 
have a performative effect on society. In relation to American structural-
functionalist sociology, Dahrendorf stated that ‘it may be suspected that looking at 
society in terms of order, stability and integration also responds to a demand of 
American society in the middle of the twentieth century and at the same time 
reinforces the prevailing mood of the times’ [my italics].142 The growing role of 
social science in public life gave rise to the spectre of an ‘oligarchic society’ of 
expert rule that Geiger had described.143 If sociologists wrote about roles, 
individuals would become even more likely to abide by them. Polling techniques 
allowed politics to be conducted on the basis of empirical research. Sociological 
studies revealed that crime was caused by social circumstances, thereby 
undermining the connection that punishment had to ‘“unscientific” values’.144 As 
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we have seen, this performative element of social science was at the centre of both 
Adorno and Habermas’ critique of positivism. Dahrendorf also lamented that 
American sociology had never been organizationally separated from social policy, 
thus giving the discipline a character distinct from the one that prevailed in Europe. 
It was oriented towards ‘improvement of enterprises and prisons, cities and schools, 
hospitals and slums, etc. ...’, but in a way that was always in line with the values 
that were already prevalent in their society.145 The mainstream of American 
sociology was dominated by ‘“dynamic conservatives”’ whose research played its 
part in the perpetuation of the status quo.146 To be sure, he maintained, this inherent 
conservatism was unintentional and in many instances ran counter to the values of 
most American sociologists. 147 
  At first, these two positions seem difficult to entertain at the same time, if 
not irreconcilable. Indeed, Dahrendorf drew a connection between these two issues. 
Ideological interpretations of the world were widespread in many sub-fields of 
human understanding:  
 
[T]he theologists of the high middle ages, and still of the reformation 
and counter-reformation, the philosophers of English empiricism, 
French enlightenment, and German idealism, and sociologists of many 
countries in new and most recent times were or are all ideologists of 
their societies: men who reproduce the world of political and social 
facts in their systems or theories in such a way that that what is real in 
their case appears if not as reasonable, at least as necessary.148 
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Viewed in isolation, this statement seems to contradict much of what Dahrendorf 
said in other methodological writings produced during the same period. For 
Adorno, Habermas, and Marcuse, the warning about the influence of ideology on 
research practices turned into a general scepticism towards empirical research that 
reified contingent realities by presenting them as necessary. Dahrendorf on the 
other hand managed to advocate the attempt to discover universal laws and develop 
universal models while two pages later arguing that ‘[w]here normative references 
of a critique of the present are banished from sociological research, the present 
inadvertently takes on an overwhelming weight’.149 In 1957, Dahrendorf argued 
that ‘today it seems at any rate more important to me to warn against the radical 
separation of science and value judgements, rather than against their mixing’.150 In 
fact, in the ‘Homo Sociologicus’ essays, Dahrendorf went as far as saying that the 
ethical questions confronting social scientists might ‘some day in the not so distant 
future’ become as pressing and complicated as those facing nuclear scientists.151 In 
the future, once sociological theory was sufficiently refined, totalitarian 
governments may become able to sustain themselves even more effectively through 
‘sociological insights’.152 Technical knowledge about industrial relations might 
become so refined to the point that it could be used for the ‘prevention of strikes 
and wage demands’.153  
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  Dahrendorf further argued that value-free sociology opened up the danger 
of uncritically conducting research on behalf of whoever paid for certain scientific 
investigations. This was particularly acute in American sociology, where a lack of 
‘moral impulses’ was discernible.154 Dahrendorf found it even more surprising that 
American sociologists did not seem to reflect much on the issue of objectivity and 
value freedom: despite their familiarity with Weber, neither Parsons nor Bendix, 
he said, devoted any time to this issue.155 In connection to his contribution to 
Culture and Social Character, a collection of critical assessments of David 
Riesman’s Lonely Crowd, Dahrendorf had to defend his critique of Riesman’s 
alleged value-freedom against Lipset, who co-edited the volume.156 Nonetheless, 
Dahrendorf’s uneasiness about value-free research never prompted him to stop 
advocating empirical research and sociological theory that in turn aimed at 
generating research questions for empirical work. Caught between the battle lines, 
he found it impossible to fully agree with even more critical assessments of 
American sociology, such as those assembled in Horowitz’s The New Sociology. 
Writing to Horowitz in January 1967, he stated that in practice it proved very 
difficult to create a ‘“new” rather than “old” sociology’: 
 
I made this point in a rather critical review of the book you edited on 
The New Sociology (less about your own article than about the 
contributions you assembled). I entirely agree with every single tenet 
of your own moral conception of the sociologist. This even includes 
the methodologically somewhat problematic notion of an orientation 
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of theory towards practice or science towards action. But I do feel that 
most of those who agree with this position are only too prone to 
abandon certain elementary standards of methodological and technical 
precision. What I have been trying to do for some time and continue to 
try is to develop rigorous theories which are nevertheless inspired by – 
if you want to call it that – Millsian notions of sociology.157 
 
  Dahrendorf’s review spelled out his apprehensions about the critiques of 
quantitative and empirical sociology expounded in the volume. For him, the book 
ultimately left the promise of a new sociology unfulfilled.158 Any truly new 
sociology would have to build on the ‘best possibilities of a formalizing social 
science’.159 He wrote this review as the University of Constance started operating. 
His attempt to create an institution firmly committed to empirical sociology in the 
form of this new university, described in Chapter IV, displayed his commitment to 
conceptions of social science shared with advocates of value freedom. 
  Dahrendorf did not hold the view that non-empirical versions of sociology 
ought to be banished entirely from the discipline. During the methodological 
debates around the turn of the decade, he insisted that it was important not to define 
sociology in such a way that would leave critical theory outside the discipline. As 
long as sociology was still in the infant state that he thought it was in, the existence 
of different ways of approaching the study of society had to be accepted. While it 
was important to further systematize sociology, the question of why social mobility 
had increased over the past decades was more pressing than the question of how 
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sociology ought to be defined.160 It was therefore clear that empirical observations 
of what is the case were logically separate from what scientists thought ought to be 
the case. There was no way in which ‘practical value judgements’ about the latter 
could be derived from the former.161 Social scientists therefore had a moral 
obligation to comment on the desirability of the social outcomes and unintended 
consequences generated by their research.  
  Dahrendorf held on to his perspective on value freedom over the next 
years and decades. In December 1975, in response to the review of Schelsky’s Die 
Arbeit tun die Anderen mentioned in Chapter II, Dahrendorf told Schelsky that 
social scientists had an obligation to control the impact of their research on society. 
This, he said, was the reason why he had written a strongly worded critique of the 
education reforms implemented in the federal state of Hesse (in which the Frankfurt 
School sociologist Ludwig von Friedeburg played a key role as the state’s 
education secretary).162 The proponents of the radical reforms of the instruction of 
social studies and politics in schools had cited Dahrendorf’s sociological theory as 
a theoretical justification, creating a situation in which he thought he had to react 
against an instance of abuse of his research. In 1980, he criticized Popper for failing 
to acknowledge the existence of an ‘Oppenheimer dilemma’ in the social sciences: 
‘[i]gnore society, and your value-free science may lend itself to terrible abuse; 
embrace society, and your value-laden science will become plainly bad’.163 Four 
years later, in September 1984, Dahrendorf again returned to this theme in his 
keynote address to the ‘Max Weber and his Contemporaries’ conference that 
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Wolfgang Mommsen organized at the German Historical Institute in London. In 
the present day, he stated, there was a need for research institutions that Weber 
would have disapproved of. There was now a need for institutions that would 
function as go-betweens between long-term oriented social research and short-term 
oriented policy-making. In Dahrendorf’s opinion, there was a need for scientific-
political endeavours exemplified by the Brookings Institution or the American 
Enterprise Institute that transcended the boundary between two spheres that, he 
said, Weber had wanted to separate: 
 
This is policy research, the attempt to apply the accumulated 
knowledge of socio-economic processes to the issues and the time-
scales which decision-makers encounter: what are the conditions of 
sustained growth here and now after two oil shocks and the interest rate 
explosion? How can we reduce the budget deficit quickly without 
unintended transfer effects for already disadvantaged groups?164 
 





  This chapter has covered Dahrendorf’s critique of American structural-
functional sociology and his attempt to reform his discipline during the later 1950s 
and 1960s. In doing so it has highlighted his alignment with American scholars 
                                                 
164 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Max Weber and Modern Social Science’, in Wolfgang Mommsen and 




such as C. Wright Mills or Hans Gerth, who agreed that material interests, power, 
and class conflicts were central to both historical and contemporary societies. He 
criticized the emphasis that Talcott Parsons and other sociologists put on the role 
of values and norms in society and invested a great deal of energy and time into 
criticizing Parsons’ voluntarist understanding of society. Against this backdrop, 
Dahrendorf argued that sociologists could, and should, study social action in terms 
of causality. Indeed, it was his optimistic view of the predictability of social action 
and sociology’s potential to uncover social laws that made him despair about 
potential abuses of sociological research. He was convinced that the new sociology 
that he hoped for was both an opportunity and a potential threat to liberty. It was 
both necessary for the study and reformation of society and at the same time 
constituted a source of new social and political problems. Equipped with 
increasingly accurate knowledge about the inner workings of society, bureaucratic 
or even totalitarian incumbents of power in future societies would be able to 
exercise power over others in ways not imaginable in the present. 
  By explaining an increasing amount of social action in terms of 
sociological laws, the relevance of individual action was reduced so much so that 
questions of morality lost their salience. At the end of ‘Homo Sociologicus’, 
Dahrendorf pressed that ‘the old commonplace “tout comprendre c’est tout 
pardonner”’ captured this dilemma.165 In this way, his intellectual distance to Isaiah 
Berlin emerged once more: Berlin quoted the same phrase of ‘tout comprendre c’est 
tout pardonner’ in ‘Historical Inevability’ in order to emphasize his scorn for the 
claim that anything that could be understood cannot be condemned.166 For Berlin, 
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the issue that made Dahrendorf despair simply did not exist. In diametrically 
opposed ways, their versions of liberalism were thus based on assumptions of social 
universes governed by causality and contingency, respectively. 
  These were questions that went to the heart of those issues that agitated 
most West German sociologists during the post-war period. While scholars such as 
Schelsky or Gehlen fretted about the influence of value judgements on politics and 
research, others, prominently members of the Frankfurt School, argued that value-
free social science reproduced the status quo. Dahrendorf shared the first group’s 
preference for empirical research while agreeing with the latter about its inherent 
dangers. It was precisely because Dahrendorf thought that society was subject to 
long-term processes that were not easily changed that he worried about them being 
reinforced through research. If it was already difficult to improve the fortunes of 
disadvantaged groups in society, social science should be conducted in such a way 
as to help to rectify such circumstances. To do so, both social research into ‘given’ 
social facts and laws and research projects that were designed to break the mould 
of entrenched social structures were needed. A prominent example of his own 
research that fell in the latter category was his research project on access to 
education by structurally disadvantaged groups, conducted at the University of 
Tübingen in the early to mid-1960s. In this work, Dahrendorf highlighted the 
disadvantages of children from rural areas, working class families, Catholic 
families, as well as girls and sought to devise policy-measures that would alleviate 
them. Heavily informed by liberal value judgments, the potential consequences of 
his research were at the forefront of Dahrendorf’s research design, devised to 
address the potentially conservative character that he thought value-neutral 
empirical sociology inevitably entailed. In fact, the conviction that the dominant 
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values present in a particular society were intricately linked to social structure and 
institutions played a role in prompting him to accept the offer to participate in the 
foundation of the University of Constance, a project that he hoped would play a 
part in ending the dominance of ‘idealism’ at German universities, an ideology that 
he held to be inextricably linked to the traditional social structure that had made 
German society susceptible to National Socialism. In this way, his involvement in 
university reform was an attempt to impose new social values on German society, 
as we shall see in the following chapter.167 
                                                 




Chapter IV: Dahrendorf’s Anti-Idealism: From Palo Alto 
and Columbia to the ‘Non-Hegelian’ University of 
Constance 
 
‘The destruction of the nonsensical idea [Ungedanken] of the humanities would probably be its 




Sociology was not the only aspect of the American scholarly world that Dahrendorf 
was drawn towards during the late 1950s and 1960s. During this period, he was 
equally preoccupied with the question that most German intellectuals were 
grappling with in one way or another: how and why had Germany succumbed to 
National Socialism in the early 1930s?2 In the United States, German-American 
scholars who had fled from National Socialism formed an intellectual environment 
that was dominated by this question. When, in 1958, he started work on the project 
that culminated in the publication of Society and Democracy in Germany in 1965, 
Dahrendorf engaged very closely with émigré scholarship and adopted a narrative 
of modern German history that resembled it in both political outlook and diagnosis. 
  This chapter discusses Dahrendorf’s engagement with Sonderweg 
narratives of German history advanced by émigré historians in the United States, 
tracing Dahrendorf’s reception of the condemnation of idealism that was central to 
these arguments. Secondly, it discusses his involvement in higher education reform 
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in West Germany in the 1960s. In particular, it attempts to show how Dahrendorf’s 
role in the foundation of the University of Constance and his attempt to create an 
institution for empirical social science reflected his methodological and political 
ideas, and how his actions in this area sought to contain and break the perceived 
monopoly of idealism at German universities. Thirdly, it seeks to highlight the 
connection between Dahrendorf’s anti-idealist stance and his analysis of West 
German social structure during the 1960s, drawing attention to the connections 
between his concern about the dominance of lawyers in politics and society, his 
sociological theory, and his attempts to reform research and teaching in law at the 
University of Constance. 
 
2. Idealism and German Social Structure. 
 
  Talcott Parsons was not the only Fellow working at the CASBS in Palo 
Alto in 1957/1958 with whose work Dahrendorf would be closely preoccupied over 
the coming years. When investigating the links between German social structure 
and German history became one of his primary objectives during the next seven 
years, Fritz Stern (and David Landes to a lesser extent), played an important role 
in introducing Dahrendorf to the works of German-American historians such as 
Hajo Holborn or Leonard Krieger. Their scholarship identified German idealism 
and the social structure that sustained it as a major factor that had made German 
society susceptible to both authoritarianism and totalitarianism. For a sociologist 




interpretations of German history proved congenial.3 While working on the 
ambitious project that ended with the publication of Society and Democracy in 
Germany in 1965, Dahrendorf came to play a prominent part in the reform of both 
secondary and higher education in West Germany, most importantly as a major 
figure in the foundation of the University of Constance. In this role, Dahrendorf 
sought to eradicate the pernicious dominance of idealist political ideas and methods 
that, he thought, held sway over German educational institutions. 
  Hajo Holborn’s essay ‘German Idealism in Social Historical Perspective’, 
published in 1952 in the Historische Zeitschrift, was a seminal contribution to this 
interpretation of modern German history.4 For Holborn, the rise of German 
idealism and Germany’s divergence from the West during the period of 1770 to 
1840 was a consequence of Germany’s social structure. He highlighted the 
dominance of the nobility in Germany, and argued that the German Bürgertum was 
dominated by civil servants and other office holders rather than merchants, due to 
the sluggish development of the German economy after the sixteenth century. This 
social structure, Holborn sought to point out, gave rise to a particular kind of 
understanding of political freedom that emphasized the rule of law, culture, and 
freedom of opinion but, crucially, not political participation. Soon after the French 
Revolution, Germans returned to their ‘culture of withdrawal’ from public political 
life, happy to concentrate on cultural matters and an intellectual sphere under the 
protection of an authoritarian state.5 
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  Leonard Krieger’s The German Idea of Freedom, proofread by Holborn 
and Felix Gilbert among others, expanded on this theme. Krieger offered a 
sweeping interpretation of German history that centred on an analysis of the tragic 
development of German liberalism in the nineteenth century. In Krieger’s view, 
heavily influenced by idealism, German liberals had concentrated on inner personal 
freedom rather than freedom as political participation. German liberals were 
obsessed with culture and the development of the highest ideals within the 
individual moral person. In turn, engagement in everyday politics was seen as 
unimportant; the pursuit of everyday politics was better left to sovereigns. Not 
least, Krieger located the negative consequences of this tradition in the realm of 
education. Krieger’s rendering of Humboldt depicted an intellectual whose 
‘concern was not to liberalize the political life of men but to accept the existing 
political system as the highest embodiment of the state and then to exclude it from 
all possible spheres of human activity, on the grounds that politics was pernicious 
to the development of the human spirit’.6 
  When Dahrendorf arrived in Palo Alto in 1957, Stern came to CASBS to 
do further work on a project that he published as The Politics of Cultural Despair 
in 1961. Four years before coming to Palo Alto, Stern had joined the History 
Faculty at Columbia University, where Holborn and Krieger were working.7 In 
December 1957, Stern delivered a paper on ‘The Political Consequences of the 
Unpolitical German’ to the Pacific Branch meeting of the American Historical 
Association. In this paper he laid out the negative political ramifications of the 
dominance of idealism in Germany. Echoing Holborn and Krieger, Stern argued 
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that German idealism had fostered an intellectual sphere in which culture was 
revered, materialism despised, and public engagement frowned upon. Focused on 
self-realization, the German education system was designed in such a way that ‘the 
schools sought to prepare the universal man, but not the public-minded citizen’.8 
Stern used Ernst Troeltsch’s wartime diaries to illustrate what he saw as 
characteristic of German idealism, namely the idea that politics should be separated 
from interests.9 Contrasting German with British and French culture, Troeltsch 
stated that a monarch was necessary as a ‘disinterested arbiter among the competing 
material interests’.10 The Politics of Cultural Despair expanded on these themes by 
focusing on Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, 
three German idealist and utopian intellectuals who, for Stern, epitomized the 
‘unpolitical German’, obsessed with culture and happy with an authoritarian state 
in which one did not have to participate in public affairs.11  
  Other historians from Holborn and Krieger’s circle produced more works 
in this vein. Many of these interpretations of German history had a socio-economic 
bent, and assumed that social settings influenced ideas to a great extent. Notably, 
Fritz Ringer’s Decline of the German Mandarins was explicitly conceived as a 
sociology of knowledge, in which Karl Mannheim featured in the first footnote. 
Likewise, Holborn’s work explained idealism in social historical terms. Krieger’s 
narrative of German history explained the lack of a vigorous and self-confident 
liberal tradition by reference to Germany’s comparatively sluggish economic 
development after the sixteenth century, which to his mind had prevented the 
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development of a prosperous middle class. When industrialization finally set in 
during the 1850s and gave rise to the possibility of a ‘broad social basis, gathered 
around a progressive middle class, interested in a free society for vital material 
reasons’, liberals were distracted by the impression of the primacy of foreign policy 
and the need for unfettered power necessary to achieve German unification that the 
failure of the Revolution of 1848 had given them.12 These assumptions about the 
primacy of socio-economic phenomena not only influenced the methodological 
outlook of their works, but was further connected to their rejection of idealism, 
which they frequently chided for its rejection of politics as impure, materialistic, 
and inimical to self-realization. This connection between the methodological 
outlook with which German history was studied and their critique of German 
idealism would also characterize Dahrendorf’s scholarship. 
  As pointed out in Chapter III, the United States, and Columbia University 
in particular, remained a frequent destination for Dahrendorf until the late 1960s. 
At Columbia in 1960, Dahrendorf gave a lecture series on ‘Social Change and 
Social Conflict’ in the Sociology Department and on ‘Democracy and Social 
Structure in Germany’ in the Government Department.13 The latter lectures offered 
some first insights gathered for Society and Democracy in Germany. When Stern 
managed to persuade Felix Gilbert to give Dahrendorf a fellowship at the IAS at 
Princeton, he reported to Dahrendorf that he had told Richard Hofstadter, Holborn, 
and Krieger of the prospect of Dahrendorf coming to the United States, all of whom 
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he reported to have been delighted to hear the news.14 On 6 April 1966, during his 
second stay at Columbia, he lectured on ‘Education and Society in Contemporary 
Germany’, and co-taught several seminars on ‘Approaches to Modern German 
History’ with Stern. The reading set for the course included books such as 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s Bread and Democracy in Germany, Holborn’s A 
History of Germany, 1648-1840, or The Birth of the German Republic by the 
Marxist historian Arthur Rosenberg. In one letter, Stern also suggested to have one 
meeting of the series on Eckart Kehr and Friedrich Meinecke. The course syllabus 
among Dahrendorf’s papers suggests that a seminar on the two historians did 
indeed take place.15 
  As Chapter II and III have shown, Dahrendorf’s political and intellectual 
concerns in the 1960s circled around the question of how a liberal political order 
could be made possible in a political world governed by ‘objective interests’ (in the 
Marxist sense) and non-random social processes. Starting off from the conviction 
that interest-conditioned social conflict was an irremediable aspect of society, 
Dahrendorf utilized arguments that he had developed during his engagement with 
Parsonian sociology when his attention shifted to the historical role of idealism in 
German society. Not surprisingly, Dahrendorf found the anti-idealism of the 
German-American historians that he had been introduced to in the United States 
very congenial to his political arguments, given that their methodological 
predilections were very similar. 
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  In 1960, Dahrendorf published the first essay that came out of his research 
project on twentieth-century German social structure and politics. Published in the 
European Journal of Sociology, which he edited with Raymond Aron and Tom 
Bottomore, his article took aim at the perceived tendency of German political 
theorists, from ‘Hegel to Carl Schmitt’, to view the state as an institution that stood 
for ‘a “general will” disconnected from parties that stood above all conflicts’.16 
From the regulation of industrial relations to the German legal system, Dahrendorf 
felt that many German institutions operated under the assumption that the state 
could establish justice. The German abhorrence of conflict and the assumption that 
the state could govern independent of sectional interests for the greater common 
good, he stated, was a metaphysical and romantic construct that was linked to the 
outlook of the ‘unpolitical German’ that Stern had described.17 Increasingly, 
Dahrendorf noted four years later, all German parties were ‘trying to become 
“people’s parties”, that is, non-ideological election machines appealing to all 
sectors of the electorate alike’.18 In the early 1960s, the self-description Volkspartei 
was not only popular among Christian Democrats. After the SPD’s famous 
conference in Bad Godesberg in 1959, where the party had renounced Marxism, 
Social Democrats increasingly made the same claim. Dahrendorf had no patience 
for the claim not to represent any sectional interests. As a guest speaker at an SPD 
party congress in October 1960, he told the assembled members how misleading 
their talk about ‘throwing Marx over board’ was: ‘in the strict sense Marx never 
was on board’.19 The party’s tradition, from Lassalle and Bebel to Ebert and 
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Schumacher, had never had much to do with Marx. The SPD, he claimed, was a 
typical political product of Imperial Germany.20  
  In Society and Democracy in Germany, Dahrendorf expanded on these 
arguments. In the preliminary methodological section, Dahrendorf intervened in 
the German historiographical debates of the 1960s, of which the controversy 
surrounding Fritz Fischer’s study of the origins of the First World War, Griff nach 
der Weltmacht, was by far the most prominent one. To Dahrendorf’s mind, the 
debate about Fischer’s book touched the core of the matter: the established 
historical narrative of German history depicted the outbreak of the war as a 
‘coincidence’, where ‘Mephisto’s hand appeared in history’.21 For him, such 
explanations were facile.22 Dahrendorf’s book attempted to provide further 
arguments for causal factors at the root of the German catastrophe of the twentieth 
century. Not all historians of Germany, Dahrendorf noted, made their lives as easy 
as those portraying the First World War as a coincidence. Notably, he counted Hajo 
Holborn, the ‘great teacher’, and other members of Holborn’s circle of students like 
Krieger and Stern as positive exceptions.23 As in earlier articles, Dahrendorf argued 
among similar lines as the American Germanists around Holborn. He chided the 
‘unpolitical German’ for facilitating authoritarianism, and he lamented the lack of 
public virtues and excessive reverence of private virtues in German society.24 
Germans, in this analysis, tended to accept more authoritarian forms of government 
as long as they were left in peace in their own private sphere. Dahrendorf took this 
argument a step further than Holborn, Stern, and Krieger, making an explicit link 
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between the political attitudes he minded and the scholarly practices he sought to 
overcome in his efforts in higher education reform. Discussing German 
conceptions of ‘truth’, Dahrendorf concentrated on the methodological ideas of 
Humboldt and Wilhelm Dilthey in order to highlight the inherent problems of the 
German academic tradition. Humboldt was prone to metaphysical speculation, 
whereas Dilthey privileged introspective understanding over what he perceived as 
the inherently limited and compromised method of the natural sciences, based on a 
‘mere shadow thrown by a reality hidden from us’.25 How on earth, Dahrendorf 
asked, could one arrive at the idea that introspection was a more reliable form of 
knowing than the natural sciences? Not only did it strike him as a problematic 
argument. More importantly, there was an affinity between the humanities as 
advocated by Humboldt and Dilthey and authoritarian politics. An ideal of 
scholarly practice that was content with contemplation and introspective 
speculation could very well be practised in private inner exile in an authoritarian 
state. For Dahrendorf, there was ground to believe that proponents of the 
Geisteswissenschaften were often quite happy with this. An empirical ideal of the 
social sciences, by contrast, necessitated an open public sphere of discussion.26 
  Dahrendorf’s objection to ideas of justice and politics that assumed the 
existence of a general interest, which he saw ingrained in German political thought, 
meant that the role of law and lawyers in German society occupied a central 
position in the project that he worked on in the first half of the 1960s. The German 
legal profession, Dahrendorf noted, ‘sees itself as explicitly normative (cf. 
discussion on Wolf/Lueke/Hax). That is, it sees its task as turning values into 
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norms’.27 On this issue of law and normativity, Dahrendorf’s thinking was heavily 
indebted to Theodor Geiger’s sociology of law. To his mind, Geiger’s Vorstudien 
zu einer Soziologie des Rechts was ‘the most important theoretical publication in 
the German language since Max Weber and one of the most important essays in 
sociological theory in general’.28 Geiger’s treatise was a staunch rebuke to 
normative philosophy of law. Rejecting ‘metaphysics’, Geiger criticized the idea 
that ‘normative conclusions’ can be derived from ‘a supposed “nature of law”.29 
Natural law of any sort was anathema to him. Likewise, Geiger rejected the ‘myth 
of free will’, the roots of which he attributed to psychological causes, ‘which Man 
has been fed by moralizing education for centuries’.30 Geiger professed that his 
interest in law originated from his ‘interest in ideology critique’, given that law was 
the most ideological of all social sciences.31 He was therefore interested in 
developing a ‘juridical realism’ that did not commit the metaphysical fallacies of 
established philosophies of law.32 As a counter-example to normative philosophies 
of law, Geiger advocated a form of so-called ‘theoretical value nihilism’. This 
position was predicated on the assumption that morality emerged as individuals 
turned the coercions imposed on them by society into conceptions of the ‘good’, 
thus easing their conscience.33 Anticipating Dahrendorf’s desire to use sociology 
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as a way of increasing individuals’ freedom from the constraints of social norms, 
expressed in ‘Homo Sociologicus’, Geiger sought to free humans from the morality 
of their societies.34 Similarly, Geiger’s conclusion that his sociology of law 
legitimized antagonistic group moralities within society prefigured aspects of 
Dahrendorf’s agonistic liberalism.35 
  Like Geiger, Dahrendorf was interested in strata- and class-specific 
mentalities and ideologies. Dahrendorf also shared Geiger’s interest in how values 
and norms emerged, a process in which both sociologists saw interests playing a 
prominent role. This topic was prominently discussed in ‘Homo Sociologicus’, and 
in 1964 Dahrendorf still analysed Geiger’s work on the emergence of norms and 
values in great detail with his research students. Here, he felt it necessary to 
emphasize the relevance of Geiger’s concepts of ‘stabilized patterns of behaviour’ 
and ‘sanction behaviour’, as both highlighted the role of power in the genesis of 
norms and values.36 Dahrendorf also followed Geiger in being deeply suspicious 
of lawyers’ claims to be neutral and objective. The situation of West Germany’s 
legal system, he argued in Society and Democracy in Germany, was such that the 
question of ‘class justice’ was still pertinent.37 For him, the question remained in 
what way court rulings were influenced by the outlook and prejudices that lawyers 
held because of their peculiar ‘social profile’, and in what way this benefited the 
‘ruling elements’.38 Geiger, in turn, regretted to be unable to include a chapter on 
‘class justice’ in his book.39 In 1960, five years prior to Society and Democracy in 
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Germany’s publication, Dahrendorf had sought to establish this empirically by 
looking at the social origin of judges at West German Oberlandesgerichte. There 
were reasons to think that rulings by judges at these law courts were often swayed 
by prejudices against defendants from lower-class backgrounds, he argued.40 In 
terms of social recruitment, most of West Germany’s lawyers hailed from 
privileged backgrounds. Disproportionately, law students came from the upper 
middle class, often with parents working as lawyers or civil servants, whereas those 
from workers’ families were greatly underrepresented. In comparison with other 
elite groups, social mobility among lawyers was low.41  
  For Dahrendorf, the misconceptions that he saw at play in the sociology 
of law overlapped with those of American structural functionalism. In ‘In Praise of 
Thrasymachos’, Dahrendorf contrasted a so-called ‘equilibrium approach’ of 
sociologists like Parsons or Karl Deutsch with the conflict-oriented ‘constraint 
approach’ of C. Wright Mills, Irving Horowitz, Raymond Aron, and himself (albeit 
in Aron’s case ‘only after considerable qualification’).42 For Parsons and Deutsch, 
 
[s]ocieties are moral entities, i.e., definable by normative structures; to 
this extent the two approaches agree. But according to the constraint 
approach norms are established and maintained only by power, and 
their substance may well be explained in terms of the interests of the 
powerful ... The ramifications of these different approaches to the 
Hobbesian problem of order are numerous and fascinating. In the 
sociology of law, for example, the equilibrium approach is likely to be 
associated with the old – and demonstrably unsatisfactory, if not wrong 
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– theory that laws grow “organically” out of people’s values and habits, 
whereas the constraint approach would lead to a more adequate, if 
apparently more Machiavellian, view of the genesis of laws.43 
 
  Society and Democracy in Germany offered a synthesis of Dahrendorf’s 
reservations about lawyers. Borrowing a term introduced by Mills, Dahrendorf 
argued that lawyers accounted for about half of West Germany’s ‘power elite’.44 
One of two Chancellors, both Foreign Ministers, and all Ministers of Finance, 
Economic Affairs, and Justice in the history of the Federal Republic had been 
lawyers.45 Lawyers dominated the Bundestag, the bureaucracy, and were even 
overrepresented among business leaders.46 As an institution of elite formation, he 
stated, German law faculties were the functional equivalent of British public 
schools and French Grande Écoles.47 According to Dahrendorf, lawyers also did 
not qualify as intellectuals, as their outlook on society largely depended on their 
social background. In political terms, the powerful position of lawyers in German 
society thus had adverse consequences. Not only were lawyers recruited from 
particular social positions; their work entailed further characteristics that reinforced 
these effects. For members of the elite, lawyers were unusually geographically 
immobile. As servants of the state who enforced prevailing opinions, their work 
reinforced the conservative positions that they grew up with in predominantly civil 
servant families. Here, Dahrendorf saw an ‘ethos of service, duty, discipline, order, 
and submission’ at work.48 Dahrendorf sought to emphasize that by virtue of their 
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recruitment and the nature of their work, lawyers were especially likely to adopt 
the normative and common interest-oriented political outlook that he thought lay 
at the root of Germany’s Sonderweg. A Germany ruled by lawyers was unlikely to 
adopt the sectional interest-oriented political option that he thought was necessary 
to create a truly liberal and democratic Germany. 
 
3. The Foundation of the ‘Non-Hegelian’ University of Constance. 
 
  Dahrendorf’s analysis of the role of idealism in German history formed 
the intellectual background and context of his actions as an educational reformer, 
particularly in his role in the foundation of the University of Constance as Vice-
President of its Foundation Committee between 1964 and 1966. This concern with 
education was not coincidental. For Dahrendorf, educational institutions were 
central to social structure, and thus determined power structures and social conflict. 
In twentieth-century societies, peoples’ interests, and the political actions and 
groupings that grew out of these interests related very directly to structures within 
hierarchical institutions. In contrast to what Marx had taught, in contemporary 
society educational and other institutions were supplanting economic factors as the 
main determinants of social structure.49 The way in which institutions operated in 
a particular society was therefore a central determining factor for the viability of 
liberal democracy. As he wrote in an essay on university reform published in 1963, 
‘[i]f there is any significant difference between the liberalism of the Enlightenment 
and of the present, it is that the old liberalism was predominantly declarative, 
                                                 




whereas the new one has to be institutional’.50 Dahrendorf’s engagement in the 
reform of educational institutions was thus first and foremost an attempt to alter the 
power structures of West German society. 
  The University of Constance was one of several new universities set up in 
West Germany to accommodate the rising number of students during the post-war 
years. In 1954, the Free University was set up in West Berlin, prompted by the fact 
that the re-named Humboldt University of Berlin was located in the eastern part of 
the city. This was followed by new universities in Bremen, Regensburg, Bochum, 
and Saarbrücken. In 1959 Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Minister-President of Baden-
Württemberg and future Chancellor of West Germany, first aired the idea of setting 
up a university in Constance. By 1961, Dahrendorf was part of a preliminary group 
working towards a concept for the new university.51 In March 1964, Kiesinger’s 
state government instituted the Foundation Committee for the new university. In 
June 1965, the committee went back to the government with a report that 
summarized its recommendations. Exactly a year later, the new university started 
preliminary operations, with Dahrendorf as the first Dean of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences.52 
  Dirk Moses argues that Dahrendorf’s intention in education reform was 
to ‘update rather than abandon the Humboldt model’.53 This is an untenable 
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assessment, as this Chapter hopes to show. Dahrendorf himself wrote in his own 
notes that the new university was a project geared at the ‘destruction of the 
nonsensical idea of the Geisteswissenschaften … empirical investigation, liberally 
understood, would be its content. Social sciences, modern natural sciences and 
experimentalized (sit venia verbo) disciplines of the philosophical faculty would 
be at its centre’.54 In retrospect, Dahrendorf reflected in an article in DIE ZEIT that 
the University of Constance had been ‘motivated by the idea to found a non-
Hegelian university, that is, a university in which the Philosophical Department 
played a minor role, if it even existed’.55 Dahrendorf’s personal sketch for the ideal 
institutional organization of the University of Constance relegated philosophy into 
a ‘Philosophical-Mathematical Interfaculty’ in which philosophers, 
mathematicians, and statisticians would collaborate as methodological auxiliaries 
for the proper faculties. In this Interfaculty Dahrendorf for instance envisioned a 
data centre and seminars on the logic of science.56 The new university would go 
against the artificial separation of the humanities and the natural sciences that had 
been established ‘in the late nineteenth century with an incredible effort in 
methodological misconceptions’.57 At Constance, the social sciences would instead 
be central to the university.58 Dahrendorf’s desire to overcome the dominance of 
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idealism in the German education system was not limited to universities. In his 
view, one of the ‘three most important issues in German education’ was ‘the 
creation of a new type of school designed for the best to compete with the 
traditional “Humanistische Gymnasium”.59 With these motivations, Dahrendorf 
was not alone among university reformers in the 1960s. As we have seen in Chapter 
I, Helmut Schelsky played a similar and, at least in terms of its methodological 
conceptualization, less contested role during the foundation of the University of 
Bielefeld. Schelsky and Dahrendorf both sought to create institutions in which the 
empirical social sciences could find room that was denied to them at ‘idealist’ 
universities. For Schelsky, founding Bielefeld was central to his concern to equip 
higher education for the role it had to play in technocratic societies in which 
administration would increasingly replace more traditional politics.60 Indeed, the 
two reformers retained their close contact that had characterized their relations in 
the 1950s, corresponding about each other’s publications and about their plans for 
university reform.  
  When Schelsky published his critique of idealist conceptions of university 
education in Einsamkeit und Freiheit in 1963, Dahrendorf congratulated him 
shortly after its publication, and wrote that a need for a ‘pilgrimage’ to Schelsky 
had arisen from his appointment to the Foundation Committee of the University of 
Constance. For this reason, he would appreciate the opportunity to speak to him 
about university reform.61 Two-and-a-half years later, Dahrendorf again wrote to 
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Schelsky saying that they should meet in order to discuss the foundation of their 
universities.62 In 1964, Dahrendorf also made frequent references to Schelsky’s 
book in an article in DIE ZEIT. Worded much more carefully than his private notes, 
the article sketched a non-idealist alternative to what he regarded as the outdated 
Humboldtian ideal of universities. The idealist university was a ‘class university’ 
for those who were able to fund their contemplative freedom. Oriented towards 
philosophical reflection, it was too theoretical and lacked practical research 
applications to real life.63 In an essay published a year earlier in 1963, he had 
already elaborated on this point, arguing that the nineteenth-century Humboldtian 
concept of academic freedom was inseparably linked to the social reality of a 
university populated by members of the aristocracy.64 It was no surprise, 
Dahrendorf observed, that universities were undergoing vast change, less so 
because of the political upheavals of recent German history, but rather due to ‘the 
slower and less visible transformations of the social substrate of politics’.65 What 
was wrong with German universities, Dahrendorf observed following the work of 
Joseph Ben-David and Abraham Zloczower, was their ‘class character, that is, their 
insufficient rootedness in the non-aristocratic bourgeoisie’.66 
  In Ludwig Raiser and Waldemar Besson, Dahrendorf had two allies on 
Constance’s Foundation Committee who were sympathetic to this outlook. Similar 
to Dahrendorf, Besson complained about the dominance of idealist philosophy in 
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German politics, which he linked to widespread abhorrence of interest politics and 
public engagement.67 Besson also described himself as someone who urged that 
higher education had to be adjusted to the realities of industrial society.68 Indeed, 
for Besson, industrial society entailed realities that German universities ‘cannot 
escape’, thus following a line of argument about practical necessities popular 
among sociologists like Dahrendorf and Schelsky.69 Minister-President Kiesinger, 
too, shared Dahrendorf’s views on the necessities that universities were confronted 
with in the present day. During the 1960s, Besson, Kiesinger, and Dahrendorf were 
closely involved with each other’s political activities. Dahrendorf later recalled 
how as Minister-President, Kiesinger had resided in Tübingen, not unlike a 
philosopher king, surrounded by ‘“his” philosophers’.70 In December 1966, Besson 
and Dahrendorf sat in the newly-elected Chancellor’s living room in Tübingen, 
conferring with Kiesinger on his first big speech before the Bundestag, the official 
government policy statement of the Grand Coalition.71 This was the culmination of 
a trustful relationship that had developed during the foundation of the University 
of Constance, in which the three had fought for the same model. On 23 May 1964, 
in a speech at the Lake Constance Summit of Christian Politicians, Kiesinger 
engaged with the ideas informing the institutional set up of the new university. At 
the beginning of his speech, Kiesinger engaged with the argument that nineteenth-
century thinkers such as Humboldt or Schiller were otherworldly figures who 
despairingly rejected industrial modernity. According to Kiesinger, the works of 
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Theodor Litt had exposed the falsity of this argument.72 Indeed, Kiesinger, argued, 
theorists like Schiller had realized that modernity entailed a danger of alienation, 
as humans were confronted with a dilemma, a contradiction between the necessities 
of social life on the one hand and individuality on the other.73 In Kiesinger’s 
narrative, nineteenth-century idealism constituted a heroic defence not against 
industry or technology, but rather against the ‘spirit that capitulated against [the 
technological age] without a fight’.74 This sounded different from Dahrendorf. 
However, Kiesinger made a turn in the middle of his speech by introducing a sharp 
distinction between past and present. In the nineteenth century, some degree of 
agency had still been preserved. In the twentieth century, Kiesinger stated, mankind 
was confronted with the ‘frightening question’ whether ‘alienation has become our 
irremediable fate’.75 He continued that it would be irresponsible to deny the 
existence of this ‘tragic dilemma’: in a world in which dynamic states such as the 
Soviet Union and China were advancing fast, developing along a certain trajectory 
was not a matter of choice anymore.76 In such a world, higher education had to 
change, and it was certainly not possible to regard its task as the development of 
‘homo humanus’.77 Not surprisingly, towards the end of the speech, Kiesinger used 
the word ‘practical necessities [Sachzwänge]’, which Schelsky and Gehlen used to 
describe constraints that politics was confronted with.78 Given these convictions, it 
is not surprising that Dahrendorf used the word ‘reverence’ to describe his opinion 
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of Kiesinger when the latter was elected Chancellor of West Germany in December 
1966.79  
  While Kiesinger was sympathetic, Dahrendorf found a formidable 
antagonist on the Foundation Committee in Joachim Ritter, professor of philosophy 
at the University of Münster. In stark contrast to Dahrendorf, Ritter was an 
advocate of the humanities, and he successfully thwarted some of Dahrendorf’s 
more radical plans for the new university.80 As Jens Hacke has shown, Ritter 
spearheaded a school of former students that included Robert Spaemann, Hermann 
Lübbe, and Odo Marquard, who vehemently opposed the idea that politics was 
rigidly constrained by practical necessities that effectively transformed politics into 
technocratic decision-making.81 Lübbe and Marquard in particular spent a great 
deal of energy criticizing philosophies of history that, they argued, grew out of 
unwillingness to recognize historical contingency.82 Ritter’s intellectual network of 
former students, Hacke attests, generally followed Popper in his critique of 
historicism and rejected the notion of ‘inexorable laws of world-historical 
development’.83 Unlike Dahrendorf, Ritter defended the humanities from the 
increasingly widespread demand that they should take methodological inspiration 
from the natural sciences. In a review of a cybernetics research proposal for the 
German Research Foundation, Ritter criticized the proposal’s suggestion to include 
the humanities in the project. For Ritter, this was simply the latest instance of a 
tendency that had manifested itself repeatedly since the eighteenth century. 
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Whenever thinkers such as Julien de La Mettrie, Auguste Comte, Henry Thomas 
Buckle, or later scientific psychologists had attempted to establish a universal 
science on a natural scientific basis that would replace philosophy, insights had 
been gained in reaction to, rather than because of, these tendencies. The humanities 
were important as a counterweight rather than as a subsection of a new universal 
science with a unified method.84 
  It quickly became evident how much Dahrendorf and Ritter disagreed on 
university reform. In January 1964, both spoke at a seminar hosted by the liberal 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation at the University of Münster. In his lecture, Ritter 
argued that university reform in the Federal Republic should not completely reject 
tradition. Drawing on the recommendations of the Wissenschaftsrat, Ritter argued 
that the Prussian university that dated back to the reform period of the early 
nineteenth century was ‘in the present and in the future still capable in the full sense 
to fulfill the functions in society and state assigned to it’.85 In his speech, Ritter 
explicitly rejected Max Scheler and Schelsky’s critiques of Humboldt, who both 
said that the social function of universities in industrial society differed from that 
of the past, and that university education should concentrate on specialized 
instruction for the purposes of practice.86 Instead, Ritter advocated an Aristotelian 
conception of ‘freedom in the context of scientific discovery [wissenschaftlicher 
Erkenntnis] ... while the practical arts and their sciences do what is “necessary”, 
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free science undertakes to keep reality as itself open...’.87 In the face of value-
rational technocratic research, philosophy was needed to make possible genuine 
political decisions. 
  Dahrendorf’s and Ritter’s differing views on science and philosophy 
resulted in recurring disagreements on the Foundation Committee. In particular, 
Ritter was not enthusiastic about Dahrendorf’s intention to relegate philosophy to 
the role of an auxiliary science within a so-called Interfaculty. Early on in the 
consultations, to Dahrendorf’s chagrin, Ritter and other members of the Foundation 
Committee managed to ensure that the new university in Constance would have a 
fully-fledged Faculty of Philosophy.88 When Ritter presented the results of a sub-
working group on the organization of a Faculty of Philosophy at Constance, 
Dahrendorf commented on Ritter’s presentation by saying that the suggestions 
were tantamount to ‘basically keep the Faculty of Philosophy at Constance as it 
currently exists elsewhere’.89 Instead, Dahrendorf reiterated, the Committee should 
consider the possibility of a ‘Mathematical-Philosophical “Interfaculty” that would 
include statistics.90 In this way it could be emphasized that ‘these subjects are 
relevant to all areas of the university and, so to speak, serve all as a “tool”.91 Ritter 
replied that it was not the point of philosophy to be a ‘tool’.92 
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  It would be unfair to follow Dahrendorf’s characterization of Ritter’s 
position as a mere continuation of the status quo. There was a consensus among all 
Committee members that Constance should be a reform university. For this reason, 
the Committee agreed in February 1965 that the first chapter of its report would 
discuss the relation between considerations on the theory of science and the reform 
plans for the university. Dahrendorf, Ritter, and Hansjochem Autrum were then 
asked to write a further draft for the first chapter.93 When the Committee gathered 
for its next meeting the following month, Dahrendorf and Ritter broke the news 
that in the end they had refrained from writing a draft because they had found it 
impossible to agree on its content.94 Dahrendorf insisted that it was imperative that 
the first chapter should contain a ‘scientific-theoretical elaboration’.95 He duly 
proceeded to read out his own personal draft for the chapter that Ritter had found 
impossible to accept. Ritter for his part preferred restricting the chapter to an 
elucidation of the pragmatic reform measures pertaining to the organizational 
constitution of the university.96 In the end, the Committee decided that Ritter, 
Autrum, and Herbert Nesselhauf should write an alternative proposal for the 
chapter, and that Gerhard Hess should merge the two into a compromise draft.97 
Among other things, Ritter’s comments on Dahrendorf’s draft, which were 
circulated among the Committee, took issue with Dahrendorf’s historical narrative 
of nineteenth-century universities. According to Ritter, Dahrendorf’s depiction of 
universities as institutions dominated by philosophy in which the sciences were 
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deliberately shut out was historically inaccurate. In fact, the natural sciences had 
dominated universities to the degree that the humanities had had to develop their 
own methods in dialogue with, and in reaction to, the sciences. Dahrendorf’s 
critique of nineteenth-century realities after Humboldt’s reforms was therefore 
unfounded, Ritter stated.98 If the final version of the chapter read more neutral than 
Dahrendorf’s draft, it still stated on its first page that profound social change since 
the early nineteenth century had rendered Humboldt’s ideal university 
anachronistic.99 
  The question of the relative merits of the empirical social sciences and 
‘normative’ humanities dominated debates about the methodological orientation of 
the University of Constance. As late as 1977, the philosopher Jürgen Mittelstraß 
commented on an essay by Dahrendorf that reflected on the foundation of 
Constance: ‘Dahrendorf’s note mentions the humanities “that we after all wanted 
to overcome” and “philosophers” “who began to shape the University of Constance 
which in a certain sense had been founded against them”.’ Observing that for 
Dahrendorf, philosophers were mere idealist epigones, Mittelstraß charged him 
with ‘scientism’:  
 
Scientism: that is that conception of science which does not attribute 
any normative power to [science] in excess of the establishment of 
rules that is inherent in methods. The result is a normative deficit, 
growing out of the intensification of a methodological deficit. The 
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natural and technical sciences teach us how we can do what we want 
to do, but not what we ought to want.100  
 
Mittelstraß repeated a critique that had been voiced by many others during the 
process of the foundation. Dahrendorf did indeed intend to make university 
teaching and research less normative. The discussions on whether higher education 
should be normative or value-free were waged passionately, at times at high-fever 
pitch. This was particularly so in debates on the role of the study of law and 
education at the new university. 
  The Foundation Committee’s report that was submitted to the state 
government argued that the University of Constance should not have a fully-
fledged Faculty of Law.101 In contrast to other universities, where teaching and 
research was determined by the need to educate lawyers fit for practice, Constance 
would focus on legal research. Five chairs for legal studies were envisaged to be 
located in the Faculty of the Social Sciences in order to draw Law closer to the 
empirical sciences.102 This number was intentionally restricted. As Raiser put it in 
a working session of the Foundation Committee, a fully-fledged law programme 
would lead to the manifestation of the legal profession’s ‘estate and corporate 
spirit’ at the new university, and would thus isolate law from the other social 
sciences at Constance, a development that would go against the explicit goal of 
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integrating law into the social sciences.103 Law was therefore not intended to be 
available to students as a stand-alone degree. Instead, Constance’s flagship degree 
would be a two-year postgraduate course [Aufbaustudium] in Law for non-lawyers, 
usually to be taken after the first state examination in Law, and in the social 
sciences for lawyers. This course would allow law graduates to move on to pursue 
doctorates in the social sciences.104 It also enabled students to combine the study 
of public law with either political science or sociology, or the study of private law 
with economics.105 
  By reforming Law at Constance, Dahrendorf attempted to break the 
dominant position that lawyers occupied in German politics and social structure, as 
identified in Society and Democracy in Germany.106 Heavily criticized by many 
law professors and members of the legal professions, the Constance reform plans 
for Law were the only aspect of the report that Kiesinger’s state government 
objected to and asked to be revised.107 Before the official report was submitted to 
the state government, the Law Faculties of the University of Freiburg and the 
University of Heidelberg had already protested against the scheme in official 
memoranda.108 The reform plans were also the subject of controversial discussions 
at the official conferences of the West German Faculties of Law in Cologne in July 
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1966 and in Freiburg in January 1967. At the second conference, Dahrendorf 
defended the plans that the Foundation Committee had drawn up.109 After the 
publication of the Foundation Committee’s report that outlined the plans for Law 
at the university, Richard Lange had already attacked the plans in the leading legal 
journal Juristenzeitung. Finding it remarkable that Constance was founded with 
definite methodological principles in mind, he argued that the plans were based on 
assumptions which were in the process of being superseded. Legal thought and 
political science were now overcoming the rigid separation of a ‘pure science of 
norms and mere description of reality’.110 Quoting Dieter Grimm and Wilhelm 
Hennis, Lange argued that is and ought were moving closer together.111 Even if 
some still held on to Max Weber, Hans Kelsen, and legal positivism, law as a non-
normative empirical science should not form the conceptual basis of a university.112 
Lange then proceeded to criticize sociology of law as offered by René König, 
Georges Gurvitch, and Theodor Geiger, as well as Dahrendorf’s sociology for its 
disregard of anthropological considerations. Geiger was chided for having dealt 
with the problem of conscience and freedom in a mere seventeen lines in his main 
treatise on sociology of law.113 
  Raiser responded in the Juristenzeitung, which again prompted a reply by 
Lange. Raiser defended the two-year postgraduate degree and the idea of 
institutionalizing intellectual exchange between legal scholars and social scientists 
within a shared faculty. Such an environment of interdisciplinary work was sorely 
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needed in an age in which sociology of law could not live up to the height of early 
twentieth-century scholars such as Eugen Ehrlich, Weber, and Geiger.114 Lange 
used his reply to Raiser’s article to once again accuse the Foundation Committee 
of seeking to inject a crude Comtean positivism into legal thought, taking particular 
aim at Raiser’s positive reference to Geiger.115 For him, Geiger’s value nihilism 
and his call to re-direct legal studies towards “state-instituted orders of life” as they 
are rather than as they should be epitomized the worst that sociology of law had to 
offer.116  
  After the publication of the Foundation Committee’s recommendations, 
Dahrendorf and Raiser spent more than one and a half years defending their plans. 
In the short run, they emerged largely victorious, although several concessions had 
had to be made along the way. For instance, at a seminar that Dahrendorf and Raiser 
organized which assembled some of West Germany’s leading legal scholars in June 
1966, a compromise solution was reached which envisaged that former students of 
law would be able to pursue doctorates in not just the social sciences but also in 
law at Constance.117 This went against the original intention of drawing lawyers 
towards the social sciences and of breaking the monopoly of normative, idealist 
legal thought in Germany. Moreover, the concession did not meet with enthusiasm 
in the Foundation Committee, but Dahrendorf advocated it as a tactical move to 
salvage the project as a whole.118 In the long run, Dahrendorf and Raiser’s success 
was pyrrhic, as Constance too saw the introduction of a fully-fledged Law degree. 
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Already in June 1968, Hess, Aebli, Besson, Brezinka, Dahrendorf, Grauhahn, and 
Scharpf debated the introduction of a full Law degree at Constance with several 
professors of law from other universities.119 In the end, it took until autumn 1974 
for Law to become a proper discipline at the new university.120 Dahrendorf 
remained bitter about this process for years. Speaking at a celebratory occasion at 
Constance in June 1988, he referred to the first legal scholars who had worked at 
the university before the introduction of the degree as a ‘trojan horse’.121 Gradually, 
he thought, the university was pulled back into the ossified tradition of the German 
university. 
  Similar to the controversies surrounding Law, the role of Education at 
Constance evoked passionate disputes both in and outside the Foundation 
Committee. The debate mainly revolved around the call to a Chair in the 
Philosophical Faculty. In August 1965, Ritter’s student Spaemann, then Professor 
of Philosophy and Education [Pädagogik] at Technical University of Stuttgart, was 
in the final stages of being appointed.122 Curiously, at the next meeting, two months 
later, the Faculty of Philosophy’s appointment committee revoked its motion to 
appoint Spaemann, stating that the Faculty of Philosophy was already strongly 
overrepresented vis-à-vis the other faculties.123 Instead, the Foundation Committee 
decided to relocate the Chair of Education to the Faculty of the Social Sciences.124 
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During the next meeting, the appointment committee of the Faculty of the Social 
Sciences suggested the appointment of Wolfgang Brezinka as professor of 
education. On behalf of the Faculty, Dahrendorf explained that Brezinka was a 
researcher who was interested in ‘devising a programme for a new empirical 
science’ and to teach students on this basis.125 Dahrendorf continued that Brezinka 
himself was ‘not interested in discussions with educationalists of the historical and 
philosophical kind’.126 The minutes of the meeting recorded that Ritter vividly 
participated in the discussions on Brezinka’s appointment, although the point of 
view he took was left unspecified. Ritter was then asked to write a report for 
Brezinka’s appointment.127 Meanwhile, Brezinka submitted an essay outlining his 
thoughts on the reform of ‘the science of education [Erziehungswissenschaft]’ to 
the Foundation Committee. The report stated that the study and teaching of 
education at German universities was in a poor state. An empirical understanding 
of educational science was sorely lacking in a field in which ‘systems of 
propositions [Aussagensysteme] that are referred to as “pedagogy” in faculties of 
philosophy are still predominantly thought of as a philosophical discipline 
[sic!]’.128 Education in Germany was still artificially separated from the social 
sciences. This was partly due to theoretical misconceptions and prejudices against 
psychology and sociology, but also due to ‘strong normative interests’.129 When 
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the Foundation Committee confirmed its decision in favour of Brezinka in the next 
meeting, Ritter said that he would re-draft the report he had prepared on his 
appointment, and circulate it to the other members along with a non-disclosure 
agreement.130 Dahrendorf had been unable to attend this meeting, but was later 
briefed on the proceedings by his ally Besson:  
 
[There is] little to report. The discussion on Brezinka went very well, 
very fair and ended as you had suggested to me in your letter. Herr 
Ritter did not confront us with any insurmountable difficulties [hat 
keine unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten aufgetürmt]. I have got the 
impression that he gave in because he does not want to come to 
Constance anymore, though he is not saying that yet.131 
 
Besson was proven right early on in the new year, when Ritter announced that after 
long deliberation he had decided not to take up his own appointment at Constance. 
The decision not to become a professor there would, as he told Gerhard Hess, 
hopefully help to pacify a situation characterized by quarrels and disagreements 
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  With the foundation of the University of Constance, Dahrendorf 
attempted to carve out a niche for his ideal of social science, which he had 
advocated since the early 1950s in debates about materialist and idealist readings 
of Marx and in controversies about sociological method and theory from the mid-
1950s until the mid-1960s.133 Constance was intended as a centre for non-utopian 
social scientific research that could contribute to better political decision-making. 
Although, as highlighted in Chapter III, Dahrendorf was very critical of the 
particular theories current in American social science and sociology, he 
nevertheless sought to emulate its influence on politics. Not without reason did he 
name John F. Kennedy as his role model in a newspaper interview in November 
1967 after having decided to run for parliament for the Free Democratic Party in 
the federal state of Baden-Württemberg.134 ‘Modern politics and modern science’, 
he maintained, were and had to be closely related.135 Kennedy was a rare example 
of a politician able to harness scientific insights, even challenge scientists on an 
intellectual level, and still take independent decisions, Dahrendorf explained.136 
This passion for Kennedy is not surprising, given that his administration signified 
the high tide of political influence for sociologists, modernization theorists, and 
other social scientists.137 Ensuring that social science could inform German politics 
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in similar ways was one of the guiding thoughts behind his conception of the 
University of Constance. 
  But Constance was also more than that. By reforming law, education, and 
the social sciences at university level, Dahrendorf also sought to overcome the 
dominance of idealism in German education institutions, which Society and 
Democracy in Germany had identified as one of the cardinal problems of German 
political culture. In this way, he attempted to implement the political implications 
of the analyses of historians like Holborn, Krieger, and Stern that idealism was 
inherently linked to an authoritarian tradition in German history. When the report 
of the Foundation Committee was submitted to the state government, Dahrendorf 
made sure to send a copy to his friend Stern, who replied that ‘[a]fter reading the 
Bericht, I feel even more strongly that Konstanz is something I would love to 
belong to’.138 In its first year of operation, the university’s Great Senate returned 
the compliment by appointing him as a permanent guest professor in the Faculty of 
the Social Sciences.139 Dahrendorf continued his scathing critique of the traditions 
of German universities in the years to come. It resurfaced in his statements at the 
German Sociological Association’s conference in Frankfurt from 8 April to 11 
April 1968, where he sat on a debate panel with the sociologists Ludwig von 
Friedeburg and Erwin Scheuch as well as three representatives of the student 
movement, Klaus Allerbeck, Hans-Jürgen Krahl, and Wolfgang Lefèvre. At this 
event, Dahrendorf maintained that ‘the German university belongs to the most 
backward institutions in German society’.140 Modernizing reforms that in other 
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parts of society had started as early as the 1920s had bypassed tertiary education. 
At German universities, he argued, ‘remnants of anachronistic [vergangenen] 
authoritarian forms of social organization’ were still alive and could at times take 
on proportions that were ‘unbearable for the individual’.141 At the same time, 
education and research at German universities were more influenced by their 
traditions than by the social reality of West Germany in the 1960s.142 Ensuring that 
social and institutional reality were aligned was central to Dahrendorf’s attempts at 
reforming university education, highlighting the dominant role he attributed to 
social structure in determining politics. 
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Chapter V: Agonistic Liberalism after the Cultural Turn: 
Dahrendorf’s Critique of Neoconservatism 
 
‘There are, as you may easily guess, a thousand issues that we need to discuss, given that I am 
increasingly beginning to practise your theories, which is leading to an even more curious 






The enthusiasm for reform that prevailed in West German academic and political 
circles in the 1960s provided a favourable environment for Dahrendorf’s education 
reform programme at the University of Constance and beyond. However, this 
enthusiasm did not last as the decade grew to a close. In the wake of the student 
protests of the late 1960s, the notion that conflicts within society could be alleviated 
by regulating industrial relations, expanding the welfare state, making institutions 
more accessible, increasing social mobility, and redistributing wealth lost some of 
its persuasiveness. The issues that motivated protesting students seemed to be of a 
nature that post-war sociology could not account for. For those social scientists 
whose work up to this point had focused on the socio-economic realm, this 
constituted a veritable challenge. The picture of Dahrendorf and student leader 
Rudi Dutschke debating on the rooftop of a TV transmission van parked outside 
the convention centre in Freiburg where the Free Democratic Party was holding its 
party conference on 29 January 1968 has become an iconic image of this turbulent 
period.2 Dahrendorf’s role at the German Sociological Association’s notoriously 
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tumultuous conference in Frankfurt in April the same year was also widely noted 
at the time. The economic shocks of the 1970s further eroded the political 
consensus of the post-war period. During these years, Dahrendorf sought to defend 
liberal political ideas against what he saw as a re-emergence of utopianism on both 
the left and the right. Neoconservatism in particular preoccupied him during these 
years, an intellectual movement in which sociologists from his transatlantic circle 
played a prominent role.  
This chapter focuses on Dahrendorf’s theory of the social causes of the 
student movement and his intellectual engagement with neoconservatism during 
the 1970s. In doing so, it places particular emphasis on his continuing reliance on 
socio-economic explanations during a period in which social scientists increasingly 
relied on ‘cultural’ explanations of politics. Here, it seeks to draw attention to 
Dahrendorf’s close engagement with scholars at Columbia University, most 
importantly Daniel Bell, and his role in the Trilateral Commission. It then discusses 
West German political debates in the wake of the student movement that 
Dahrendorf engaged in, questioning the argument of a rapprochement with 
conservatism on his part during this decade. 
  In developing this argument, the chapter makes use of the ideal-typical 
concept of ‘neoconservatism’. This term was coined by critics and was rejected by 
several of those thinkers associated with it, prominently Bell and, at first, Norman 
Podhoretz, the editor of the neoconservative periodical Commentary.3 In spite of 
its limited self-descriptive usage, the term remains helpful if it can be shown that 
specific assumptions were shared by various thinkers who were prompted to think 
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about politics in new ways by the same contemporary events and developments. 
To show that this was the case with ‘neoconservatives’, and to explain how 
Dahrendorf interacted with their ideas, is the central aim of this chapter. 
 
2. Methodological Change and the Intellectual Reaction to the Student 
Movement. 
 
  The period from the later 1960s onwards constituted a time of change for 
the social sciences. Some of these methodological changes have been noted and 
referred to as the ‘cultural turn’.4 Changing views on causality and predictability 
were a prominent part of this, as several historians of science have noted.5 Anselm 
Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael argue that since the 1980s ‘conceptions of 
historical processes [Verlaufsbegriffe] first declined and then disappeared 
seemingly completely in western societies’.6 While Dahrendorf’s case suggests 
that this change was not all-encompassing, politics increasingly came to be seen as 
an unstable, unpredictable, and contingent process. Consequently, intellectual 
interest in historical processes and long-term structural factors declined. Predicting 
the implications of present sociological phenomena for the future became less 
popular. 
  These changes began during the decade following the formation of protest 
movements on university campuses on both sides of the Atlantic. Beginning in 
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Berkeley in California in 1965, protests spread to other universities during the 
following years. In West Germany, the Free University in West Berlin and the 
University of Frankfurt were hotspots, whereas Dahrendorf’s Constance remained 
comparatively calm. In the United States, Columbia University saw large-scale 
protests that in late April 1968 reached a climax when police forces cleared 
occupied university buildings. Perhaps even more so than at other American 
universities, protests at Columbia revolved around the problem of race relations. 
With its campus directly adjacent to Harlem, one of the catalysts of the protests 
were university plans to build a new gymnasium, which were felt to ignore the 
interests of the neighbourhood’s predominantly Black community. As we have 
seen in Chapter III, Columbia was Dahrendorf’s destination for two visiting 
fellowships from February to June 1960 and from March to May 1966 and 
assembled many of his closest American intellectual associates. It was here that 
many members of Dahrendorf’s transatlantic circle gradually shifted their political 
position in the late 1960s in ways that prompted him to reformulate his political 
ideas, giving rise to two books and one eventually abandoned, unpublished book 
project: The New Liberty (1974), Life Chances (1979), and Contradictions of 
Modernity (unpublished). Intellectually, however, Dahrendorf felt somewhat 
distant from the university, particularly its Department of Sociology. After 
returning from Columbia in 1966, he wrote to David Lockwood that Columbia was 
‘a miserable place now, and by that I mean sociology in particular’.7 
  Dahrendorf’s close friend Fritz Stern played a central role in events on 
campus during the Columbia student protests. When students tried to invade the 
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office of Columbia’s Vice-President David Truman in the Lower Library in May 
1968, Stern joined Truman in his office to express solidarity with the embattled 
administrator. When bricks came crashing through the windows during that night, 
Stern and Truman hid under the desk together.8 A month earlier, Stern had told 
Mark Rudd, the local Chairman of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), that 
his protest methods compared to those of the Nazis.9 This was in spite of Stern’s 
prominent opposition to the Vietnam War, an issue on which he agreed with 
protesting students.10 Stern’s disapproval of the student movement also shone 
through his analysis of its causes. In his opinion, the radical students represented 
the idealist and apolitical ‘cultural pessimism’ that he thought lay at the root of 
Germany’s troubled history during the nineteenth and twentieth century.11 In 1965, 
he recalled in 1970, Berkeley had reminded him of the ‘pathetic, serious fling of 
German youth before the first World War’.12 In particular, Stern was dismayed by 
the type of demands that students were voicing. The student movement was not a 
socio-economic phenomenon, he concluded. In fact, those involved in it explicitly 
rejected the ‘materialism’ of previous generations.13 In order to account for it, 
attention had to be drawn to its ‘cultural’ character:  
 
The underlying motives ... are not political or social, but cultural and 
psychological. The political disasters of the 1960s provided the setting 
for the discharge of essentially cultural grievances ... The present 
movement is closely related to the profound contemporaneous changes 
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in Western art, Western consciousness and, above all, Western style of 
life. It is part of what may some day be called our own Cultural 
Revolution.14 
 
  Stern’s cultural analysis of the student movement chimed with that of his 
Columbia colleague Bell.15 Bell and Dahrendorf’s itineraries crossed several times 
around the turn of the decade and during the 1970s. In May 1969, both delivered 
papers at the Bilderberg meeting in Denmark, offering their interpretations of the 
causes of student unrest. Moreover, as Bell mentioned in the preface of The Coming 
of Post-Industrial Society (1973), its sixth Chapter had been the basis of discussion 
at a seminar that he had co-organized with Dahrendorf in Zurich in June 1970. 
Funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the seminar was attended by Jean 
Floud, François Bourricaud, Giovanni Sartori, Peter Wiles, Kenichi Tominaga, 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, Reinhard Bendix, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Michel Crozier, 
Zygmunt Bauman, Helio Jaguaribe, Juan Linz, Ota Sik, Andrew Shonfield, David 
Lockwood, Stanley Hoffmann, and Stephen Graubard.16 In autumn 1976, Bell 
arrived in London to spend the academic year of 1976/1977 at the LSE.17 In May 
1977, he also gave the LSE’s Hobhouse Memorial Lecture. As ex officio head of 
the Hobhouse Memorial Lectureship Trust Committee, Dahrendorf was closely 
involved in getting Bell to deliver the lecture and ended up chairing the event.18 In 
the later 1980s, Bell and Dahrendorf still corresponded. When Bell wrote an essay 
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on ‘The German Question’ for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in 1990, he still drew on 
Dahrendorf’s Society and Democracy in Germany.19 
  Bell’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and the Cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism (1976) engaged with the role of cultural factors in 
society, and with the political implications of the transition to post-industrial 
society that he diagnosed. According to Bell, post-industrial societies were 
characterized by an increasingly important ‘knowledge class’ in proportion to the 
growing importance of science and knowledge.20 Moreover, Bell argued that 
‘culture has become the most dynamic component of our civilization’, a thesis that 
became widely debated in academic circles.21 The economy, he stated, had lost 
influence as a shaping force of peoples’ lives and consciences, leading to the 
decline of bourgeois values.22 Culture had attained autonomy, and was no longer 
influenced by social structure.23 Bell’s Hobhouse Memorial Lecture on the ‘Return 
of the Sacred: The Argument on the Future of Religion’ formed a coda to these 
research concerns. These arguments about the importance of culture had already 
prefigured in Bell’s contribution to the edited volume The Radical Right (1955). 
Quoting the progressivist historian Charles Beard, Bell had then argued that 
American history to date had been shaped by the interplay of diverging socio-
economic interests. However, in the prosperous present, the politics of the radical 
right were not economic, but moralistic ‘status politics’, following Richard 
Hofstadter’s formulation.24  
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  Similar to Stern, Bell’s thinking about politics was greatly influenced by 
the upheaval on university campuses. Bell was appalled by police violence when 
university buildings at Columbia were cleared, as well as the politics of radical 
sections among the students. As Howard Brick points out, Bell initially expressed 
sympathy for the New Left’s critique of bureaucracy in the name of freedom and 
democracy.25 And yet, over the course of the late 1960s, he grew more critical. In 
particular, he objected to the ‘moralism’ that he thought was current among 
students. For Bell, progress through social reform depended on administrative 
measures based on sufficient knowledge of the workings of society; social policy 
failures in the United States during this period were due to ‘the inherent complexity 
of our social problems, the lack of detailed social science knowledge as to how to 
“cut” into them, and the shortage of trained administrators’.26 Refusing to engage 
with social reform in this way, the student movement was more moral than 
political.27 Bell drew a distinction between moralistic students and problem-
oriented policy-makers, which pointed to the question of the merits of value-free 
technocratic social science, one of the central issues of debate. 
  Similar to many other neoconservatives, Bell gradually shifted from 
rejecting moralism to the position that a return of morality in public life was 
necessary in the years following the student movement. In a review of an essay 
collection by Bell published in the London Review of Books in February 1981, 
Dahrendorf pointed to the Hobhouse lecture from 1977, ‘The Return of the Sacred’, 
as the clearest expression of his neoconservatism. Here, he professed to find it 
‘fascinating to follow Bell to his “retreat from the excesses of modernity”. There 
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are, he says, needs of morality, of redemption and of mysticism which suggest the 
return of the sacred...’.28 In the lecture, Bell had developed his ideas on the 
prospects for religion in the modern age, arriving at conclusions ultimately opposite 
to those of Max Weber’s disenchantment thesis. While he agreed that 
secularization had diminished religion’s role in public life (with, as he thought, 
decidedly negative consequences), he did not believe that private religious beliefs 
had or would diminish. The existential impulses and questions that prompted 
religious beliefs and contemplations were still the same across all societies.29 The 
previous year, Dahrendorf had already told Bell that he thought that his work was 
part of a shift in political thinking: 
 
I do believe that you have been very much a part of changing times; 
and both the “part of” and the “changing” are characteristic of your 
unique contribution to our understanding of the world. For instance, I 
shall argue in my next book that the break between the first 300 plus (I 
have not got the book before me and must guess) pages of The Coming 
of Post-Industrial Society and the rest marks the point of change around 
1970-71-72 ... which in retrospect seems the most important since the 
Second World War.30 
 
  Historians of neoconservatism have awarded Bell a central place in the 
movement’s history.31 Already at the time, Habermas singled him out as one of its 
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main representatives, writing that Bell and other neoconservatives located the 
causes of the pathologies of modernity in the realm ‘culture’, inverting cause and 
effect by disregarding ‘economic and social causes for the altered attitudes towards 
work, consumption and leisure’.32 In 1982, Habermas noted that neoconservatives 
tended to locate those political conflicts that really mattered in what Podhoretz 
called the ‘realm of ideas’.33 Justin Vaïsse echoes this assessment, arguing that for 
neoconservatives, the political crisis that they thought society was experiencing 
was ‘above all moral and cultural, a matter of ideas’.34 Indeed, Nathan Glazer, a 
close associate of Bell since their student days, later remembered: 
 
What astonishes me in glancing over those early issues [of Public 
Interest] was how soon the simple notion that science and research 
could guide us in domestic social policy became complicated, how 
rapidly this theme was reduced ... Managing social problems was 
harder than we thought ... We began to realize that our successes in 
shaping a better and more harmonious society, if there were to be any, 
were more dependent on a fund of traditional orientations, ‘values’, or, 
if your will, ‘virtue’, than any social science or ‘social engineering’ 
approach.35 
 
  At Columbia, the liberal historian Richard Hofstadter, another member of 
Dahrendorf’s transatlantic circle, was also deeply embroiled in the unrest on 
campus. Like Bell and Stern, Hofstadter was an advocate of reform, and agreed 
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with protesting students that the construction of the gymnasium on the corner of 
the Columbia campus near Harlem was problematic.36 He also sought to engage 
with radical students, inviting them to his home for discussions.37 Nonetheless, 
Hofstadter was troubled by the excesses of radicalism, and in the end even 
advocated a boycott of ‘withholding instruction, grades, and letters of 
recommendation from the agitators’.38 These events left an imprint on Hofstadter’s 
work that corresponded to the transformation of the works of Bell, Stern, and 
others. As David Brown shows, for a long time, Hofstadter’s intellectual concerns 
had revolved around the issue of conflict and consensus. In his later work, 
Hofstadter gravitated towards emphasizing the importance of a ‘moral consensus’ 
and a shared ideology for the survival of a liberal political order.39 It was this re-
emergence of emphases on morality and prioritizing consensus over conflict, 
particularly among his intellectual interlocutors, that preoccupied Dahrendorf over 
the course of the decade that followed the student protests of the late 1960s.  
  In the Federal Republic, the student movement and the intellectual 
reaction to it also had a transformative impact on political discourse. Numerous 
German liberal intellectuals turned towards liberal conservatism in reaction to 
1968.40 Concerns about culture, language, values, and morality now acquired a 
status of increased political salience.41 Christian Graf von Krockow, himself a 
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participant of contemporary political debates, observed that during the late 1960s, 
‘technocratic conservatism’ became challenged by a ‘moralizing conservatism’ 
that sought to re-instate values and behavioural virtues.42 In reaction to the student 
movement, German intellectuals increasingly emphasized the role of ‘culture’ in 
society. Richard Löwenthal, a contributor to the American journals Encounter and 
Dissent and founding member of the Association for Academic Freedom in 
November 1970, depicted the student movement and the ‘young Western 
intelligentsia’s disaffection from the democratic system’ as the ‘expression of a 
more long-term cultural crisis’.43 For Löwenthal, the shift on the left could not be 
explained in terms of social factors, given that the political and social systems in 
the West were functioning.44 Instead, the political crisis of the late 1960s and 1970s 
was linked to the decline of ‘basic values’ and ‘norms of conduct and institutions’.45 
A sizable number of commentators shared this assessment of a cultural crisis and 
thought that political power was increasingly exercised by intellectuals.46 In 1975, 
as we have seen in Chapter II, disagreement about this point led to the falling out 
between Schelsky and Dahrendorf. Indeed, this point was still emphasized in the 
early 1980s. Thus, Hermann Lübbe lamented the dominance of the ‘left media 
intelligence’ in West German politics.47 Shortly after his election as Chancellor, 
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Helmut Kohl spoke of the need for a ‘renovation of the ideal-moral foundations of 
politics’ at the Christian Democratic Union’s conference in Cologne in May 1983, 
quoting Lübbe to make this point.48 Habermas also noted the increasing importance 
of culture in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981), which observed that 
social conflicts no longer revolved around material distribution. Present and future 
conflicts, he argued, were instead determined by questions of ‘cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization’.49 Whereas workers and 
business still supported older political values, the younger generation and the 
educated were yearning for a new form of politics that moved beyond material 
issues.50 For Social Democrats, too, material issues became somewhat less central 
after the late 1960s. Issues connected to the ‘quality of life’, as opposed to material 
redistribution, became more prominent in the SPD’s political rhetoric from 1972 
and 1973 onwards.51 
  Paralleling American neoconservatives, many of those German social 
scientists whose political outlook changed as a reaction to the student movement 
also shifted their academic attention towards culture. Targeted by students at the 
University of Freiburg, Wilhelm Hennis reflected on the role of methodology in 
the political conflicts of his day. In July 1969, the political scientist argued in a 
radio lecture that the student movement was caused by a moral crisis created by the 
rise of value-free social science. The lack of engagement with norms in university 
teaching had created a generation of politically irresponsible students.52 When the 
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Association for Academic Freedom was set up the next year, Hennis was one of 
the founding members and took on a prominent role in the organization.53 
Academically, Hennis’ interests shifted away from a political science of institutions 
towards the study of ideas in reaction to the student movement.54 While on leave at 
the New School of Social Research in New York in 1977, he started a project on 
Weber that led to the publication of Max Weber’s Question in 1987.55 Centrally, 
the book criticized the way in which Weber had been, as he saw it, appropriated by 
post-war modernization theorists. Weber, he claimed, was neither interested in 
modernization nor universal history.56 Furthermore, Weber’s writings on value 
freedom were a ‘never ending source of misunderstandings and useful for a 
conception of social science that is not bothered by “problems of culture”.57 
Instead, Hennis portrayed Weber as profoundly interested in culture and morality. 
In this respect, Weber was said to be heavily indebted to Friedrich Nietzsche, whom 
‘he read as a moralist’.58 Worried about the inability of value-free sociology to 
provide moral guidance to members of society, Hennis’ interpretation was a frontal 
attack on the reception of Weber by advocates of empirical sociology. Above all, 
it was an attempt to contain methodological commitments that he thought had made 
the student movement possible. 
  The situation in the historical discipline was similar. On the one hand, 
historians interested in socio-economic conflict and social structures, like Hans-
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Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka at the University of Bielefeld, were disrupting the 
profession. Established at the university that Schelsky had set up with 
methodological commitments similar to those Dahrendorf had had during the 
foundation of the University of Constance, Wehler and Kocka challenged what 
they perceived as a methodologically impoverished historiographical 
establishment. Wehler joined the University of Bieleld in 1971, followed by Kocka 
in 1972.59 The first issue of their flagship journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft was 
published in 1975.60 As a consequence, their historiographical orientation has 
become associated with this decade.61 However, their theoretical commitment to a 
practice of history that focused on socio-economic questions, taking cues from 
Weber, Karl Marx, Alexander Gerschenkron, and indeed Dahrendorf, was 
representative of the methodological outlook of the post-war social sciences.62 
Developed during the 1960s, their outlook was heavily inspired by sociology. As 
soon as Wehler and Kocka were appointed at Bielefeld, their ideas came under fire. 
As Philipp Stelzel points out, the notion that the Bielefeld School represented a 
new ‘orthodoxy’ that had acquired hegemonic status, alleged by Thomas 
Nipperdey as early as 1979, is unfounded.63 Confronted with protesting students 
whose grievances seemed ideal rather than material, historians questioned the idea 
that socio-economic aspects were central to politics in the early 1970s. In 1974, 
even Wolfgang Mommsen, who was more favourably disposed to the works of his 
colleagues in Bielefeld than many other historians, wrote that the recent past had 
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disproved the assumption that socio-economic issues were central and that politics 
and culture were its derivatives.64  
  For conservative historians, the case was even clearer. Golo Mann’s 
intervention at the neoconservative Tendenzwende conference, held in Munich in 
1974, was emblematic for this. Mann’s paper criticized both the New Left, whose 
increasing influence on the social sciences and humanities he considered a political 
and scholarly problem, and sociological approaches to history. He claimed that the 
structural approaches championed by Germany’s social historians, which 
prioritized sociological aspects over events, depicted societies as completely 
rationalized total entities which rendered history predetermined, whereas history 
was in fact open-ended.65 Likewise reacting against the historiographical influence 
of the left, Nipperdey and Lübbe published re-appraisals of historicism in 1975 and 
1977, respectively.66 History as the study of individuals and contingency had to be 
resurrected in order to contain the influence of structure-oriented historiography.67 
An ardent critic of the student movement, Lübbe drew on Karl Popper’s work to 
make this case in the face of the perceived negative consequences of the ‘academic 
cultural revolution’ that he thought Germany had witnessed.68 Nipperdey, like 
Hennis and Löwenthal a prominent member of the Association for Academic 
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Freedom, continued this line of argument in his history of Germany since the 
Napoleonic Wars, which sought to challenge the structural approach of social 
historians.69 Placing human agency at the centre of his narrative, his first sentence 
in the first volume (published in 1983) read: ‘In the beginning was Napoleon’.70 
For Nipperdey, the French leader personified personal power. That this stood at the 
centre of history was, he said, a fact that could be denied by ‘[o]nly those who have 
become ideologically blinded confronted with the phenomenon of power and 
concentrate all attention on the movements of society and “internal” politics and 
structures’.71  
  Similarly, Karl Dietrich Bracher noted in the preface to the English 
edition of The Age of Ideologies, penned in November 1983, that his work ‘was 
carried out in the face of the topical discussion about the profound change of social 
and political values in the seventies’.72 Bracher was part of a generation of scholars 
whose career start had coincided with the Federal Republic’s foundational years, 
publishing his Habilitation thesis on the demise of the Weimar Republic in 1955. 
At the beginning of the characteristically entitled chapter on ‘Ideology and Social 
Structure’ of this book, he distanced himself from historians who studied ideas 
without reference to their socio-economic context.73 In The Age of Ideologies, 
Bracher repeated this point with a reference to Karl Mannheim.74 Nonetheless, a 
change of focus had taken place. Instead of chapters on ‘Ideology and Social 
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Structure’, the ‘Problem of Power Structure’, and ‘The Problem of Bureaucracy’, 
he now wrote chapters that looked at ‘The Struggle for Values and Orientations’ or 
‘Changing Opinions and Political Culture in the Seventies’. Bracher began his new 
book by stating that a combination of ideologization and a ‘crisis of progress’ had 
led to a ‘clash of ideas and ideologies, capable of toppling long-established moral 
and value structures’.75  
  These arguments echoed the assessment of political scientists such as 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann or Ronald Inglehart that Germany (Noelle-Neumann) 
and the developed world more generally (Inglehart) were undergoing a value shift 
away from material towards post-material values.76 Inglehart’s work was widely 
received in West Germany.77 Habermas used Inglehart’s work to back up his claims 
for a shift towards culture in politics, and Bracher used his work to show that a 
value shift had taken place in the 1970s.78  
  Dahrendorf’s work was not exempted from critique by those who 
observed a turn towards culture in contemporary politics. Inglehart cited it as an 
example of sociology inapplicable to politics after the value shift.79 As mentioned 
in the Introduction, Geoff Eley charged Dahrendorf and other proponents of the 
Sonderweg thesis for stipulating that societies must necessarily progress through a 
historical stage in which the ‘bourgeoisie’ dominated politics. Eley argued that 
Dahrendorf thought that Germany’s failure to develop a politically strong 
bourgeoisie ‘postponed the inevitable march of progress - the ultimate necessity of 
Germany’s “bourgeois revolution” or its functional equivalent, which would finally 
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“open the road to modernity”, in Dahrendorf’s revealing phrase’.80 Part of a group 
of culture-oriented Gramscian neo-Marxist historians that included Richard Evans 
and David Blackbourn, Eley contributed to a methodological shift in an alliance 
with German historians of very different political backgrounds. 
 
3. Dahrendorf’s Analysis of the Student Movement.  
 
  Dahrendorf himself argued that social scientists’ perspectives had 
changed since the early 1970s. In 1980 he observed: 
 
the 1970s have brought about a change in the socio-economic climate 
(of which we have mentioned but some of the most obvious signs 
which surely must have consequences for the politics of advanced 
societies ... There is by comparison to the 1950s and 1960s, a strange 
silence of socio-political analysis, which is made all the more striking 
by the number of publications in the field.81 
 
Not only was ‘socio-political analysis’ absent; there was also an increasing number 
of theorists like Bell who overestimated the influence of intellectuals and ideas in 
society.82 This critical perspective on Bell’s work was a continuous theme in his 
writings and public statements throughout the whole decade. In July 1974, towards 
the end of his time on the European Commission, Dahrendorf had explicitly 
criticized Bell’s argument of an increasingly powerful ‘professional and technical 
class’, arguing that the members of this class were still dependent on those who 
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paid their salaries and were therefore not the true wielders of power. Given that 
parliaments and state institutions would continue to influence the kind of research 
that was conducted, ‘research and development, far from transcending the values 
of the society surrounding it, is in fact part of it, an indispensable element of an 
existing socio-economic structure...’.83  
  At the height of student protesting in 1968, Dahrendorf provided his 
theory of its origins at the Sixteenth Sociological Conference in Frankfurt in April 
1968 and at the Bilderberg meeting in May 1968, mentioned above. He continued 
to put emphasis on the role played by bureaucratization in the structuring of 
political conflicts. In this way, he held on to a thematic focus that had characterized 
the German social sciences for decades, as we have seen in Chapter I. Dahrendorf 
explained that the student movement was merely one aspect of a general social 
trend that also led to the emergence of new separatist national movements in 
Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Canada, Italy, and Switzerland. In companies and in 
educational institutions, demands for increasing participation could be heard. In 
churches, too, calls for increasing layman influence were made, and discussions 
about democratizing armies were going on.84 Developed societies were witnessing 
a general revolt against bureaucratization, which in turn was a necessary 
consequence of the expansion of civil rights. The symptoms of this dilemma could 
be felt particularly in higher education, as providing education opportunities to 
more members of society unavoidably curtailed the opportunities of those who 
were already inside the system. Having larger universities meant that it was 
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necessary to bureaucratize and streamline instruction inside these institutions, 
rendering impossible older aristocratic forms of university life.85 The expansion of 
universities would thus unavoidably curtail some academic freedoms.86 University 
students would cease to be able to freely move between universities and subjects. 
As student numbers increased as education opportunities were extended to 
previously disfranchised groups, regularizing, and thus bureaucratizing, university 
education became necessary. He therefore advocated the introduction of degrees 
with regularized curricula and more rigid examination processes and schedules.87 
Students could then move through universities more quickly, increasing the total 
capacity of universities.88 He also called for the introduction of undergraduate and 
postgraduate degrees (at the time, most degrees took five years to finish).89  
  The topic of student unrest remained on Dahrendorf’s mind over the 
coming years. As pointed out in Chapter II, delivering the 1974 BBC Reith 
Lectures, starting on 13 November 1974, was his first academic activity after 
transferring from the European Commission to the LSE. Inspired by the Marxian 
motivation to make sense of modernity’s inherent contradictions, the lectures 
sought to make sense of the prospect for liberal democracy in developed societies 
experiencing little economic growth following the Oil Shock of the previous year 
and suffering from the ossified bureaucratic structures of the service class society. 
Like previous works, The New Liberty argued that developed societies had run into 
severe contradictions arising from the fact that the expansion of social rights 
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increased bureaucracy. Even though he conceded that Weber may have 
overestimated the problem of bureaucratization (an opinion that he also expressed 
in a note of thanks to the Weber scholar Wolfgang Mommsen for sending him a 
copy of The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max 
Weber (1974)), he nevertheless regarded it as an irremediable aspect of 
modernization.90 Like Weber, Dahrendorf saw liberalism’s task as protecting 
individual freedom against bureaucracy. This was a dilemma, since the provision 
of citizenship rights necessitated bureaucratization: ‘we have to admit that we could 
not possibly live a reasonably secure and prosperous life without administrative 
services’.91 Extending rights to education, health care, and other welfare provisions 
was a necessary outcome of the expansion of voting rights to the overall population. 
This process was to be welcomed, but at the same time it was unavoidable to 
administer all these provisions without considerable bureaucratization. As a 
consequence individuals increasingly found their lives governed by institutions and 
organizations. In this new society, bureaucratic encroachment on the individual 
hampered certain potentials of human development.  
  The assumption of dialectical theorists on the left that such contradictions 
would lead to ‘systemic change’ did not hold any water, Dahrendorf pointed out in 
‘The New Liberty: Comments on Italian Critics’.92 Instead, what could be seen in 
developed societies was ‘a new theme of history’ that was less about growth than 
protecting individual liberty against bureaucratic encroachment.93 The sociological 
question was who would ‘carry the banner of the future. Where in other words, 
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does change come from if we look at it in terms of social groups, even classes?’94 
The student protests of the preceding years, he thought, had been a bellwether of 
this shift. Students and teachers, forming the ‘educational class’, were at the 
forefront of those who demanded the further democratization of society.95 The New 
Liberty left no doubt about the importance which Dahrendorf attributed to the 
student movement as a social force, arguing that ‘[p]erhaps the student unrest of 
the late 1960s will one day occupy its place in the genesis of the new process of 
class articulation which is foreshadowed by the revolt of the individual’.96 
  Dahrendorf thought that many prominent sociologists had missed this 
dynamic of modernization. In 1969, he asked why ‘[e]ven the most intelligent 
analysts’, including thinkers such as Raymond Aron and Seymour Martin Lipset, 
thought that the 1950s had heralded an ‘end of ideology’, a period in which politics 
would increasingly be reduced to technical administrative problems?97 And why 
were these intellectuals more puzzled and troubled by student unrest than others? 
Dahrendorf stated that they had missed a historical dynamic that T.H. Marshall had 
detected. Marx had been correct to refer to the ‘liberal idea of citizen participation 
rights’ as ‘both “revolutionary” and “unbearably formal”.98 Socialism, Dahrendorf 
sought to show, was an attempt to complement political rights of participation with 
social rights of participation.99 Marshall had successfully shown that this process 
was a necessary outcome of the introduction of voting rights.100 However, 
                                                 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid. 
96 Dahrendorf, The New Liberty, 29. 
97 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Das Ende des Sozialismus und die Wiedergeburt des Liberalismus’, in Klaus 
Hansen (ed.), Frankfurter Schule und Liberalismus: Beiträge zum Dialog zwischen Kritischer 
Gesellschaftstheorie und politischem Liberalismus (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1969), 201: ‘Noch die intelligentesten Analytiker’, ‘Ende der Ideologie’. 
98 ibid., 202: ‘liberalen Gedanken bürgerlicher Teilnahmerechte’, ‘zugleich “revolutionär” und 
“unerträglich formal”’. 
99 ibid., 204. 




expanding social rights necessarily led to bureaucratization, which in turn gave rise 
to wholly new social conflicts within large hierarchical bureaucratic organizations. 
In this sense, Dahrendorf’s analysis of the student movement of the late 1960s was 
in line with Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, which had pointed to 
present and future social conflicts taking place within bureaucratic ‘imperatively 
coordinated associations’.101 The student movement thus acted as another case in 
point for Dahrendorf’s Marxian conviction that ‘social structures as distinct from 
most other structures are capable of producing within themselves the elements of 
their supersession and change.’102 Only if one ignored the fact that new forms of 
political organization generated novel social conflicts could one believe that 
ideology had ended.  
  With this analysis of the student movement as a social force, Dahrendorf 
diverged from those social scientists in his transatlantic network who interpreted it 
as a cultural phenomenon. His interpretation also meant that he viewed it as a 
legitimate form of protest, which, being directed against power hierarchies within 
bureaucratic institutions, could not be wished away by relegating it to the realm of 
cultural change. He also sympathized with some demands made by students. While 
he did not think that it was a panacea, he considered tripartite representation of 
students, assistants, and professors on university decision-making bodies to be an 
important part of university reform.103 He also thought that abolishing professorial 
tenure was worthy of serious consideration.104  
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  Dahrendorf’s analysis put him even more at odds with German 
neoconservatives. In a critical engagement with Karl Jaspers’ Die geistige Situation 
der Zeit, written for Habermas’ Stichworte zur ‘geistigen Situation der Zeit’ (1979), 
Dahrendorf was scathing about social democratic intellectuals of the 
Tendenzwende kind who had turned into critics of the student movement. This 
group, which he said shared Jaspers’ cultural pessimist obsession with the decline 
of culture in modernity, wanted to close the drawbridge after having reached the 
‘saving shore of social privileges’.105 Their opposition, he argued, had aspects of 
an ideological justification of the interests of those who refused to accept that their 
ideal of university life was forever lost because of historical developments that 
could not be rolled back. In turn, Dahrendorf looked to the student movement as a 
social force which could push for change. As much as he minded the utopianism 
of demands for ‘freedom from domination’, he still hoped that such ideas, even in 
their entirely exaggerated state, could help to break up the mould of the given 
institutional state of society.106 While Bell’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society 
also noted a ‘society-side uprising against bureaucracy and a desire for 
participation’, Dahrendorf’s reaction to the student movement differed in that he 
did not think that this uprising should be contained by recourse to morality and 
culture.107 
  This did not mean that Dahrendorf agreed or even sympathized with 
radical sections of the student movement. While he agreed that students were 
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voicing legitimate grievances, he criticized those who advocated political violence 
and saw the liberal parliamentary system as a sham.108 Likewise, student activists 
criticized Dahrendorf at Constance. In leaflets that seemed to have been distributed 
before his lectures, Dahrendorf found himself criticized for espousing a capitalist 
conception of rationality and for insisting on the need for political elites as a 
prerequisite for healthy democracies.109 Dahrendorf would also later find himself 
criticized from the other side. It was not for nothing that Kurt Sontheimer, a critic 
of the student movement who did think that ideas and intellectuals played a 
prominent role in politics, criticized Dahrendorf for espousing a liberalism that had 
no substance and was solely concerned with ensuring that political systems 
remained open for new political developments. But open for what? Dahrendorf had 
no answer to this question, Sontheimer alleged.110 These observations captured 
Dahrendorf well. Dahrendorf repeatedly admonished his readers that it was 
imperative to furnish social forces with the possibility of manifesting themselves 
in parliamentary politics. If not, political violence could ultimately ensue. In 
contrast to neoconservatives, Dahrendorf thought that the impetus behind politics 
would come from social forces instead of intellectuals. It should therefore not 
surprise that when discussing the ‘crisis in the 1970s’ in The Modern Social 
Conflict (1988), Dahrendorf questioned the validity of Inglehart’s argument about 
a value shift. In contrast, he thought that material values were still likely to trump 
non-material ones.111 
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4. Debating Neoconservatism from the Trilateral Commission to Life Chances. 
 
  The Trilateral Commission was one of the most prominent settings in 
which Dahrendorf interacted with neoconservative theorists. Set up by Brzezinski 
and funded by David Rockefeller, it assembled leading figures from the worlds of 
social science and foreign policy to discuss the challenges facing developed 
societies. The Commission was Brzezinski’s brainchild. In April 1972, he sent a 
memorandum to Rockefeller that argued that the ‘postindustrial societies’ of the 
United States, Europe, and Japan were confronted with the same political issues.112 
After Rockefeller and Brzezinski’s recommendation to include Japanese delegates 
was not heeded by the Bilderberg Group, which they initially envisaged as the 
vehicle for their intellectual interests, the Trilateral Commission was set up in 
response.113 In October 1973, the Commission met for the first time in Tokyo.114 
With Jimmy Carter, the Commission included a future President of the United 
States; in fact, with Brzezinski, Walter Mondale, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, 
Michael Blumenthal, and Warren Christopher, Carter later recruited several key 
members of the Commission for his administration.115 Dahrendorf was one of the 
social scientists who Brzezinski asked to participate in the Commission.116 
  Based at Columbia, Brzezinski worked on issues that also preoccupied 
other members of Dahrendorf’s transatlantic network. Brzezinski was interested in 
futurology and Bell’s work in this area. He commented that ‘[r]ecent years have 
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seen a proliferation of exciting and challenging literature on the future’ in reference 
to the Daedalus issue ‘Toward the Year 2000’ that Bell had edited and published 
in 1967.117 In contrast to Bell’s emphasis on culture, however, Brzezinski argued 
that technology would increasingly become the cultural, psychological, social, and 
economic shaping force of society.118 Brzezinski saw the scope for individual 
agency shrinking, and argued that ‘[h]uman conduct will become less spontaneous 
and less mysterious - more predetermined and subject to deliberate 
“programming”.119 In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, Bell in turn took 
issue with Brzezinski’s alleged ‘technological determinism’ and stated that social 
structure did not determine society.120 
  The Trilateral Commission reached its highest profile after the publication 
of the report on the ‘Governability of Democracies’, written by the social scientists 
Samuel Huntington, Michel Crozier, and Joji Watanuki, each representing one 
member region. The report was presented at a conference in Kyoto on 30 and 31 
May 1975, where Dahrendorf had the privilege of delivering the opening statement 
in the discussion. Gilman points out that Huntington had been a leading critic of 
modernization theory since the mid-1960s who challenged the assumption that 
modernization was an ‘irreversible’ process.121 Instead, Huntington argued that 
modernization was cyclical, a fact that, he argued, had not been lost on interwar 
commentators such as Oswald Spengler, Vilfredo Pareto, Pitirim Sorokin, and 
Arnold Toynbee.122 For him, modernization theorists greatly underestimated the 
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influence of culture and tradition on societies.123 Two days after the conference, 
Dahrendorf described the proceedings as a ‘clash between the conservative 
majority of the Trilateral Commission … who seem to seek a return to the good old 
values of discipline and secretive government, and those among us who do not 
regard modernity as corrupted [verderbt] from the outset...’.124 In a separate letter 
written the same day, Dahrendorf argued that nothing less than the question of 
either returning to autocracy or finding new forms of democracy was at stake.125 In 
their report, Huntington, Crozier, and Watanuki engaged with questions that 
Dahrendorf was also interested in. The student movement, alluded to as 
‘oppositionist intellectuals and privatistic youth’, had made a deep impression on 
the authors.126 They observed that ‘advanced industrial societies have spawned a 
stratum of value-oriented [my italics] intellectuals ... their behavior contrasting 
with that of the also increasing numbers of technocrats and policy-oriented [my 
italics] intellectuals.’127 By drawing this contrast between technocrats on the one 
hand and intellectuals who rejected value-free research on the other, the authors 
made the same observation that Bell had made when he criticized the moralism that 
he saw current among students. The ‘intellectual world’ of advanced societies was 
out of balance, the report claimed: policy-oriented intellectuals had come to exert 
political influence and occupy the social standing that scholars in the humanities 
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had held in the past. However, while declining, ‘value-oriented intellectuals ... find 
new and rapidly-developing openings in the fields of communications’, which 
created a group of political intellectuals of a ‘protest type’.128 A new social fault 
line had thus opened up in which intellectual critics played a prominent role. Like 
many other social scientists at the time, Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki spoke 
of a cultural crisis: 
 
Daniel Bell has rightly pointed out the basic importance of culture in 
the coming of post-industrial society ... But neither Daniel Bell nor any 
other futurologist has foreseen the importance and the painfulness of 
such an ongoing process of change. There is no reason to believe that 
the contemporary cultural revolution will be more peaceful than the 
industrial revolutions of the past.129 
 
  At the Kyoto conference, Dahrendorf emerged as one of the report’s most 
vigorous critics. His points resembled earlier engagements with neoconservative 
critics of the changing political culture of western societies. Besides questioning 
some of the report’s assumptions, such as that the viability of democracy depended 
on economic growth, Dahrendorf took issue with the concept of ‘governability’, a 
crucial aspect of the Trilateral Commission’s raison d’être. In his statement on the 
report delivered at the conference, Dahrendorf remarked: 
 
Governability presumably refers to the ability of governments to give 
direction to the economies, societies, and political communities in 
which they govern, and to do so effectively. Could it not be argued that 
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one of the traditional characteristics of democracies is that we do not 
ask governments to give direction to the economies, societies, and 
political communities, at least not to the extent to which non-
democratic societies are doing this?130 
 
This sounded similar to the ‘non-interventionist’ liberalism that became 
increasingly popular during this decade. Although it went into a somewhat similar 
direction, Dahrendorf did not object to proactive policies by the state in either the 
economic or the social realm. Instead, he objected to the idea that the initiative for 
such interventions should come from governments and civil servants rather than 
the population. In the report, Crozier argued that governments were suffering from 
an ‘overload’ of political demands coming from various angles.131 Firstly, 
conditions in modern societies were such that ‘a great many more groups and 
interests [could] coalesce’.132 Secondly, changes in information transmission made 
it impossible to ‘maintain the traditional distance that was deemed necessary to 
govern’.133 Thirdly, the emergence of democratic values meant that access to 
information was less easily restricted.134 Crozier’s point about the ‘overload’ of 
governments became a commonplace among political commentators during the 
1970s. At Kyoto, Brzezinski made similar observations about a crisis in 
international relations resulting from the emergence of ‘new demands and ... the 
presence of many new participants’.135 On this point, Dahrendorf diverged from 
the neoconservative converts of his liberal circle. Increasing demands for 
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participation in the ‘machinery of decision-making’ in various institutions was a 
‘natural consequence of the development of citizenship over the last century or 
two’, and as such could not be changed.136 ‘There are historical forces’ that were 
‘too powerful to be contained; citizenship is one of them’, he had observed in an 
article that grew out of a paper given at a conference organized by Robert 
Heilbroner at the New School of Social Research in April 1974.137 When the title 
was published, Dahrendorf made sure that Podhoretz received a copy.138 It was 
necessary to increase rather than restrict participation in order to safeguard 
democracy. The new social conflicts of the bureaucratic age arose from ‘manifest 
interests’ generated by structural conditions. From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that Dahrendorf returned to reading Marx closely during his time as 
European Commissioner in the early 1970s, and redirected attention to the role of 
‘objective interests’ in social conflict.139 As in his work on the sociology of 
revolution during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Dahrendorf insisted on the 
importance of accepting interests and social conflict as a necessary part of social 
life that could not be overcome. Chimerical hopes to turn back the clock and return 
to a time in which governments had not been ‘overloaded’ by demands were 
utopian. Demands by the citizenry were not a variable that could be adjusted in 
order to make technocratic governance practicable again. 
  At the Tendenzwende conference in Munich in November 1974, 
Dahrendorf had made similar points to the German neoconservatives assembled 
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there. Jens Hacke, Franziska Meifort, and Nikolai Wehrs have taken Dahrendorf’s 
participation at this conference and the ideas expressed in his paper as evidence of 
a rapprochement with conservatism.140 Nevertheless, when he started to speak, 
Dahrendorf remarked that some participants may be surprised to see him at a 
gathering of this nature, as it ‘is a fact that I come to you as someone on the left, 
because I am a liberal, and I am not prepared to relinquish this word to those on the 
right.141 Further, Dahrendorf expressed his scepticism about the term ‘reversal of 
tendencies’ since he regarded it as hopeless to assume that one could reverse 
historical developments by recourse to ‘reminding a changing present about values 
that it has departed from; that it is possible to lead this present back to these 
values’.142 Instead, Dahrendorf made it clear that the pressing issues of the day 
were connected to the particular ‘socio-economic state’ that developed societies 
found themselves in.143  
  These debates with neoconservatives left a deep impression on 
Dahrendorf. Indeed, the issue of democratic decision-making came to occupy the 
centre stage of his work over the following years. In reaction to Bell’s assertion 
that “a society that does not have its best men at the head of its leading institutions 
is a sociological and moral absurdity”, Dahrendorf insisted that ‘[t]his never 
happens, of course; what happens is that societies define what is “good” and “best” 
in new ways’.144 Further, he detected an implicit assumption about the existence of 
a ‘natural hierarchy’ in Bell’s chapter on ‘Meritocracy and Equality’ in The Coming 
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of Post-Industrial Society.145 At Munich, Dahrendorf stated that it was misguided 
to hope – as John Stuart Mill had done in his view – for a form of representative 
government that would allow the ‘educated’ to force their views on the 
‘uneducated’.146 Dahrendorf engaged with the question of democratic participation 
in a way that differed markedly from other participants, arguing that increased 
democratic participation was ‘one of the greatest instances of progress in the 
development of developed societies during the last decades’.147 Indeed, Dahrendorf 
prioritized aligning decision-making with popular demands over governmental 
efficiency. This is evident in handwritten notes Dahrendorf scribbled on the back 
of an offprint of the Herbert Lehman lecture by the American politician Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, a key figure in the neoconservative movement. Here, 
Dahrendorf noted: ‘how important is effectiveness of govt.?’ in response to the 
arguments expressed in the offprint that Moynihan had sent him personally.148  
  To be sure, Dahrendorf agreed that the nature of increasingly complex 
political issues, which often required transnational solutions, was such that the 
scope for political participation was worryingly low. The existence of increasingly 
complex decision-making in politics was central to the arguments of those who 
worried about the ‘governability’ of post-industrial societies. However, in contrast 
to those concerned by the ‘overload’ of governments by popular demands, he 
considered this to be a challenge to think of new ways to establish parliamentary 
oversight. In a lecture at the University of St. Andrews in 1975, Dahrendorf stated:  
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The economic consequences of the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971 probably affected more people more deeply than a 
whole year of national economic policies under parliamentary control. 
However: where was the democratic control of these measures? How 
did the principle of regulated conflict apply to these decisions? It is 
difficult to find even traces of such control...149 
 
For this reason, Dahrendorf worried about the political power of autonomous 
institutions in the economic sphere, such as large monopolistic companies or trade 
unions. The power of such bureaucratic institutions vis-à-vis parliament was a 
central issue that he flagged as relevant in his introductory remarks as chair of the 
panel ‘Are Free Societies Still Governable and Capable of Concerted International 
Action?’ at the Königswinter Conference in March 1975.150 In this vein, 
Dahrendorf also criticized calls for increasing the power of the judiciary at the 
expense of the legislature that were being made in Britain at the time.151 This was 
no call for radical democratization; Dahrendorf stayed clear of demands for direct 
democracy and criticized the ‘imperative mandates’ that the SPD practised in some 
of West Germany’s larger cities.152 At Munich, he had rejected the concepts of 
imperative mandates, ‘permanent discussion’, and the notion that sections of the 
populations should be allocated seats in proportion to their share of the overall 
population.153 However, it would be wrong to read a turn towards conservatism 
into these observations. Dahrendorf rejected the assumption that culture had 
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replaced socio-economic factors as the linchpin of politics, and consequently 
rejected the political conclusions neoconservatives drew from the emergence of a 
‘cultural crisis’. 
Besides Dahrendorf, Habermas was undoubtedly one of the Federal 
Republic’s leading critics of neoconservatism in this period. Indeed, the two 
sociologists increasingly gravitated towards one another over the course of the 
decade. In 1979, Dahrendorf was appointed as Habermas’s co-director of the Max 
Planck Institute (MPI) in Starnberg to succeed the retiring Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker. Habermas had first asked Dahrendorf in April 1975 whether he would 
consider an appointment as director at the MPI in Starnberg.154 Set up in 1970 
(Habermas relocated from Frankfurt in 1971), the Institute was devoted to research 
on the ‘living conditions of the scientific-technological world’.155 Dahrendorf 
declined the offer at the time, but nevertheless held Habermas and his work in high 
regard. In July 1975, he told the sociologist Renate Mayntz that he thought that 
Habermas’ work on the problem of legitimation was very important and worthy of 
continuous discussion.156 Habermas seemed to think similarly about Dahrendorf’s 
work. When he attempted to attract Dahrendorf to Starnberg for a second time three 
years later, he highlighted the convergence of their interests in the research 
proposal written for the time after Dahrendorf’s arrival. In this proposal, which 
already pointed in the direction of the Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas 
explained that ‘Dahrendorf and I are equally interested in the construction of a 
theory of society that can describe and explain the structure-creating development 
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tendencies of societies’.157 In 1974, after he left the European Commission, 
Dahrendorf was appointed to the MPI’s Scientific Advisory Board, and in this 
function visited the Institute to discuss book projects and other research activities. 
In 1978, Dahrendorf also acted as an expert witness for the Max Planck Foundation 
for the thematic orientation of the Starnberg Institute after Weizsäcker’s retirement. 
Here, as Ariane Leendertz points out, Dahrendorf recommended focusing on 
international relations, with a particular emphasis on its economic dimension.158 
This area was also part of the thematic focus – alongside total social analysis, 
theory of social processes, and political theory – that Dahrendorf proposed when 
he was asked to succeed Weizsäcker.159 The research proposal Dahrendorf wrote 
for the MPI shows that he was interested in re-thinking his conflict theory for the 
purpose of trying to make sense of the manifestation of conflicting interests within 
international negotiations at a time in which ‘the chances to prevent international 
class struggle are small’.160 
 In the end, Dahrendorf turned down the appointment. To Wolfgang Zapf 
he described the decision as difficult because he ‘valued Jürgen Habermas more 
than almost all other people who I know’.161 As a consequence, Habermas and 
Dahrendorf’s writings developed more independently than they might have done. 
Nonetheless, they continued to take an interest in each other’s work. In response to 
Dahrendorf’s book project on the ‘Contradictions of Modernity’, Habermas wrote 
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that he was also working on a piece that engaged with ‘modernity and the rather 
hollow programme of post-Enlightenment and postmodernism’.162  
Over the course of the preceding years, Dahrendorf had been a sympathetic 
yet critical supporter of the researchers at the MPI in Starnberg. The Institute 
achieved a certain notoriety in 1976, when the proceedings of a conference in 
Munich were prominently discussed in DIE ZEIT and elsewhere in the media. With 
contributions by scholars such as Hans Albert, Hermann Lübbe, and Nikolaus 
Lobkowicz, the conference concentrated on a critical discussion of the ‘finalization 
thesis’ of the Starnberg scholars Gernot Böhme, Wolfgang van den Daele, and 
Wolfgang Krohn. In two articles published in 1972 and 1973, the authors had 
sought to challenge what they described as history of science written from an 
enlightened-positivist perspective that presumed that scientific progress happened 
independent of outside influences.163 Although Böhme, Daele, and Krohn took 
inspiration from Thomas Kuhn’s writings on this subject, they wanted to go further 
than Kuhn by pointing to the influence of socio-economic interests on the success 
of scientific theories.164 At the same time, the programme to flesh out extra-
scientific influences on the course of scientific progress was intertwined with a call 
to put science under the influence of a Habermasian ‘rationally produced social 
consensus’.165 It was this point that would come to be criticized in particular as a 
call for the politicization of science.166 In many ways, the debate on the ‘finalization 
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thesis’ continued debates that had dominated during the Positivism Dispute, 
described in Chapter I. On the one hand, Böhme, Daele, and Krohn criticized 
Popper’s argument that the question of the influence of extra-scientific factors on 
science was a moot one.167 On the other hand, their concern that value-free science 
threatened to constrain the free collective development of society through 
democratic decision-making echoed Habermas’ objections to ‘positivism’ in the 
early 1960s. To their mind, social science as it was commonly practised blindly 
facilitated the needs of industry, military, and other existing power structures.168 It 
was thus no co-incidence that Popper’s student Albert, perhaps his key popularizer 
in Germany, played a central role in criticizing the ‘finalization thesis’. 
Correspondingly, Lübbe’s contribution to the conference critical of the Starnberg 
theorists took aim at Habermas’ earlier critique of so-called positivism from the 
1960s.169 Drawing attention to the ‘moralism’ underlying this anti-positivism, 
Lübbe defended a value-free conception of science that recognized a distinction 
between politics and the ‘execution of practical necessities’, and the necessity of 
both.170 
  Dahrendorf’s defence of the Starnberg group in the debate thus 
symbolized his continuous and increasing distance from strict interpretations of 
critical rationalism by Popper and his followers. Whereas Dahrendorf expressed 
his admiration of Habermas, Popper had called Habermas an ‘idiot’ in December 
1969.171 While the debate was held in newspaper columns, Dahrendorf 
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simultaneously fought plans to cut funding for or even close the Starnberg institute 
that were being considered by the Max Planck Association’s senate, of which he 
was a member. Allusions Dahrendorf made in a letter to Heinrich Popitz suggest 
that he suspected that these plans were ideologically motivated.172 Reacting to the 
Munich conference, Dahrendorf wrote a column for DIE ZEIT that denied that the 
finalization thesis was a ‘red theory’ and that its proponents were radicals, 
dismissing this perspective as symptoms of contemporary political panic.173 In 
correspondence exchanged after the publication of the article, Dahrendorf further 
sought to make it clear to Albert that he thought that the latter overestimated the 
influence of the Starnberg group in public discourse: 
 
I recently spent a whole evening debating with the Starnberg scholars, 
and I went away with two impressions from this discussion. The first 
impression is one of stagnation in the thought of the Starnberg scholars, 
who have basically not managed to add anything to their first 
theoretical ideas. The other one is that they feel downright persecuted 
despite everything that you, Herr Albert, may say about their chances 
of success. The bliss at the fact that an article got published in English 
in an insignificant journal struck me as a remarkable sign of the group’s 
isolation. If my articles had any additional political intention, it was to 
ensure that the Federal Republic does not make the mistake of ridding 
itself of a significant part of inconvenient fellow citizens.174 
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In contrast to Dahrendorf, Albert did assume that ideas had a strong influence on 
society. At the conference in Munich, he argued that was overly optimistic to 
assume that politics was the pursuit of soberly analysed interests. It was not the 
case, Albert submitted, that interests trumped ideas in politics.175  
  This debate on the merits of critical theory developed at Starnberg 
continued for several years. Dahrendorf did not conceal his negative attitude 
towards Albert and other followers of Popper, and indeed to some extent even 
Popper himself. Thus, he described Albert and the ‘Popper people’ as humourless 
in a letter to Helmut Spinner, the author of a book that critiqued critical rationalism 
for itself resting on a philosophy of history.176 This was the context in which 
Dahrendorf aired his critique that Popper was ignorant of the existence of an 
‘Oppenheimer dilemma’ in the social sciences.177 Dahrendorf’s attention was again 
directed to opposition to the Starnberg project after the publication of the 
proceedings of another conference held in Munich on 15 and 16 January 1980, 
which he reviewed for DIE ZEIT. With Lübbe, Nipperdey, Friedrich Tenbruck, 
Gerard Radnitzky, and Robert Spaemann, the conference assembled speakers who 
had already contributed to previous debates with members of the Frankfurt School. 
The preface to the publication explicitly located the conference in the tradition of 
                                                 
politisches Ziel verfolgt habe, dann das, dafür zu sorgen, daß die Bundesrepublik nicht den Fehler 
macht, sich von einem beträchtlichen Teil unbequemer Mitbürger zu trennen.’ 
175 Hans Albert, ‘Die Idee der Wahrheit und der Primat der Politik: Über die Konsequenzen der 
deutschen Ideologie für die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft’, in Hübner, Lobkowicz, Lübbe, and 
Radnitzky (eds.), Die politische Herausforderung der Wissenschaft, 149-50. 
176 BArch, Ralf Dahrendorf Papers, N1749/75, Ralf Dahrendorf to Helmut Spinner, 17 July 1978: 
‘Popper-Leute’. For the book, cf. Helmut Spinner, Popper und die Politik: 
Geschlossenheitsprobleme, Rekonstruktion und Kritik der Sozial-, Politik und 
Geschichtsphilosophie des kritischen Rationalismus (Bonn: Dietz, 1978). 




the Tendenzwende conference of 1974, where Dahrendorf had participated.178 Yet 
again, the debate unfolded as a coda of the Positivism Dispute. Radnitzky’s 
contribution emphasized falsification as the core principle of science and rejected 
the notion that ideas and knowledge were ‘socially determined’.179 Like Popper, 
Radnitzky dismissed sociology of knowledge as a field of enquiry unworthy of 
attention.180 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Dahrendorf’s fascination with sociology 
of knowledge, it was Radnitzky’s essay that his review focused on specifically. 
Further, it criticized Tenbruck’s statement which suggested that West Germany had 
undergone a veritable ‘cultural revolution’ at the hands of intellectuals:  
 
For decades society has been depicted as a place in which conflict has 
to be fought rationally, all types of tradition or need for community 
have been ridiculed, all institutions have been reduced to mere 
domination, values have been turned into impositions.181  
 
As in the case of other critics of the student movement, culture, values, and tradition 
occupied a central place in Tenbruck’s thinking. Not only had the intellectual 
distance between Dahrendorf and self-professed Popperian philosophers of science 
become apparent in Dahrendorf’s writings. In a written reply to the review 
addressed to the editors of DIE ZEIT, Radnitzky argued that Dahrendorf’s 
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argumentation was inconsistent with Popper’s ideas, despite his constant insistence 
to be indebted to him.182  
  From this perspective, it does not surprise that Dahrendorf spent the turn 
of the decade trying to update and improve the theoretical backdrop of his agonistic 
version of liberalism. Centrally, this involved a restatement of his methodological 
assumptions. In contrast to the growing tendency among political theorists to 
conceive of history as an indeterminate open process, in Life Chances, Dahrendorf 
reformulated his conception of causality in social action. In late March and early 
April 1977, Dahrendorf delivered three lectures at the Christian Gauss Seminar at 
Princeton University. At this point, the ‘Life Chances‘ project still had the 
provisional subtitle ‘Essay in the Theory of Social Processes’.183 Two years earlier, 
he had already complained to Robert Merton about the ‘inability of people to 
imagine that “social relations” are neither micro-random (i.e. in themselves) nor 
macro-random (i.e. in their context)’.184 It was not without reason that the published 
version of Life Chances discussed Weber’s concept of ‘chance’ at length.185 
Prompted by early twentieth-century discussions in both the social sciences and 
philosophy of law, Weber had developed an understanding of causality that 
eschewed both strict determinism and the argument that considerations of causality 
were irrelevant to the humanities.186 In a preliminary draft of the book’s 
introduction, Dahrendorf’s discussion of Weber was in some aspects more detailed 
than in the final version. As he pointed out, Weber’s fascination with the concept 
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of ‘chance’ stemmed from the fact that it allowed him to conceive of ‘social laws’ 
as ‘not simply regularities of social processes, but “chances” of processes occurring 
regularly ... Events which theories would lead us to expect to happen may in fact 
not happen; there is room for deviance, for the unexpected, for freedom...’.187 At 
the same time, social laws and regularities were not random: ‘Chances are 
probabilities anchored in social structure’.188 With these observations, Dahrendorf 
had moved considerably beyond his condemnation of Weber a decade earlier. 
  In a similar vein, Dahrendorf reacted to Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle 
Stengers’ La Nouvelle Alliance, which Prigogine sent to Dahrendorf after its 
publication in 1979. Prigogine, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1977 
for his work on thermodynamics, collaborated with the Belgian philosopher 
Stengers to write a critique of ‘mechanistic’ understandings of science which 
thought in terms of universal laws and necessity. Based on thermodynamics, the 
authors instead advocated recognising the role of chance, openness, and 
uncertainty. Moreover, Prigogine and Stengers maintained that science and 
scientific research were heavily influenced by culture and ideology.189 In writing 
the foreword for the English translation of the book, the futurist Alvin Toffler took 
this idea one step further. For him, the industrial age had given birth to mechanistic 
notions of science and causality. It should therefore not surprise, he stated, that the 
transition to post-industrial societies would lead to the emergence of new world 
views.190 Confronted with this book, which he professed to have read immediately 
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after its arrival, Dahrendorf promised to send Prigogine a copy of Life Chances, 
‘because in two of its chapters I am in fact applying a similar approach to the 
understanding of history’.191 After alerting Prigogine to the relevance of Popper’s 
The Self and its Brain to his interests and asking him about his opinion on Paul 
Feyerabend’s ‘“post-modern” answers to the questions of post-modernity’, 
Dahrendorf ended the letter with an expression of doubt: ‘but there remains a little 
question mark: have you really suspended “necessity” for good?’192 
In the Gauss lectures, Dahrendorf defended himself against the charge that 
he was engaged in a sort of ‘socio-metaphysics’ by recourse to Weber’s 
probabilistic understanding of causality.193 Social structures governed the 
behaviour of members of society in all realms: 
 
The fact that people do not necessarily behave in accordance with 
structural patterns also means that they do not have to be aware of the 
expectations governing their behaviour. This is the truth in the much- 
discussed concept of “objective interests” (“class interests”) of which 
people become aware (“conscious”) only under certain conditions. 
Similarly, it is possible to provide an analysis of structural 
opportunities – chances, life chances – without assuming that people 
are necessarily aware of their options. The objective-subjective 
dimensions are quite misleading to describe this matter...194 
 
Weber had held a similar middle position between voluntarism and determinism, 
Dahrendorf observed: ‘Weber shies away from stating categorically the necessity 
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of certain events on forms or forms of action occurring: he protects himself by 
using the word “chance”. On the other hand he recognizes that the first axiom of 
social analysis is that social action is not random’.195  
  When Life Chances was published as a book, Dahrendorf did not include 
the lengthy discussion of method the introduction to his lectures had offered. In the 
book Dahrendorf relegated some of the passages on Weber and causality from the 
beginning of the introduction to a middle section in the book. It is not clear why he 
made this change. The passages on Weber constituted the oldest part of the book, 
with parts of it dating back ‘more than ten years’.196 Arguably, the change 
ultimately worked against Dahrendorf, as the charge that he engaged in 
metaphysical philosophy of history formed the cornerstone of Stuart Hampshire’s 
critique in the London Review of Books.197 On the other hand, Dahrendorf now 
introduced a reading of Weber’s concept of ‘chance’ that was not present in the 
lectures, explaining that Weber used the word in two senses pertaining to both 
‘probability of behaviour’ and individual ‘chance of satisfying interests’.198 These 
two meanings were intricately linked in Weber’s thought, since the chances 
individuals had to realize their interests were connected to social circumstances: 
‘Chances themselves are socially determined. Social structures are arrangements 
of chances’.199 Dahrendorf further criticized that Weber conceived of political 
legitimacy in exclusively ideal terms, that is that for Weber legitimacy really meant 
‘believed legitimacy, indeed the belief in legitimacy’.200 On this point, Dahrendorf 
was inspired by Habermas’ critique of Weber in Zur Rekonstruktion des 
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historischen Materialismus.201 When it came to legitimation, Dahrendorf felt, 
Weber ‘[c]haracteristically ... abandons structural analysis’.202 In this way, 
Dahrendorf continued the theme touched on in his Habilitationsprobevorlesung of 
1957, which had argued that Weber tended to privilege the ideal over the socio-
economic realm.203 The changes Dahrendorf made between lectures and book 
helped to obscure the methodological gulf that existed between Dahrendorf and 
liberals like Popper, Berlin, and Hayek in relation to the role of ideas and interests 
in history. Nonetheless, one reviewer read the book as a ‘friendly critique of Karl 
Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies ... and a rich alternative to F.A. Hayek’s 
Constitution of Liberty...’.204  
  The book’s published version also included a paper that Dahrendorf had 
given at the annual European Forum Alpbach in Austria in 1978, which offered an 
interpretation of the reasons why developed societies found themselves in the midst 
of what Habermas called ‘legitimation crisis’. Habermas’ work during this period 
also responded to neoconservative ideas. His writings on the question of 
legitimation partly unfolded in dialogue with Hennis. In his own work on 
legitimation, Hennis took Habermas to task for ignoring the fact that legitimacy 
can only arise from culture and tradition. Similar to Bell, he worried that increasing 
rationality in modern societies chipped away at ‘pre-political cultural and religious 
norms’.205 Likewise, Hennis argued that the usage of the word ‘legitimation’ rather 
than ‘legitimacy’ implied a process, which only made sense if one knew what 
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would come at the end of this process.206 Correspondingly, he saw Habermas’ work 
as prompted by a frustrated search for causality in a historical process.207 By way 
of discussing the ‘subtle contributions of Jürgen Habermas to our subject’, 
Dahrendorf sought to provide an exposition of his own theory of history, and to 
show that it did not commit himself to a historicist logic of history.208 Following 
Habermas’ critique of Weber, Dahrendorf further agreed that it was hopeless to try 
to overcome legitimation crises by way of ‘“normativistic” [attempts] to find 
pervasive bases of valuation for assessing the justice of power’.209 However, he 
took issue with Habermas’ ‘reconstructive’ concept of legitimation, as it professed 
the intention to discern the ‘logic of development’ of different legitimatory systems 
over the course of history.210 For Dahrendorf, Habermas’ attempt to make sense of 
political events since the late 1960s thus served as a useful prompt to discuss his 
ideas about historical development. Dahrendorf argued that the danger of 
historicism could be avoided if Habermas’ system was changed in one significant 
aspect, namely if a project of enquiry was formulated which would study the 
historical succession of different systems of legitimation ‘structurally, without any 
attempt to find a logic of development’.211  
  This did not mean that Dahrendorf subscribed to the radical rejection of 
philosophy of history imputed to him by Hübinger.212 He still thought that discrete 
historical periods were governed by particular principles which gave periods 
characters that set them apart from the past and the future.213 What struck him as 
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unpersuasive was the assumption that discrete historical periods succeeded one 
another with an inherent logic. The ‘hegemonial values’ that Dahrendorf saw at 
play in determining the character of a period were connected to social forces, that 
is, the economic, social, and technical reality given in a particular society. 
However, at times, the potential for the realization of life chances in societies 
outgrew the possibilities and restrictions offered by society, giving rise to situations 
in which legitimation crises ‘may be inevitable’.214 
  One of Life Chances’ core arguments was that chances for individual 
development depended on two variables, chances and ligatures, the latter of which 
had been much discounted in previous decades. The book thus took up the thread 
of the debate on norms, values, and morality of the preceding years. Indeed, the 
way Dahrendorf now discussed Émile Durkheim’s concept of ‘anomie’, i.e. the 
absence of ligatures in a given society or group, seemed to indicate a change of 
heart about the issues that had concerned neoconservatives for a decade already. 
By ‘ligatures’, Dahrendorf referred to factors that ‘relate people to an anchorage 
which transcends special social relations and power decisions and escapes rapid 
historical change, the relation itself being naturally to change in long historical 
rhythms’.215 Religion, history, patriotism, or a sense of family could provide a 
sense of purpose in a modernizing world which seemed to destroy traditional bonds 
while creating new options.216  
  Meifort has noted the similarity between this assessment and conservative 
ideas.217 However, a year after the publication of Life Chances, Dahrendorf 
admitted that he felt uneasy about the wording of his book because it left room for 
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the interpretation that he had argued in favour of attempting to create ligatures. 
Ligatures, however, could not be organized; they emerged in and of themselves. 
Anyone who assumed the role of ‘organizer of ligatures’ should be regarded with 
the utmost suspicion.218 Dahrendorf then went on to remark that he had recently re-
read Weber’s writings on the ‘return of the sacred’, and that he found Weber’s 




  When the decade drew to a close in 1979, it had become commonplace to 
speak of a return of ideology in politics. Many of Dahrendorf’s liberal associates 
had shifted towards the right in reaction to the student movement. By contrast, 
Dahrendorf did not interpret the student movement as a cultural phenomenon or a 
symptom of a deeper cultural crisis. As a consequence, he was less worried about 
the role of ideas in the public sphere, and did not shift towards emphasizing the 
importance of morality and virtues. Instead, he held on to a sociological vision of 
politics that prioritized the role of ‘objective interests’ in determining political 
behaviour, while an increasing number of theorists argued that politics and society 
were more unpredictable and contingent than had previously been realized. 
Reformulating his conception of causality in social action therefore became central 
to his ‘Life Chances’ project of the late 1970s. This divergence in conceptions of 
causality would play a similar role in Dahrendorf’s critique of neoliberalism in the 
1980s. Even more so, his reception of neoconservative moralism carried over into 
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this critique. Dahrendorf’s Law and Order, published in 1985, drew a connection 
between the resurgence of moralism on the right and renewed emphases on the free 
market.220 As we shall see in the following chapter, his thoughts on these two new 
political currents were intricately linked. 
                                                 




Chapter VI: Dahrendorf’s Critique of Neoliberalism 
 
‘Not everything that is distasteful to some, or to me, or even to Hayek, has by the same token 
constitutional status. Whatever is raised to that plane is thereby removed from the day-to-day 
struggles of normal politics, until in the end a total constitution emerges in which there is nothing 
left to disagree about, a total society, another totalitarianism.’ (Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the 




Half way through Dahrendorf’s Directorship at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, Margaret Thatcher was elected Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom after a decisive victory by the Conservative Party in the General Election 
of May 1979. Together with Ronald Reagan’s triumph in the US Presidential 
Election in 1980 and the FDP’s shift of allegiance from the SPD to the CDU/CSU 
to form a new government with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor in October 1982, 
Thatcher’s arrival at 10 Downing Street was symptomatic of a veritable change of 
political currents around the turn of the decade. During the preceding years, 
intellectual conservatism had been resurgent in the wake of the student movement 
and left-wing terrorism.1 Similarly, economic liberalism was gaining ground in 
political debates. In 1974, Friedrich Hayek was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Economics, followed by Milton Friedman in 1976.  
  Dahrendorf’s attitude towards this political realignment was mixed. In the 
Federal Republic, he supported his party’s decision to leave the coalition with 
Helmut Schmidt’s Social Democrats for the Christian Democrats. In fact, in late 
                                                 




1982 and early 1983 Dahrendorf seriously considered a return to politics, taking 
part in the FDP’s election campaign in 1983 on a scale that he had not done since 
1969. In Britain on the other hand, he was very critical of Thatcher’s politics from 
the very beginning of her tenure. In addition to Thatcher, his critique of free-market 
oriented liberalism extended to economists such as Hayek, Friedman, Robert 
Nozick, and, in particular, proponents of ‘public choice theory’ and ‘constitutional 
economics’ like James Buchanan or Gordon Tullock.  
  As shown in Chapter II, Dahrendorf had initially praised Hayek as an 
inspirational liberal theorist in Society and Democracy in Germany (1965) and 
Konflikt und Freiheit (1972). By the late 1970s, Dahrendorf’s view of Hayek had 
changed radically. On 17 May 1978, Hayek came to the LSE to deliver that year’s 
Hobhouse Memorial Lecture on ‘The Three Sources of Human Values’, which was 
subsequently published in the third volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. Ex 
officio, Dahrendorf chaired the lecture and hosted the subsequent dinner party in 
honour of the speaker in his private dining room in his flat at The Anchorage on 
the LSE’s campus. His dinner speech seemed to have been sufficiently lukewarm 
that the anthropologist Raymond Firth felt urged to write to Dahrendorf a few days 
later. In the letter, Firth said: 
 
I hope you were not a trifle disappointed in saying that it was an 
anecdotal evening. It seemed to me that given the assembly this was 
probably the mood most in accord with the occasion, of honouring a 
distinguished colleague whose thought processes commanded respect 
if not agreement.2  
                                                 






In his reply, Dahrendorf admitted that Firth’s observation was ‘at least half correct. 
I had in fact expected a substantive discussion that evening’.3 Half a year later, 
Dahrendorf’s changed attitude towards the Austrian economist manifested itself 
again. In his Lionel Trilling Lecture on ‘Life Chances: On the Dimensions of 
Liberty in Society’, given at Columbia University on 7 December 1978, 
Dahrendorf referred to Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty as ‘only a half liberal 
book’.4 By 1990, when he felt that Hayek was unduly celebrated in Eastern 
European countries that were about to abandon communism, Dahrendorf argued 
that Hayek’s political theory had the potential to lead to a totalitarianism that would 
not necessarily be preferable to the type that Eastern Europe had just managed to 
throw off.5 
  Franziska Meifort takes Dahrendorf’s engagement in the FDP’s election 
campaign in 1983 as evidence for an alleged turn from social liberalism towards 
market liberalism.6 This chapter seeks to nuance this picture, shedding light on 
Dahrendorf’s critique of Hayek and neoliberal theory as it evolved over the course 
of the later 1970s and 1980s. In so doing it emphasises the continuity between 
Dahrendorf’s earlier thought, grounded in a materialist vision of politics, and his 
critique of neoliberalism. Criticizing Hayek, Buchanan, and Tullock, for their 
attempts to settle political questions on the constitutional level, Dahrendorf 
continued to emphasize the importance of allowing sectional interest groups to 
pursue their politics in the parliamentary sphere. Taking into account Dahrendorf’s 
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critique of market- and constitution-oriented versions of liberalism, a different 
picture of his intellectual development during the 1980s emerges. This puts 
Dahrendorf’s support for the FDP’s break with the SPD in 1982 in a somewhat 
paradoxical light. Prominent members of the party’s left wing, such as Günter 
Verheugen, Ingrid Matthäus-Meier, and Andreas von Schoeler, left the FDP and 
joined the SPD after the end of the coalition. However, there are alternative ways 
of accounting for Dahrendorf’s support for ending Helmut Schmidt’s time in office 
as Chancellor of the Federal Republic. When rumours circulated that Schmidt 
would become co-publisher of DIE ZEIT in early 1983, Dahrendorf threatened to 
stop writing for the newspaper. In a letter to Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, one of the 
other co-publishers, Dahrendorf depicted Schmidt as a quasi-authoritarian figure 
with profoundly anti-liberal views. Reminding her that the committed National 
Socialist Schmidt had sat in the audience rows when his father Gustav Dahrendorf 
was prosecuted at Roland Freisler’s Volksgerichtshof, Dahrendorf admitted that his 
wife was probably right that his views on Schmidt were emotional. As he reminded 
Dönhoff, he and Schmidt had a history of disagreements that dated back to their 
student days at the University of Hamburg, when they had clashed in social 
democratic student politics circles.7 Dahrendorf’s personal loyalty to Schmidt was 
thus limited.  
  Moreover, during the run-up to the change of coalition Dahrendorf had 
reiterated his opinion that the role of the market in society was subject to 
considerable limitations. Gerhart Baum, Minister of the Interior and one of his close 
allies on the FDP’s left wing, received a letter from Dahrendorf which argued that 
                                                 





the ‘market is indeed a nice liberal word – as long as intelligent people do not start 
to believe that we have a market economy.’8 The strength of the German economy, 
Dahrendorf added, had always been connected to the prefix ‘social’.9 Dahrendorf’s 
support for the FDP’s shift of allegiance should thus not be read as a shift towards 
economic liberalism. Moreover, several historians have pointed out that foreign 
policy considerations were as important as, if not more than, economic policy 
during the Liberals’ decision-making process in favour of leaving the coalition.10 
In his memoirs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, party leader and Foreign Secretary under 
both Schmidt and Kohl, remembered that the NATO double-track decision and the 
SPD’s flagging support for it had been the decisive issue at the time.11 
  Similar to the term ‘neoconservatism’, ‘neoliberalism’ has been 
predominantly used by its critics. As with neoconservatism, this thesis uses the 
word as a concept to describe a trend within liberal thought in the 1970s that can 
be described as new, notwithstanding the fact that the origin of the term 
neoliberalism stretches back much further. This is not to say that the ideas described 
as ‘neoliberal’ in this thesis were not around before the 1970s. The more profound 
change of that decade related to the way in which ideas that had been in circulation 
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2. Neoliberalism as Utopia. 
 
  In 1966, the Walter Eucken Institute invited Dahrendorf to give a guest 
lecture at the University of Freiburg. The Institute was one of the most important 
intellectual centres of economic liberalism in the Federal Republic, established at 
the university that had lent its name to the liberal Freiburg School. It was not 
without reason that Hayek came to Freiburg as professor of economics in 1962, 
where he stayed until 1969. Dahrendorf’s lecture on ‘market and plan rationality’ 
was his first intellectual attempt to make sense of the liberalism espoused by the 
Freiburg economists, and it prefigured some of the points that would become more 
prominent in his writings ten to twenty years later. Delivered a year after the 
publication of Society and Democracy in Germany, which had praised Hayek’s 
liberalism, the lecture provided Dahrendorf with an opportunity to engage with 
Hayek’s ideas. Indeed, Hayek’s distinction between two kinds of rationalism, 
developed in a lecture in Tokyo in April 1964 that was published by the Economic 
Studies Quarterly in 1965, inspired Dahrendorf’s choice of theme.12 Dahrendorf 
professed to ‘accept ... without reservation’ Hayek’s distinction between Humean 
‘critical rationalism’ and Cartesian ‘constructivist rationalism’.13 For Hayek, Hume 
was one of the first theorists to realize that conventions ordering the interaction of 
humans did not emerge through conscious design. Descartes on the other hand 
anticipated the conception that human societies needed to be organized in 
accordance with rationally conceived designs, and thus figured as the forefather of 
social and economic planning in the twentieth century.14 Dahrendorf agreed that 
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market rationality was in many ways preferable to plan rationality. Not only did it 
provide space for individual preferences and decisions; it also made social conflict 
less likely to lead to ‘revolutionary upheavals’.15  
  Dahrendorf’s professed agreement with Hayek could be read as evidence 
that in 1966, he was still closer to Hayek than he would be in later years. While this 
is true, the extent to which their liberal theories were in agreement should not be 
overestimated. Characteristically, Dahrendorf’s homage to Hayek’s arguments 
about different kinds of rationality came at the very end of the first section of the 
lecture, suggesting that there was a significant rhetorical element in it. In the second 
part, he explained why the pure interpretation of Hayek’s distinction was 
problematic, and that there were sociological reasons why unfettered markets were 
not preferable to a mix of both rationalities that was more suitable to a more 
complex reality.16 In all societies, social structures existed that systematically 
undermined the rules of the game set in a purely market-rational environment. 
Tenant farmers could be coerced not to vote, or husbands could tell their wives how 
to vote. Purely market-rational politics ignored the existence of power within 
society: ‘Under all conceivable social conditions, the market is a fiction; the game 
always takes place in front of city hall’.17 Market rationality had to be supplemented 
by compensatory measures and other social rights ‘unless it is to remain an 
ideology of systematic privilege for those who are already in a position to 
participate’.18 Political theories solely reliant on market rationality failed to 
recognize the prominent role that interests played in politics, and that interests 
invariably led to ossifying structures and the privileging of entrenched positions. 
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Some non-market counteracting mechanism was necessary to break these 
structures up when they emerged. This assessment of Hayek was in line with 
Dahrendorf’s broader political theory. Crucially, he disagreed with the optimistic 
assumption that material interest conflicts could be superseded through win-win 
scenarios. In a review of Jan Pen’s Harmony and Conflict in Modern Society, he 
stated that it was wrong to assume that if ‘A increases his income two-fold and B 
three-fold’, social conflict was resolved. It was utopian to assume that this worked 
– those left behind in relative terms would not be pacified by increases in their real 
income.19 On this point, he was unable to make an assumption that was central to 
Hayek’s thinking. 
  After 1966, Hayek did not attract Dahrendorf’s attention again until the 
later 1970s. This was not for a lack of interest in economic matters. His years in 
Brussels as European Commissioner for Trade included the tumultuous weeks and 
months following the ‘Nixon shock’ in August 1971, when the American 
government decided to decouple the US dollar from its gold backing. Looking 
back, Dahrendorf remembered how the members of the European Commission 
returned to Brussels overnight from holiday to find emergency measures to cope 
with the new economic context that the world found itself in.20 International 
economic matters subsequently occupied Dahrendorf in a way that they had not 
done before his time in politics, when his sociological work had concentrated on 
domestic social conflict. The BBC Reith Lectures mentioned in Chapter V, given 
from November 1974 onwards and published as The New Liberty, were closely 
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concerned with the implications of economic issues for politics after the Oil Shock 
of 1973. Over the coming years, Dahrendorf would be in close intellectual 
exchange with economists. In February 1976, he spoke at the European 
Management Forum in Davos. In October 1977, Dahrendorf corresponded with 
Chancellor Schmidt about possible solutions to the problem of unemployment, 
alerting the head of the West German government to American policy experiments 
about which Mitchell Sviridoff had told him at a meeting of the Ford Foundation.21 
The following year, he visited 10 Downing Street to discuss Britain’s intractable 
unemployment and inflation with economists from the LSE and Prime Minister 
James Callaghan.22 Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter V, Dahrendorf intended to 
conduct research on the role of economic interest conflicts in international 
diplomacy at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg in his research proposal written 
in 1978 for the purposes of his appointment. 
  As shown in the previous chapter, Dahrendorf interpreted the student 
movement as a counter-movement against increasing bureaucratization. A decade 
after the student movement, he located the causes of the rise of ‘libertarianism’ in 
the same realm. In a lecture at the University of Michigan in September 1980, he 
said that ‘they express the desire of many to be freed of the iron cage of bondage 
of modern bureaucratic states’.23 Indeed, bureaucracy and the growing regulatory 
burdens on business was one of the issues that neoliberals were keenest to address. 
From their perspective, inefficient large conglomerates and monopolies were the 
consequences of government interference with market mechanisms. In 1975, 
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Friedman sent Dahrendorf a note that took issue with the central claim of The New 
Liberty, of which he had sent Friedman a copy. As we have seen in Chapter V, 
Dahrendorf’s laboured worries about how liberalism and individual liberty could 
survive in an inexorably bureaucratizing environment dominated by overpowering 
state institutions, big business, and trade unions were central to his intellectual 
preoccupations. According to Friedman, this dilemma simply did not exist, since 
government intervention was to blame for ‘giant companies and giant trade 
unions’.24 It was a fallacy to think that bureaucracy was inevitable, and therefore 
to think that a new liberalism devised for the bureaucratic age was necessary. 
Dahrendorf nonetheless reiterated his call for rethinking liberalism in the light of 
new social realities, arguing that at some point, market economies ran into a 
‘contradiction’ because the economic growth that they depended on could only be 
generated by large-scale organizations.25 Dahrendorf came back to Friedman’s 
critique in the Michigan lecture mentioned above, speaking of libertarians who 
were ‘likely to follow Friedman on his sentimental journey to renew old memories’ 
of a past before the trajectory of modernization had created the irremediable 
bureaucracy of the present.26 
  Dahrendorf also had to defend his views on bureaucratization against 
critics from the left. In Italy, the sociologist Luciano Pellicani voiced objections to 
Dahrendorf’s views on bureaucracy as expressed in The New Liberty. Responding 
to his ‘Italian critics’, Dahrendorf again insisted that ‘[b]ureaucracy is no 
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accident’.27 Moreover, he not only saw bureaucratization as a necessary element of 
western modernization, but indeed as a precondition for modernity tout court – 
socialism as practised in the Soviet Union was subject to the same logic of 
modernity. When Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker wrote from the Max Planck 
Institute in Starnberg that it was a ‘practical necessity’ that revolutionary socialism 
developed into a bureaucratized system if it was established in power for long 
enough, Dahrendorf replied that the Soviet Union did not have anything to do with 
revolutionary socialism at all, but rather that it represented the bureaucratic attempt 
at economic development.28 This necessitated a ‘painful transition from late feudal 
society’; the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union was a ‘practical necessity in the 
simple sense that the problem of economic development has to be addressed’.29  
  These exchanges came at a crucial juncture when key assumptions about 
the irremediable bureaucratic tendencies of modern industrial societies, laid out in 
Chapter I, became challenged as part of a more general crisis that the social 
sciences found themselves in after the late 1960s.30 As scholars increasingly came 
to see historical development and modernization as more contingent than social 
scientists had previously thought, the conviction that bureaucracy was not an 
inexorable part of modernity became more widely accepted. 31 The optimism of 
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free-market oriented liberals that bureaucracy could be reduced through 
deregulation thus dovetailed with a more general intellectual shift. 
  Friedman was not the only liberal economist who sought ways of cutting 
back bureaucracy. In 1975, Buchanan noted that the current decade had seen a 
surge in demands for ‘a dismantling of bureaucracy’, an objective that he 
emphatically agreed with.32 Tullock engaged with this problem in his book The 
Politics of Bureaucracy (1965). The existence of large-scale organizations that 
could pursue sectional interests at the expense of the overall public was also central 
to Mancur Olson’s explanation of economic stagnation since the early 1970s in the 
Rise and Decline of Nations.33 Friedman’s insistence on bureaucracy’s contingency 
in modern society – expressed in his letter to Dahrendorf – was in line with a longer 
tradition of classical liberal thought. In The Good Society (1937), Walter Lippmann 
similarly insisted that ‘corporate concentration’ in big business and monopolies 
was not an ‘inexorable consequence’ of technological change.34 Instead, Lippmann 
blamed the introduction of limited liability legislation for the rise of large-scale 
conglomerates.35 Two years later, Lionel Robbins made the same point in his 
appropriately entitled essay on ‘The “Inevitability” of Monopoly’, which argued 
that monopolistic concentration was not inevitable but rather a consequence of 
‘state policy’.36 Writing during the Second World War, Hayek’s mentor Ludwig 
von Mises attacked the idea that the growth of bureaucracy, monopolies, and the 
power of managers was an inexorable process and ‘therefore an inescapable evil’.37 
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Bureaucracy was ‘not inherent in the evolution of business. It is an outcome of 
government meddling with business’.38 By implication, the problem of bureaucracy 
could be dealt with if one was willing to rein in state interference. In the late 1930s 
and the following decades, these views stood outside the mainstream of social 
thought. Only after the late 1960s and early 1970s had seen the demise of 
assumptions about the ‘inevitability’ of certain aspects of modernization were these 
ideas seriously considered. 
  For Dahrendorf, however, bureaucracy was there to stay. Commenting on 
the Swedish general election of September 1985, he was happy to draw attention 
to the research of the Swedish sociologist Hans Zetterberg which showed that this 
had been the first election in human history in which more than 50 per cent of the 
electorate received their income, in some form or another, from the state. In other 
countries this was only different in degree but not in kind.39 One of the publications 
that Dahrendorf closely engaged with on the question of bureaucracy was Olson’s 
aforementioned The Rise and Decline of Nations. Published in 1982, Olson’s book 
was one of many attempts to make sense of the causes of economic stagnation in 
Western Europe and the developed world more generally. Dahrendorf and Olson 
met for the first time at a conference in Turin on 6 to 8 June 1985 and afterwards 
started corresponding. In response to Dahrendorf’s ‘uneasiness about my 
comments at the end of the book about its implications for public policy’, Olson 
sent him his essay on ‘Ideology and Growth’.40 Olson also asked Dahrendorf to 
speak at a symposium about his book at the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin on 28 
October 1985, an invitation that Dahrendorf duly accepted.41 This did not stop 
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Dahrendorf from criticizing Olson for his arguments about sclerotic rigidity. 
Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden, those European countries that had been most 
economically successful in the 1980s, he argued, were furthest from Olson’s ideal 
of a free market. Moreover, Japan’s incomparable economic success was based on 
a model of bureaucratic co-ordination which was decidedly at odds with what 
Olson had in mind.42 In a review of Hayek’s The Fatal Conceit published three 
years later, he reiterated this point by highlighting the role of bureaucratic business 
and government in ‘some of the most spectacular growth stories’, Germany, Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.43 There was thus no sign that modernity would cease to 
be an iron cage. For Dahrendorf, the existence of large-scale organizations was the 
crucial factor that rendered neoliberal theories anachronistic and dangerous. 
Encouraging large bureaucratic corporations to behave in accordance with the 
business virtues of earlier periods would only lead to what Susan Strange called 
‘casino capitalism’.44 
  This was also the reasoning behind Dahrendorf’s declaration that 
Thatcher’s politics were utopian and anachronistic in the DIE ZEIT article of 17 
October 1980 mentioned in Chapter II.45 When people wanted to protect something 
that did not actually exist, Dahrendorf urged, one should suspect ideology to be at 
play, that is, the ‘pretence of falsities for the purpose of protecting certain 
interests’.46 Big business, cartels, trade unions, and other big structures necessitated 
a departure towards a ‘new’ kind of liberalism.47 Ideological politics that pretended 
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that this was not so would soon or later break down in the face of reality. Thatcher’s 
government was a case in point for him. In 1981, the year of the radical monetarist 
budget and the Brixton riots of April 1981, Dahrendorf placed a bet that Thatcher 
would not survive another year in office.48 In the same vein, he used his regular 
column in Finanz und Wirtschaft to highlight how constrained Thatcher really was. 
While she had been adamant about her intention to cut state spending, the British 
budget kept growing under her auspices.49 Ironically, Thatcher had been pushed 
into increasing subsidies for those state industries that she had previously wanted 
to expose to market mechanisms. In December 1981 he wrote that the next general 
election was very likely already lost for the Prime Minister.50 In June 1982, in the 
wake of the Falklands War when Thatcher’s approval ratings surged, Dahrendorf 
suggested that her poll numbers were likely to fall as fast as they had risen.51 
  The longer Thatcher stayed in office, the more complicated Dahrendorf’s 
claims about the utopian character and impossibility of Thatcherism became. The 
1983 general election at the latest suggested that Thatcher’s Premiership was not a 
brief episode that would soon be ended by a traditional, moderate Conservative 
Prime Minister, as Dahrendorf had predicted. Nevertheless, Dahrendorf continued 
to argue that Thatcherism was a political phenomenon whose long-term success 
was improbable. In this vein, he pointed out that Thatcher’s politics was based on 
a plurality of votes (43 per cent) which was only turned into a majority by an 
anachronistic voting system. Even among those who voted for the Conservative 
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Party there was a sizable number who did not agree with her economic policies.52 
In spite of their radical rhetoric, Thatcher’s Conservative government tended to be 
pulled back into the centre, already content if they managed to limit the growth rate 
of government instead of actually rolling back the state.53 Economic policy, he 
claimed, was still heavily constrained by the ‘much derided practical necessities’.54 
In 1988, Dahrendorf saw the same happening in the US Presidential Election, with 
all candidates moving into a centrist direction. What could any candidate offer to 
do differently than the incumbent President Reagan? Firstly, even the President of 
the United States was confronted with a world economy that he could not influence. 
Secondly, while voters in the late 1980s often preferred policies that were more 
social than those of Reagan and Thatcher, they also did not want a return to the 
strong state and the bureaucracy that such a change would entail.55 In the late 1980s, 
Dahrendorf felt that technocratic government was back more than ever. Politics as 
the execution of practical necessities was again the mode of governance: 
 
[O]ne is reminded of the ‘practical constraints [Sachgesetzlichkeiten]’ 
that many find scary for good reasons. Do we not live in manmade 
circumstances, which for this reason can also be changed by men? 
Sure, sure, but nonetheless many things suggest that the constraints 
under which governments are operating limit freedom of action more 
strongly than in the past.56  
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Dahrendorf continued that politicians like Spain’s Felipe Gonzales who accepted 
these constraints could lead their countries to a ‘bearable and even prosperous 
future’.57 Those who did not accept them – like Greece’s Andreas Papandreou – 
led their countries to disaster.58 Long after their demise, Dahrendorf thus still 
adhered to the assumptions of the paradigms of the post-war social sciences. 
However, he still did not see the requirement to govern in line with practical 
necessities positively. The lack of an effective democratic opposition that could 
deal with and transform the constraints of the present would likely lead to 
widespread frustration and apathy. For the time being, the lack of a powerful social 
force that had an interest in transformation left the task of opposition to small 
‘moral minorities’.59 
  Lacking a dynamic new social class, the social structure of the present 
meant that those members of society who had an objective interest in changing the 
status quo were unable to do so. In making this argument, Dahrendorf drew heavily 
on the concept of an ‘underclass’ proposed by Ken Auletta in 1982 in a book about 
poverty in the United States.60 According to Dahrendorf, the new poverty of the 
present involved the bottom ten per cent of society, who were excluded from all 
essential aspects of civil society by the so-called ‘majority class’, a large collection 
of social groups who accounted for about two thirds of society and shared an 
interest in the maintenance of the post-war settlement. It was this ‘majority class’ 
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that was increasingly politically dominant, rather than the members of the 
‘stockbroker belt’ whose interests and social prejudices were best served by the 
free market.61 The underclass, by contrast, had no means of collective organization, 
and its members were largely politically apathetic. There was thus little chance that 
it would turn into a formidable social force that could break the mould of present-
day politics.62 
 
3. Against Strong Constitutions: Dahrendorf’s Agonistic Critique of 
Neoliberalism. 
 
  In the mid-1980s, Dahrendorf began working on a critique of 
neoliberalism and constitutional economics, although in the end he did not manage 
to produce more than fragments. After his term as Director of the LSE ended in 
September 1984, Dahrendorf returned to the University of Constance. In Summer 
1986, he went to the University of Basel as a Visiting Professor, a role followed by 
a stint as Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation in New York in late 1986 
and early 1987. In 1987, he moved back to the United Kingdom to become Warden 
of St Antony’s College, Oxford. Engaging with the new currents of liberal theory 
of the day became an integral part of his academic work during these years. Two 
essay projects on ‘Market, Power, and Law’ and ‘Liberals and the Social Contract’ 
that he worked on in spring and early summer 1986 respectively, of which the 
former ultimately remained unpublished, are particularly relevant.63 Critically 
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engaging with constitutional economics was central to their concerns. When 
Dahrendorf was asked to give recommendations for the thematic orientation of the 
Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, he wrote that ‘political economy 
(constitutional economics, political theory)’ was among the most topical issues. 
More specifically, he added, his own interests in this area circled around the topics 
‘welfare state, role of the state, law and order, poverty, development, and related 
subjects’.64 A list of books on constitutional economics that he compiled shows 
which authors he engaged with: Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1956)), Friedrich Hayek (The Constitution of Liberty (1960), Law, 
Legislation and Liberty (1973, 1976, 1979)), James Buchanan (The Calculus of 
Consent (1962), The Limits of Liberty (1975), The Power to Tax (1981)), R. B. 
MacKenzie (Bound to be Free (1982), Constitutional Economics (1984), D. L. Lee 
and R.B. MacKenzie (Constitutional Economics (1985), Geoffrey Brennan and 
James Buchanan (The Reason of Rules (1985), and George Stigler (The Citizen and 
the State (1985)).65 
  At the end of 1985, Dahrendorf drafted an application for a research grant 
which provides a window into his interests at the time. Outlining his idea for a 
proposed new book, he asked for financial assistance to spend time in four different 
places for research purposes. Firstly, Dahrendorf wanted to work in Washington, 
for instance at the Witson Center, in order to familiarize himself with constitutional 
economics. Secondly, he sought to spend time in Oxford, preferably Nuffield 
College. As a third base, Dahrendorf asked for funding for a period in Berlin, 
suggesting the Wissenschaftskolleg, ‘in order to look more closely at what has 
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come to be called “eco-libertarian” thinking’.66 Finally, he wanted to cap off these 
research trips at an interdisciplinary institution such as the Institute for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto or the Institute of Advanced Study 
at Princeton.67 Dahrendorf’s outline provides several clues to the direction of his 
thinking in the mid-1980s. He intended to write a critique of liberal and libertarian 
ideas that involved using constitutional measures to ensure that irresponsible 
parliamentarians did not excessively interfere with the market. 
  Constitutions were indeed central to liberal thought in the 1970s and 
1980s. They were central to Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty, whose author 
stated that he would have named the book The Constitution of Liberty had he not 
already published a book under the same name.68 Similarly, Buchanan and Tullock 
were concerned with the role of constitutions in political economy. Chapter II has 
highlighted Dahrendorf’s adoption of Marx’s rejection of the concept of ‘justice’. 
Chapter IV has covered his political attempts to break the dominant position that, 
he thought, lawyers held in West German politics. This profound scepticism 
towards law and lawyers resurfaced in his works on neoliberalism. When 
constitutions and the ‘social contract’ re-emerged as topics of political debate with 
books such as John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (1974), Dahrendorf’s attitude towards law continued to form an 
integral part of his critique of neoliberal appraisals of strong constitutions as a 
safeguard against parliamentary encroachment on markets and individual freedom. 
When interviewed alongside Hayek in 1983, Dahrendorf insisted (in stark contrast 
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with Hayek’s political vision) that the increasing power of judges was a threat to 
the rule of law.69  
  Continuity also characterized Dahrendorf’s thinking about industrial 
conflict. As shown in Chapter II, in 1957 he had told other CASBS Fellows in Palo 
Alto that suppression of such conflicts should ‘never even be considered’.70 In 
1981, he re-iterated this point to the FDP politician Gerhart Baum, quoting the 
Gaitskell Memorial Lecture of 1970 on ‘Trade Unions, the Law and Society’ by 
the German émigré legal scholar Otto Kahn-Freund. Dahrendorf translated what he 
held to be the key passage for Baum, which read: ‘The law is likely to be a failure 
whenever it seeks to counteract habits of action or of inaction adopted by large 
numbers of men and women in pursuance of established social custom, norms of 
conduct or ethical or religious convictions’.71 Dahrendorf seemed to be fascinated 
by Kahn-Freund’s statement, as he quoted the same passage in a lecture on ‘Law 
and Politics in the European Community’, where he repeated his conviction that 
law cannot replace politics.72 Intellectually, Kahn-Freund had a certain affinity 
with Dahrendorf. He had studied law in Frankfurt during Weimar, moving in a 
socialist circle that included Hugo Sinzheimer, Ernst Fraenkel, and Franz 
Neumann.73 After emigrating he became one of Britain’s most prominent advocates 
of the sociology of law, and helped publish and translate Karl Renner’s The 
Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions.74 Both Kahn-Freund and 
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Dahrendorf held that social forces were stronger than the law. In his lecture, 
Dahrendorf only felt the need to point out that Kahn-Freund should have added 
‘interests’ to the list of those social factors that superseded positive law.75 
  Constitutional measures used to ensure that sectional interests did not 
influence policy-making were a central concern of Hayek as well as Buchanan and 
Tullock’s public choice theory. In The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and 
Tullock argued that in many cases there were few rational reasons for the use of 
simple majority voting procedures, and that unanimity requirements for 
constitutional settlements should be reappraised.76 In addition to that, 
supermajority requirements or checks and balances such as bicameral systems 
could be used to minimize special interest politics. Conceding that rational actors 
will depart from the unanimity principle in a number of cases, Buchanan and 
Tullock nevertheless insisted that ‘[t]hese variants will be rationally chosen, not 
because they will produce “better” collective decisions (they will not), but rather 
because, on balance, the sheer weight of the costs involved in reaching decisions 
unanimously dictates some departure from the “ideal” rule’.77 Going further, they 
reasoned that ‘for any change in the public interest, unanimous support can be 
achieved’.78 In a similar way, Hayek argued against what he considered rigid 
conceptions of majoritarian democracy. Indeed, he explicitly rejected agonistic 
conceptions of democracy that considered politics to be a material conflict. In the 
last volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty, published in 1979, Hayek snubbed at 
the ‘cynical realism which is characteristic of some contemporary political 
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scientists who regard democracy merely as just another form of an inevitable 
struggle in which it is decided “who gets what, when, and how”’.79 In the following 
pages, Hayek consequently offered a theory of democracy that sought to avoid the 
excesses of majoritarianism and interest politics. 
  Implicitly, these observations entailed the assumption that a free market 
unhampered by interest politics and rent-seeking was in the ultimate interest of 
society as a whole. This point went to the heart of Dahrendorf’s critique of 
neoliberalism, which itself was based on the fear that calls for strong constitutional 
rules about what kind of political measures parliaments could take would cancel 
parliament’s role as a theatre for interest politics. In its essence, the disagreement 
involved three dimensions. Firstly, Dahrendorf denied that such an overall interest 
could be established. Based on the conviction that conflicting group interests 
existed in all societies, he had criticized the notion that establishing consensus 
along the lines of a common interest was possible throughout his career. Secondly, 
Dahrendorf’s political theory had always revolved around the question of how 
social change could be translated into politics while avoiding the risk of violent 
revolutions. Settling those matters that Hayek, Buchanan, and Tullock wanted to 
solve constitutionally would seriously impair a society’s capacity to adapt to future 
social forces that no one could foresee. When Buchanan and Dahrendorf met at a 
CIVITAS conference at the University of Herdecke in late October 1986, 
Dahrendorf criticized the economist for making the implicit assumption that there 
was one type of constitution that was equally suited to all points in history. 
Speaking as the commentator on Buchanan’s paper on ‘Market Failure and Political 
                                                 




Failure’, he observed that the social contract was not something that could be 
imposed irrespective of time, as it was a historical process itself.80 
  The third difference related to Dahrendorf’s views on what factors were 
dominant in history and society. As shown in the Introduction and Chapter II, in 
The Counter-Revolution of Science (1952) and The Constitution of Liberty (1960), 
Hayek emphasized the influence of ideas and rejected so-called ‘positivism’ in its 
many guises. For him, Marx’s historical materialism was part of long canon of 
sociological writings with fundamentally flawed methodologies.81 Assumptions of 
historical inevitability and practical necessities were anathema to him. Hayek still 
adhered to this outlook when the three volumes of Law, Legislation, and Liberty 
were published from 1973 onwards. Its first volume reformulated these principles. 
In the chapter on ‘Principles and Expediency’, Hayek took aim at decision-makers 
and social scientists who argued that that the age of ideology was over and that 
politics and administration were now a matter of ‘social techniques’.82 According 
to Hayek, it was a mistake to regard politics as a matter of Max Weber’s ‘purposive 
rationality’.83 It was not the case, he added, that policy-making was often a matter 
of ‘inevitable necessities’.84 In this vein, he also insisted that his earlier book The 
Road to Serfdom (1945) had been misunderstood. In no way had it attempted to 
argue that societies that pursue certain socialist policies will ‘ineluctably be driven 
to go the whole way to a totalitarian system’.85 It was always possible to change 
the direction of things. These methodological commitments allowed Hayek to be 
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optimistic that members of society could be persuaded to act in their ultimate rather 
than immediate interest, that is, to cooperate in imposing the constitutional means 
that he thought were necessary. Politics, he said, should be utopian in the positive 
sense of being directed towards an ideal society. It was the fault of those who 
argued in favour of necessity to have turned ‘utopia’ and ‘ideology’ into a ‘bad 
word’.86 
  In his path-breaking study of Hayek’s political theory, Chandran 
Kukathas argues that it ultimately suffers from a contradiction between anti-
rationalist Humean and rationalist Kantian impulses that Hayek himself failed to 
resolve. On the one hand, Hayek insisted that society’s complexity meant that it 
was beyond the capacity of human reason to actively design social orders.87 Human 
morality, norms, and laws had to be understood as a product of social evolution 
rather than of conscious creation.88 Notwithstanding this commitment, Kukathas 
states, Hayek did not manage to avoid normative commitments when he sought to 
give substance to the meaning of concepts such as private property or freedom of 
contract.89 In other words, Hayek’s constitutional politics were not free of 
normative requirements addressed to members of the political order. Dahrendorf 
also claimed that neoliberalism contained a moralistic element. In Die Chancen der 
Krise (1983), he argued that neoliberal rhetoric often involved the claim to be in 
possession of a ‘moral truth’.90 While questioning labelling Hayek as a 
conservative, Kukathas nonetheless sees conservative elements at play in his ideas, 
as his scepticism towards rationally designed reforms led him to value continuity, 
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tradition, and institutions.91 Although this is true, Kukathas does not include 
Hayek’s fundamentally optimist perspective on the possibility and desirability of 
change, depicted in the previous paragraph, in his analysis. Adding this aspect in 
fact reinforces Kukathas’ overall argument about the contradictory nature of 
Hayek’s Humean and Kantian instincts. 
  Dahrendorf’s critique of constitutional economics throws this 
contradiction into relief. For him, agonistic parliamentary politics amounted to a 
process of discovery of institutions and measures best suited to the particular 
circumstances at a given point in time, similar to the way Hayek conceived of the 
market as a process of discovery. Hayek was unable to answer the question of how, 
based on a pessimistic view of the capacity of the human mind, one could be 
sceptical of rational and conscious designs for interventions in the market and at 
the same time advocate measures that hamper the process of rewriting and 
rediscovering politics in the parliamentary sphere. If it was true that social structure 
and the structure of interest conflicts changed over time, certain redistributive 
measures might be necessary at one point even if they may later become unjustified 
(and vice versa).92 Constitutional instruments that preclude redistribution and 
innovation in social welfare would then be a dangerous choice, and indeed one that 
is based on what Hayek himself called the ‘pretence of knowledge’, hampering the 
introduction of new redistributive measures that may be rendered appropriate or 
even necessary by future social conflicts whose prediction lies beyond the capacity 
of the human mind.93 
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  Both Dahrendorf’s and Hayek’s liberalism were thus based on a form of 
epistemic modesty. The claim that no single institution could process sufficient 
amounts of economic information was central to Hayek’s advocacy of the market 
over centrally planned economies. Similarly, Dahrendorf’s writings emphasized 
the uncertainty of human knowledge. In fact, both Dahrendorf and Hayek quoted 
Popper to make these points.94 For Dahrendorf, the uncertain nature of human 
knowledge was a strong reason to oppose rigid constitutional settlements that 
constrained the freedom of political decision-making: ‘We are assuming that 
nobody knows or can know what form of social order is ultimately satisfactory, 
good, just’.95 By contrast, Hayek’s epistemic modesty aimed at limiting the state’s 
remit of making decisions on behalf of individuals. Unlike Dahrendorf, Hayek 
assumed that it could be established that certain political orders were more just than 
others, judging by the extent to which they respected individual liberty and the rule 
of law. In different ways, both of their liberalisms were non-interventionist. 
Hayek’s liberalism was geared at safeguarding individual freedom from state 
interference. Dahrendorf, by contrast, sought to safeguard the political process as 
such from prejudicial interferences that would intensify social conflict and, by 
removing the parliamentary safety valve for interest politics, making political 
violence and revolutions more likely. 
  Buchanan and Tullock in turn based their ‘hope for some “improvement”’ 
on persuading interest groups to at least partially consent to stricter constitutional 
rules that, while hampering their own ability to pursue special interest politics, 
would ultimately help them profit from the fact that all other groups were similarly 
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restricted, thus leading to a situation that was ultimately better for everyone.96 
Conceptually, the public choice theorists were able to entertain this hope because 
they assumed that the degree to which politics was characterized by special interest 
politics was a variable rather than a given. On this point, they directly challenged 
what they perceived as the social scientific consensus of their day, namely that ‘[i]n 
recent years the role of the pressure or special-interest group in democratic political 
process has come to be more widely accepted as inevitable’.97 In contrast to this 
view, they argued that the dominance of interest groups was a consequence of the 
growth of government.98 If government could be cut back, interest politics would 
diminish as well. Buchanan and Tullock did not argue that it was the task of social 
scientists to alter the political behaviour of citizens. In an essay appended to The 
Calculus of Consent, Buchanan argued that economists, social scientists, and 
political theorists ‘should take his human actors as he finds them’ and not engage 
in normative prescriptions as to what their political action should look like.99 This 
was a curious statement in the light of the fact that altering political behaviour was 
the central intention of their constitutional recommendations. 
  Given his materialist methodological preconceptions about the role of 
‘objective interests’ in governing political behaviour, these were assumptions that 
Dahrendorf was incapable of entertaining. In direct contrast to Hayek, he thought 
that there was an ‘inherent logic of process’ in the development of citizenship rights 
over the course of the past centuries. He repeated this thought, taken from T.H. 
Marshall, at a prominent point at the very beginning of the introduction of his 
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unpublished essay on ‘Markt, Macht und Recht’.100 In analogy to Keynes’ theorem 
about sticky real wages, Dahrendorf claimed that citizenship rights were ‘sticky ... 
Once citizenship has advanced to a certain point, the probability is that it will stay 




  The present and the previous chapter have studied Dahrendorf’s critiques 
of neoconservatism and neoliberalism as they developed in a changing intellectual 
context in which the focus of the social sciences shifted from sociological towards 
cultural and ideal political themes. Between the late 1960s and early 1980s, the 
notion that the process of modernization was much more contingent than had 
previously been recognized became increasingly accepted by a growing number of 
scholars. Taken together, the two chapters constitute one whole: the collapse of 
modernization theory and the post-war methodological consensus from the later 
1960s and early 1970s onwards on the one hand and the rise of market-oriented 
liberalism in the following years on the other were two sides of the same coin. The 
liberal tradition that ran from Mises, Lippmann, and Robbins in the inter-war 
period to Hayek and Friedman in the post-war period insisted that bureaucratization 
was not an irremediable part of modernity, and that the problem of economic 
inefficiency and infringements on individual liberty by big organizations could be 
solved if only the role of the state in the market was rolled back. As surveyed in 
Chapter V, in contrast to many other scholars, Dahrendorf’s thematic focus did not 
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change radically in reaction to the student movement. This continuity coloured his 
reception of neoliberalism – he continued to view bureaucratization as an integral 
part of modernity and to treat politics as closely connected to social structure. For 
him, interests continued to trump ideas in politics. Modern societies, irrespective 
of whether they were industrial or post-industrial, heavily constrained individual 
freedom of choice. The point that social structure constrained politics and rendered 
political ideas relating to previous structures anachronistic was what Dahrendorf 
had in mind when he criticized Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, Nozick, and Olson 
for their ‘lacking sense of history’ in early 1986.102 The relation between 
bureaucratization and modernity also occupied a very prominent place in The 
Modern Social Conflict (1988).103 During the same year, he even criticized Popper 
for failing to take into account the problem that bureaucracy posed to the theory of 
democracy. Reacting to Popper’s article in The Economist in April 1988, 
mentioned in Chapter II, which made the case that majoritarian voting systems 
were preferable to proportional systems, Dahrendorf argued that this view 
overestimated ‘the importance of changes in government personnel’ in a society in 
which policy decisions were increasingly taken within the bureaucracy rather than 
the government.104 Designing voting systems in a way that made radical changes 
of government easier than in proportional systems was harmful, as it would give 
the population the impression that their lives were much more dependent on 
bureaucratic servants who ‘cannot be dislodged’.105 Yet another decade later, 
Dahrendorf advocated establishing institutions for so-called ‘counter-experts’ who 
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could act as checks and balances on the rule of experts in areas in the international 
sphere in which democratic legitimacy was difficult to achieve because of the 
‘highly technical questions’ that decision-makers had to deal with.106 By this time, 
however, fortunes had turned. It was no longer widely assumed that the range of 
choices open to individuals and societies as a whole were severely limited. In the 
political imaginations dominating this period, the future was open and contingent. 
In contrast to the post-war period, it was Dahrendorf who now stood outside the 
mainstream of the social sciences. 
  Apart from short essays and fragments that survived among his papers, 
Dahrendorf never wrote an exhaustive synthesis of his critique of neoliberalism. 
This raises the question of how important engaging with neoliberalism really was 
to him. If he really cared that much about the neoliberal challenge to his own 
conception of liberalism as this chapter suggests, why did he not finish the ‘Market, 
Power, and Law’ project? It is impossible to provide an exhaustive answer to this 
question based on the available evidence. However, after his move into politics in 
October 1967, it was not at all out of character for Dahrendorf to begin working on 
academic projects that he eventually abandoned. Life Chances (1979), arguably the 
most substantial publication that he produced after his political career, was 
intended as a methodological preliminary that would introduce the theme of the 
larger and unfinished ‘Contradictions of Modernity’ project. More importantly, in 
the mid-1980s he faced an intellectual problem that made producing an exhaustive 
critique of neoliberalism a challenging endeavour. While arguing that the attempt 
to re-write the social contract through imposing stringent constitutional limits was 
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dangerous, Dahrendorf conceded that the social contract needed to be rewritten. He 
also conceded to be hard pressed to say what constitutional reforms were in fact 
needed. As he wrote in December 1986 while based at the Russell Sage Foundation 
in New York: ‘It is not yet clear to see who will have an interest in making liberal 
rejuvenation their task.’107 In other words, what social groups had an interest in 
seeking constitutional renewal? What developments could bring politics back in 
line with social structure? In an age in which social conflict ran along the lines of 
the ‘underclass’ and the ‘majority class’, there was little hope for a vigorous reform 
movement of those who had an ‘objective interest’ in change.  
  For Dahrendorf, this was a dilemma since he assumed that he could only 
produce recommendations for constitutional politics if he had an understanding of 
the social-structural context for which a constitutional settlement had to be found. 
In the research proposal submitted in January 1986 mentioned above, Dahrendorf 
professed his intention to ‘concentrate on the points at which social analysis and 
political theory can inspire each other. The two never meet; statements of fact and 
value remain forever divided. But they can be related...’.108 In the same vein, he 
criticized Hayek’s The Fatal Conceit for having no concern for reality.109 His 
problems were exacerbated by the fact that in contrast to the post-war period, he 
could no longer draw on the works of a large number of other social scientists who 
were interested in similar questions. To his mind, many issues were still waiting to 
be investigated and translated into political theory. It was not uncharacteristic that 
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the last sentence of one of Dahrendorf’s books produced during the decade ended 
with the statement that answers to the questions of the day had yet to be found.110 
In Reisen nach Innen und Außen (1984), he recounted how he had received 
numerous letters asking for concrete remedies after publishing an article on the 
underclass in DIE ZEIT. Notwithstanding the demands of his contemporaries, he 
stated that all he could offer for the time being was ‘ruthless analysis’.111 In this 
way, it is not surprising that he never produced a synthesis of his thoughts on 
neoliberalism that would include not only a critique, but also a positive alternative. 
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  This thesis has sought to provide an interpretation of Dahrendorf’s liberal 
political thought through a close study of the methodological ideas and 
commitments that he developed and expressed over the course of his academic and 
political career between the early 1950s and late 1980s. Situating Dahrendorf in the 
context of longstanding debates about modernity in German social thought, it has 
sought to establish a hitherto neglected connection between his materialist method 
and his agonistic liberalism. This remained central to his thinking about politics 
throughout his entire career.  
  In the aftermath of the First World War, insisting on the inevitability of 
modernity’s unpleasant corollaries formed a central part of liberal rhetoric, finding 
expression in the political writings Max Weber, Friedrich Naumann, Joseph 
Schumpeter, Ernst Troeltsch, and Friedrich Meinecke. These arguments soon 
became challenged by other intellectuals, many of which later developed sympathy 
for National Socialism, which came to be seen as a movement that could reverse 
bureaucratization and alienation, and act freely irrespective of constraints 
associated with modernity. After the Second World War, the fortunes of this 
perspective waned. In fact, many intellectuals who had sympathized with Nazism 
now came to insist on modernity’s irremediable character, prominently Helmut 
Schelsky, Arnold Gehlen, and Hans Freyer. At the time, members of the Frankfurt 
School and other critics of empirical research criticized this outlook, insisting on 
the contingency of a modernity that could in fact be changed. In contrast to the 
claims of the existing literature, this was the origin of the debates that subsequently 




however, a shift in the opposite direction took place. Reacting against the student 
movement, scholars such as Daniel Bell or Samuel Huntington in the United States 
and Thomas Nipperdey or Wilhelm Hennis in the Federal Republic started to put 
culture at the centre of their research. Individual agency and historical contingency 
again came to be seen as highly significant (Chapter V). 
  Dahrendorf’s political thought developed in this context. In his youth and 
early career, he espoused political socialism and held a much more radical political 
outlook than previous commentators have allowed for. This was combined with a 
decidedly materialist reading of history, an orientation that he retained throughout 
his life and which heavily impacted his political theory. Influenced by Karl Marx, 
Karl Mannheim, Karl Renner, and Theodor Geiger, Dahrendorf’s liberalism rested 
on the assumption that the political behaviour of groups and individuals had to be 
accepted as a given. Opposing political projects that sought to change how voters 
and citizens acted, Dahrendorf advocated a version of liberalism that emphasized 
the importance of constitutional settlements that facilitate the pursuit of interest 
politics in parliamentary settings. Channelling interests democratically was 
supposed to prevent the escalation of social conflicts into violence and revolution, 
which he thought was likely to occur if the pursuit of interest in politics was 
suppressed. This put him at fundamental odds with Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, or 
even Friedrich Hayek, who all considered ideas to trump interests in politics 
(Chapter II). 
  During the debates that had prompted the Positivism Dispute, advocates 
of empirical sociology like Schelsky and Gehlen argued that the sociological 
discipline and universities more generally had to adapt to the realities of modern 




the importance of administration in public life grew, universities had to facilitate 
exchange between politics and research and educate a new cohort of administrators 
for a society in which bureaucratic decision-making was becoming increasingly 
dominant. Dahrendorf agreed with the broader methodological spin of these 
arguments. In the debates held in the Foundation Committee of the University of 
Constance between 1964 and 1966, he advocated giving the university a new 
character that abandoned the allegedly dominant idealist type modelled on Wilhelm 
von Humboldt’s University of Berlin. Facing the opposition of Joachim Ritter on 
the Foundation Committee, Dahrendorf strove to establish a university where 
scholars could study social structure in a way that he thought was not possible at 
the Federal Republic’s older universities, which he took to be dominated by 
scholars who treated society and politics as phenomena to be studied 
philosophically. He also attempted to challenge the centrality of law faculties to the 
formation of the Federal Republic’s elite, which he had highlighted in Society and 
Democracy in Germany (1965). With this methodological programme at its outset, 
Constance paralleled the foundation of the University of Bielefeld, where Schelsky 
played a similarly central role (Chapter IV). 
  Despite his methodological agreement with advocates of technocratic 
visions of politics during the Positivism Dispute and his broad agreement with 
Schelsky on university reform, Dahrendorf fundamentally disagreed with their 
positive view of bureaucracy. Even though he accepted bureaucratization as an 
irremediable part of modernity, he nevertheless found himself ‘in despair’ facing 
the consequences that he thought increasingly bureaucratic politics entailed for the 
prospect of liberty. Both in his academic work and his political statements, he 




vis-à-vis parliaments and voters. From his Habilitation lecture in Summer 1957 at 
the University of Saarland onwards, his sociological writings repeatedly criticized 
Max Weber’s ideal of value-freedom for its alleged affinity with the ideology of 
bureaucracy (Chapter III). 
  The last two chapters of this thesis have had two aims. Covering 
Dahrendorf’s intellectual engagement with neoconservatism (Chapter V) and 
neoliberalism (Chapter VI), this part has also made a more general argument about 
the history of the social sciences and liberal political thought in Germany and 
beyond in the second half of the twentieth century. 
  From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, historians have been 
puzzled by the degree to which twentieth-century theorists based their ideas on the 
conception of inexorable social trends. Thus, Stefan Eich and Adam Tooze criticize 
Weber for an alleged ahistorical outlook in which ‘[h]istory is no longer a 
contingent and open-ended process’.1 By arguing that certain aspects of political 
life (such as the violent character of state power) were invariably present 
throughout history, they argue, Weber failed to recognize that history at certain 
times entailed profound novelty.2 In a second step, Eich and Tooze contrast 
Weber’s work with that of Troeltsch and Meinecke, who are said to have 
recognized that history is a contingent process.3 In this reading, Weber emerges as 
a misguided political theorist as a consequence of his misguided methodological 
orientation. Chapter I of this thesis has shown that drawing this contrast between 
Weber on the hand and Meinecke and Troeltsch on the other does not capture the 
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complexity of any of these theorists.4 Both Meinecke and Weber, as we have seen, 
treated bureaucratization as an inevitable aspect of modernity. Troeltsch employed 
a similar rhetoric of inevitability in his political writings as Weber did. 
  The methodological outlook exemplified by Eich and Tooze has become 
widely accepted among historians of Germany over the last two decades. 
Christopher Clark for instance draws on Georg Jellinek’s concept of the ‘normative 
power of the factual’ to make the case that previous historians have been too 
concerned with uncovering the causes of the First World War, leading them to 
downplay contingency and the degree to which the future was open – rather than 
pre-determined – before the July Crisis of 1914.5 Likewise, commenting on the 
Weimar Republic’s fiscal policy during the inflation years around 1923, Niall 
Ferguson castigates the existence of an alleged ‘determinist consensus’.6 Arguing 
that alternative policy paths were in fact open during the inflation, Ferguson argues 
that it is ‘condescending to the past to suggest that people at the time had no free 
will; that they were the helpless “objects” of impersonal “structural” forces over 
which they had no control.’7 Today, such revisionist interpretations abound.8 
Almost forty years after Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn criticized Dahrendorf 
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for his alleged determinism and Nipperdey sought to reorient historiography in 
reaction to the student movement, their perspective has become a new consensus.9  
  It is the great merit of this new consensus that it recognizes that a 
fundamental methodological shift took place over the course of the second half of 
the twentieth century, which has resulted in scholars placing stronger emphasis on 
historical contingency. In this respect it is superior to the secondary literature on 
Dahrendorf that has portrayed him as a Popperian liberal or even a ‘Cold War 
liberal’.10 As we have seen in the Introduction, Gangolf Hübinger has described 
Dahrendorf as part of an intellectual tradition that he lauded for its recognition of 
historical contingency, a reading that this thesis hopes to dispel.11 However, this 
thesis suggests that the new historiographical consensus itself rests on an ahistorical 
reading of twentieth-century German intellectual history, one that overlaps with the 
ahistorical narratives that form the basis of the writings of Hayek and Popper. 
Instead of asking why mid-century theorists were so oriented towards structures 
and necessity, this thesis turns this question on its head and asks why this 
orientation was supplanted by novel methodological commitments after the early 
1970s. Once the question is altered, a new perspective emerges: the post-war social 
scientific paradigm within which Dahrendorf worked and developed his 
perspective on the nature of politics did not decline because of its inherent 
contradictions, as is implied by contemporary scholarship. Instead, this thesis 
suggests that the thematic shift away from socio-economic aspects towards culture 
and ideas that took place in history and the social sciences was rooted in a political 
reaction to contemporary events, most importantly the student movement. By the 
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time Dahrendorf travelled to Kyoto in May 1975 to comment on the Trilateral 
Commission’s ‘Report on the Governability of Democracies’, the report’s 
diagnosis of a so-called cultural crisis had become a commonplace (Chapter V). 
  Over the following years, this shift profoundly altered the thematic focus 
of the social sciences and the structure of liberal political thought. The neoliberal 
reform programme that gained widespread acceptance during the later 1970s and 
1980s was centrally underpinned by the argument that bureaucracy, large-scale 
monopolies, and cartels were contingent rather than inherent aspects of modernity. 
As the post-war social-scientific paradigms fell apart in reaction to the student 
movement and the political-economic crises of the 1970s, belief in the 
predictability of social processes disintegrated. Once this theoretical shift had 
happened, politics became an open field of possibilities, freed from the constraints 
of the post-war consensus – the future was no longer a field governed by 
probabilistic causality. The new versions of liberalism that now gained widespread 
currency operated with a wider horizon of expectations that differed fundamentally 
from the consensus liberalism of the post-war period, of which Dahrendorf’s 
liberalism was one variant.12 In contrast to many of his intellectual interlocutors, 
his political interventions in these decades evidenced a much greater deal of 
continuity in terms of thinking about the constraints with which he thought politics 
to be confronted. However, by this point, this argument had lost the persuasiveness 
that it had carried in previous decades (Chapter VI). 
  It may be reasonably said that while this interpretation helps to resolve 
many questions surrounding Dahrendorf, it also raises a new one. That is, why did 
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someone who argued that the political behaviour of both groups and individuals 
depended on the ‘binding character of natural forces’ become so engaged in the 
public spheres of the Federal Republic, Britain, and the United States? This 
apparent contradiction is only surprising if his materialist-inspired agonistic 
liberalism and philosophy of science is presented as determinist, as Eley and 
Blackbourn as well as Stuart Hampshire have done.  
  The argument put forward here is different. Those aspects of public life 
that Dahrendorf insisted had to be accepted as given in politics provided a 
framework that constrained the meaningful range of action, but, within this 
framework, diverging options and routes were still possible. In fact, his decision to 
enter politics in October 1967 was prompted by his fear of the consequences of the 
rise of what he, following Renner, called the ‘service class society’. The rise of 
bureaucracy and expert-led politics was to a very considerable degree inevitable, 
but this did not mean that genuine political action was completely impossible. The 
realities of modern industrial society provided a bounded field within which 
political decisions could take place. His worst fears were reserved for the 
potentially disastrous consequences of utopian versions of politics gaining 
acceptance that ignored the realities that he thought all developed societies were 
facing. This impulse, first evident in his critique of idealist interpretations of Marx 
in the early 1950s, still animated him during the 1980s when he criticized Margaret 
Thatcher’s politics. His political engagement was instead motivated to ensure that 
social structure and politics did not drift apart. Politics needed to remain open: his 
rejection of strong constitutions, presented in Chapter VI, was connected to his fear 




and altering political landscapes characterized by new social conflicts and shifting 
frontiers between interest groups.  
  Dahrendorf was aware that his theoretical formulations sometimes 
clashed with our everyday perceptions of how politics works. While his 
sociological theory suggested that rigid causalities were at play in society, he 
recognized that experience often suggested otherwise. However, he was adamant 
that common-sense experience of individual cases must not distract from the fact 
that when examined at a higher level, politics was subject to regularities that put 
individual cases in a different light: this was why sociology needed an ideal-typical 
concept of a ‘Homo Sociologicus’, in analogy to those employed by economists 
and psychologists. In individual instances, regularities could be broken, but for the 
sake of science behaviour had to be formulated causally. Until the publication of 
Life Chances in 1979, Dahrendorf struggled to theoretically conceptualize 
structural causality. Given that he differentiated between science (formulating 
general laws) and common sense (confronted with individuality), it is not 
surprising that he frequently engaged in politics and political debate during his 
career.  
  Indeed, the perception of a tension between Dahrendorf’s methodological 
commitments and his active politics seems to point towards a misapprehension of 
historical materialism. Not unlike Dahrendorf, Marx also took an active part in the 
politics of his day. This also applied to other members of the intellectual networks 
discussed in this thesis. While it is easy to misconstrue the meaning of Schelsky’s 
statement that sociology ought to ‘make visible that which is happening anyway 
and cannot be changed’, he also occupied himself with practical politics.13 
                                                 




Moreover, while he did see some social trends as inexorable, this did not apply 
across the board. In this vein, his Sociology of Sexuality (1955) criticized biological 
interpretations that considered human sexuality to be determined by nature. 
Instead, he argued that sexuality was to a considerable extent a cultural product.14 
Similarly, Hans-Ulrich Wehler criticized modernization theorists for their failure 
to recognize that history and modernity were more diverse than the experiences of 
a few western countries.15 By demonstrating Germany’s divergence from the 
trajectories of modernization in the United States, France, and Britain, his  attempt 
to make sense of its diverging path was motivated to highlight modernity’s 
diversity. For him, recognizing diversity as well as structures was not a 
contradiction. In this way, Schelsky and Wehler were both more nuanced theorists 
than subsequent commentators have allowed for – theirs was not a global 
metaphysical determinism.16  
  The same was true in Dahrendorf’s case. Situating him in the context of 
this debate about structure and contingency in twentieth-century German scholarly 
circles, this thesis presses the case that his generation’s adamant insistence on 
structures, necessity, and the importance of socio-economic issues has to be set into 
the perspective of its rejection of interwar emphases on culture and contingency by 
conservative intellectuals, some of which welcomed National Socialism as the 
political vehicle that could break the perceived iron cage of serfdom. By making 
this emphasis, Dahrendorf and other adherents of the post-war liberal consensus, 
like Fritz Stern, Hajo Holborn, or Leonard Krieger, made a conscious political 
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effort to contain the political influence of culture and contingency-oriented 
conceptions of society that had prompted the previous generation to opt for political 
extremism in the hope that it offered a way out of a modernity dominated by 
rationality, technology, and bureaucracy. This involved making a conscious value 
judgement in favour of material over cultural political questions. In this, they 
resembled the liberal generation of Weber, Naumann, Schumpeter, Troeltsch, and 
Meinecke, who had opted for a similar rhetoric of inevitability (while placing much 
more emphasis on the importance of culture). While Dahrendorf shared some of 
the concerns about technocracy that the interwar generation of conservatives had 
entertained, his liberalism barred him from opting for the solutions that they had 
advocated. As a consequence, his liberalism remained a despairing one that was 
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